All wars have causes; some have pretexts. When Polybios (6. 6. 1–7. 3) distinguishes between the cause, the pretext, and the beginning of war, his language sounds curiously modern. When he summarizes the causes of the Second Punic War the modern reader is not so satisfied. The war was due, in his opinion, to the indignation of Hamilcar Barca, who had to accept peace when he could have continued fighting in Sicily; to the anger of the Carthaginians, when they were forced to surrender Sardinia; and to the good fortune which attended their armies in Spain. A more recent account differs from Polybios not only on matters of detail. ‘It is true that it was Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, undertaken in full knowledge of the almost inevitable consequences, that precipitated the war, but the historian must decide that, so far as attack and defence have a meaning in the clash between states, the balance of aggression must incline against Rome.’

Jebb renders the last clause as follows: ‘The warrior of the white shield, who came from Argos in his panoply, hath been stirred by thee to headlong flight, in swifter career.’ ‘In swifter career’ is a discreet rendering of ., Jebb says, ‘does not mean (1) “in flight swifter than their former approach“ nor (2) “the reins are shaken ever faster on the horses' necks”.’ ‘The Argives’, he writes, ‘began their retreat in the darkness (cf. 16): when the sun rises, the flashing steel of their bridles shows them in headlong flight’. Cf. P. Mazon, R.E.G. xxv (1951), 13. This view is shared by all modern scholars, except that Dain and Mazon put commas after and translate accordingly; which I do not think is an improvement.

A Principle of fundamental importance, if it is valid, for the interpretation of the Pentekontaetia is laid down by the authors of A. T.L. iii in its most rigorous terms: it is that Thucydides has set events ‘in proper order … without any deviation whatever’. The conclusion appears to the present writer to be founded ultimately on a false assumption about Thucydides' purpose in these chapters (89-118. 2), namely that he set out to write an outline history of the period of fifty years to which he refers in 118.2 and, in effect, in 97. An examination of these passages reveals that it is not the outline of a period as a period that is offered, but rather the account of a particular theme or process falling within the period: his purpose in presenting the theme there defined is to be seen from the setting of the excursus as a unit in Bk. I rather than from the statement in 97.2: the due significance of this last, and of the demarcation of a period in 118. 2, is to be seen only in this wider context.

It has long been known that two medieval scholiasts, one of them called John of Sicily, the other anonymous, commenting on a passage of Hermogenes' , ascribe what looks like a passage of the de Sublimitate to ‘Longinus’. On the assumption, however, that the ‘Longinus’ referred to must be Cassius Longinus, the third-century rhetorician, scholars have tended to minimize the vweight of the evidence and attempted to explain it away. For it is now established that the de Sublimitate must date from the first century A.D. Yet, apart from the identity of ‘Longinus’, the evidence of the scholiasts looks clear and specific.

The article of Dr. Wasserstein, ‘The Manuscript-tradition of Statius'; Siluae’, C.Q. N.s. iii (1953), 69–78, causes me to revert once again to the question I treated twice in Philologus Ixvi (1907), 85–134; lxxxii (1927), 167–180. In the first place I must refer to a frequent slip of the pen which occurs, for example, in the 414 verses of the Culex thrice, viz.:

MR. MARTIN seems to have misread my table. He professes to summarize its last two rows, but he has got the last but one all wrong, and the last he omits altogether. My last row but one signifies: In the matter of a following disyllabic thesis Phaedria, Pamphilĕ, and Parmenō behave exactly alike: no argument here either for or against Phaedriā. The last row speaks plainly: If Phaedria were a cretic, we should expect to find it used as a cretic at least six times. Mr. Martin had found it so used once, and I noted that this one example was in fact an ablative–a strange coincidence. But this was not, as Mr. Martin says, the only ‘error’ of which I ‘convicted’ him. I also, and primarily, pointed out that what he called ‘the significant thing’, viz. that the scansion Phaedriâ was never inevitable, held no significance whatever, since all dactylic words were in the same case.

The complete, or almost complete, absence from the Theaetetus of any unequivocal reference to Platonic Forms is a problem, the solution of which appeared to many scholars to have been found and convincingly presented in the late Professor Gornford's book Plato's Theory of Knowledge, published in 1935. Put briefly, his contention was that the main purpose of the dialogue is to show that no acceptable definition of knowledge can be reached if the Forms are left out of account, that there are a number of passages in which any reader of the middle dialogues would see that they were deliberately being left out of account, and one or two, namely in the famous digression on the philosophic life, and in the discussion of ‘common terms’ , where they are actually brought in, though not indeed under the name of

Little progress has been made in classifying the manuscript tradition of Livy's First Decade since Frigell published his Livianorum Librorum Primae Decadis Emendandae Ratio (1875). This laid the foundations of a serious analysis of the manuscripts, but was hampered by the fact that full evidence was not available at that date. The deficiency was made good by the Oxford editors, who, however, failed to make use of their evidence to explore in detail the inter relation of the manuscripts. Walters indeed disclaims its importance (C.Q. ii [1908], p. 213): ‘Further in stemmata-making I decline to go, for “stemmata quid faciunt?” except much stereotyped mischief.’

