The ‘Spartan legend’ as a research problem was formulated back in the nineteenth century (see E.G. Tigerstedt, The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity [1965], vol. I, p. 310 n. 2). Since the 1930s this topic has been explicitly or indirectly present in almost every discourse devoted to the history of ancient Sparta. Modern research into any aspect of Lacedaemon history encounters a ‘Spartan mirage’ and very often turns into another attempt to ‘expose’ the legend.
According to the preface, the main purpose of the book is ‘to compare Sparta's actual battlefield record with the legend of its military superiority’ (p. 9). This is another attempt to remove the false ‘clothes’ from the Spartans and present them in a ‘naked’ form. True, the title of the book is alarming: without wavering, C. makes the word ‘lie’ a key term of his work. However, it is obvious that the phenomenon, which due to F. Ollier is called the ‘Spartan mirage’, is complex in its origins, structure, content and specific incarnations in different historical conditions. Calling this phenomenon ‘lie’ simplifies the problem. Why does C., deeply immersed in the topic, do this? My subsequent text is an attempt to answer this question.
The book is divided into three parts. Part 1, ‘The Myth of Sparta’, is a short introduction serving as an ideological manifesto, where C. states that his task is to destroy the lie of the military superiority of the Spartans and strike at laconophilia (sic) which underlies modern ‘toxic masculinity’. C. calls himself a genuine warrior of truth: ‘Truth is perhaps the greatest weapon we have. And it's a weapon I will gladly use’ (p. 20).
Part 2, ‘The Reality of Sparta’, is the most informative and largest section of the book. In seven chapters C. gives a consistent overview of the Spartan military experience in individual wars and battles (from Lycurgus’ mythical past and the Messenian Wars to the Battle of Mantinea in 207 bce); the eighth chapter serves as a conclusion, in which C. summarises his insights about such aspects as discipline, manpower crisis, scouting and reconnaissance, siegecraft, corruption, winning by trickery and diplomacy etc.
Part 3, ‘Tangling Myth and Reality’, consists of a single chapter, in which C. returns to the discourse of the introduction and again attacks laconophilia. In the end, C. expresses the hope that he has managed to present the Spartans in a more human image. The book is provided with two appendices (historiography and fundamentals of ancient battle), a glossary, a bibliography, an index, plates and a table ‘The Spartan record’.
C.'s expert knowledge of tactics and military equipment is obvious. The undoubted advantage of this book is that C. has real military experience. As for the ancient tactics, he achieves his goals. His book will resonate with fans of war games and any reader interested in ancient military history topics. This is fascinating reading for beginners in military history, as the book provides an accessible overview of a large period.
C.'s task is not to investigate the question of how the legend of Spartan militarism developed and on what real historical basis it functioned. C.'s task is simpler: to refute the heroic image of the Spartan army in the face of a very specific audience – sofa strategists – as well as to strike at people with laconophilia, whose quintessence is the film 300, overflowing with historical absurdities.
So, C.'s supertask is to crush the image of the Spartan superwarrior. What technique does C. use? To begin with, this Hollywood term ‘superwarriors’ does not find any analogies in the original ‘Spartan legend’. Quite the contrary, Herodotus (7.104) puts into the mouth of Demaratus the idea that the Spartans, taken by themselves, are not superior to other Greeks.
The methodological defect is manifested in C.'s inconsistent treatment of sources. For instance, he expresses caution about the Hellenistic sources of Pausanias’ description (p. 65). But when C. analyses some battles of the Messenian Wars, he treats Pausanias’ text uncritically. C. uses the text that, in fact, is a Messenian saga as if it was an eyewitness view. This strangeness I can explain by only one thing: Pausanias’ text gives a lot of opportunities to convince readers that the Spartans and their kings constantly showed cowardice and meanness, and that militarily they were not stronger, but more often weaker than the Messenians. Vice versa, when the source's statements contradict C.'s theory, he easily gets out of the situation with phrases like: ‘This is, of course, utter hogwash’ (p. 78) or ‘that I just can't believe’ (p. 148) and offers his own speculative interpretation (examples of rationalisation: pp. 78, 86–7, 94, 96, 103, 133 and passim).
C. does not give references to the sources he uses. And C. rarely mentions the names of his predecessors. At the same time, the bibliography is very representative, although selective (almost entirely Anglophone).
C. consistently deprives the Spartans of the virtues attributed to them along different lines: inability to take cities; greed and cowardice, inherent in the Spartans; religious hypocrisy etc. By drawing these lines C. collects any direct evidence and indirect hints from sources that confirm his postulate.
In the story of the Battle of Plataea C. diligently inspires readers with the idea that Pausanias, the commander of the united Greek army, showed elementary cowardice (pp. 163–4). The fact that C. does this in an assumed form does not change the essence of the matter: the whole reconstruction proceeds from this assumption. The famous manoeuvre of Pausanias, when he swapped positions with the Athenians twice in broad daylight and in the line of sight of the enemy, C. explains simply: he accepts Herodotus’ words (9.46) that Pausanias ‘was afraid of the Persians’. C. is not confused by the fact that so far Pausanias has demonstrated strategic restraint and has not shown fear. C. shares the version of Herodotus, for whom it was a soldier's battle, the success of which depended on chance. With all that, C. does not allow readers, not burdened with knowledge of specialised literature, to find out that there is another explanation for this episode, according to which these manoeuvres were part of the tactical game of Pausanias, generally typical for Spartan military thinking. In other words, Pausanias seduced Mardonius, trying to make him believe in the low morale of the Spartans and start acting first, leaving a convenient defensive position (cf. J.P. Barron, CAH IV2 [1988], pp. 605–6).
C.'s bias is obvious even in the selection of the battle maps: readers are offered plans for the four most significant Spartan defeats – and not a single victory (p. 13). The schematic, simplified method of presenting the material is determined by C.'s tasks and the kind of audience he addresses in the first place. Since C. does not set himself the task of seriously studying the ‘Spartan military mirage’, but he is going to strike at the primitive image of Spartan warriors existing in Western mass culture, his argumentation does not involve direct references to sources and literature.
Confusing hypotheses with facts, simplifications, the arbitrary nature of the criticism, the one-sidedness of the discussion of historical problems and the total absence of references mean that this volume is likely to have limited use for serious researchers of Spartan history. This is a pity, because C.'s fundamental goal is good – to see real people and glimpses of real society behind the fog of the mirage. Bold and refreshing statements are found throughout, but this does not change the impression of the book.