The Lex Plotia Agraria is known to us only by name through a single reference in one of Cicero's letters, from which we can extract nothing more than a terminus ante quern and a very general notion of its probable scope. Gabba in a short article, after reviewing the different hypotheses about this law, decided in favour of a suggestion put forward originally by Zumpt, that it belongs probably to the year 70/69 B.C.; and identifying it with a law referred to in a passage of Dio, he argued that the law was passed on behalf of Pompey's and Metellus Pius' veterans of the Spanish war. Following a suggestion of Niccolini he identified Plotius with the Plotius, tribune 70/69 B.C., who was responsible for the Lex Plotia de reditu Lepidanorum, and the date of his tribunate he put in 70 B.C. With Gabba's reasoning and general conclusions the present writer is in agreement, namely, that the law belongs to 70/69 B.C., and aimed at providing land for the veterans of Pompey and Metellus; the object of this note is to draw attention to a piece of evidence which has hitherto been strangely neglected, and to draw some possible inferences about the scope and fate of the law.

Despite the long controversy on the date and composition of the First Philippic, we are no nearer, it would seem, to a satisfactory solution. F. Focke, apparently following a suggestion in Gercke-Norden, developed what is perhaps the most reasonable presentation of the view that the speech was delivered in the spring of 350 B.C.; but what vitiates his argument in the long run is Focke's constant presumption that all the various datable references must belong to one and the same speech or stratum of composition. For although the view of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that the First Philippic really comprises two distinct speeches, has not in its extreme form won acceptance with modern scholars, other more moderate solutions are not impossible; and it would seem that Blass's revision theory (for which Werner Jaeger has expressed sympathy) suggests a more subtle way of handling the various inconsistencies between the first (§§ 1–29) and the second (30–50) parts of the speech.

A Previous article made a linguistic study of municeps. The present examines the Roman discussions of the word. I hope further to discuss the definitions of Verrius Flaccus, the history of the ius, and the juridical concept.

Roman historical and legal discussion of municeps is to be found in the Digest (50. 1. 1, Ulpian), in the Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius (16. 13), and in the De verborum significatu of Sextus Pompeius Festus (p. 126 L.) and its epitome by Paulus (pp. 117 and 155 L.). It comprises legal definitions, which must have had at least contemporary validity, historical definitions of what the word meant at different periods in its history, and the citation of precedents with or without historical detail. Of these the last two are the most important.

The purpose of this paper is to protest against the opinion that Catullus' Elegiacs are careless and uncouth. It will be shown that in many details his metre resembles that of the Augustan Elegists, and then it will be argued that some of the points in which Catullus differs from the Augustans are signs not of incompetence or indifference but of a deliberate adjustment of metre to content

Probably no part of the Iliad has given rise to more discussion than the apparent contradiction between Books 9 and 16. In the former, Agamemnon's embassy offers Achilles the restoration of Briseis and ‘handsome gifts’ in recompense for taking her: in the latter Achilles tells Patroklos to obey his battle-orders exactly, ‘so that you may win me great renown and glory from all the Danaans, and they shall restore the lovely damsel and also give splendid gifts’ —just as though he had not refused precisely these things only the night before

Inc.Q,., N.S. v (1955), i76ff., Mr. A. E. Harvey discusses the problem presented by the first ten lines of the first column of the Berlin Papyrus of Corinna, and finds the solution in the region of erroneous colometry. So far as I can judge, he is justified in claiming that he has offered ‘the most concise and satisfactory explanation of the irregularities’; but, if so, there is one further step which should be taken, and there is one obscurity in his account which should be clarified

O. A. W. Dilke (Proc. Class. Assoc. liii [1956], 30 f.) disapproves of the reading uergens advocated by me in C.Q., NS. iv [1954], 188 f., retains uertens of the better manuscripts translating ‘and Fortune did not take long to change the balance of so many weights’, and, citing for the use of diu Sen. Contr. 2. 3. 10 ‘si non impetro ut uiuam, hoc certe impetrem ne diu moriar’, asks ‘How is this not a parallel?’ Others too have not hesitated to ascribe a similar use to diu. The difficulty is that to which I briefly referred in C.Q,., I.e. The adverb diu is appropriate only with verbs representing a continuous or protracted action: e.g. morior may represent such an action, and it does so in Sen., I.e.—the speaker prays for exemption from a protracted death and diu retains its characteristic sense.