Accounting for change is the most vexed problem in the social sciences. In none of these disciplines do we yet have adequate explanations of why and how individuals, social systems, cultures, economies, or polities change — prospering, developing, transforming themselves, stagnating and sometimes succumbing. Yet to account for “historical” change requires just such prior accounts from psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and political science. Furthermore, it involves the even more difficult question of how and why changes in each of these “units” of history affect and are affected by each other. Of all of these complex relationships between individual and social order, between economy and family, between culture and government, and so on, we now have only the most rudimentary models and maps. The problem of accounting for historical change, to which Dr. Wyatt addresses himself in his comments on Dr. Lifton's paper, will therefore not be solved in the near future. Nor will it, I suspect, be solved at all without profound transformations in each of the different fields involved. For truly to account for history will require within each discipline an as-yet-unachieved vision of men as simultaneously psychological individuals, social animals, cultural creatures, historical figures and economic and political men.

The problem of entrepreneurship has been one of the central interests of economic theorists since the industrial revolution. Discussions of the entrepreneur in such theory tended to a large extent to focus upon the basis of entrepreneurship. This argument is typified by Schumpeter's criticism of Marx's handling of the problem of primitive accumulation; Schumpeter argues against the rejection by Marx of superior intelligence and energy as explanatory factors in entrepreneurial success.

Present-day political systems in the nation states of Southeast Asia can be classified in accordance with various criteria; they can, for example, be politically grouped on a spectrum ranging from parliamentary democracy to totalitarian dictatorship. The focus of the present inquiry is the sociology of political elites rather than the forms of polity which these elites have created or helped to create. It deals exclusively with the ruling “national” elites, leaving out of consideration secondary groups, such as territorially- or ethnicallybased local and regional elites, religious leaders, and other traditional elites. Two kinds of “national” elite can be discerned in contemporary Southeast Asia, which we shall call “intelligentsia elites” and “modernizing traditional elites”. Disregarding for the time being the constitutional frameworks and the degree of popular participation of each individual state, it may be said that both elites are in many respects oligarchies.

It was David Hume who said that “a man acquainted with history may in some respect be said to have lived from the beginning of the world”. At the present juncture of time, when various civilizations are in the process of being more and more closely interlinked, it certainly seems desirable for all of us to “have lived from the beginning of the world”. From this springs the necessity for having a theory of universal history which is applicable to the main historical processes in our world. For without such a theory the facts become unmanageable in their complexity and enormous volume; no sort of intellectual comprehension is possible. A theory or philosophy of history has, of course, to be applicable in the same manner as a scientific hypothesis. That is to say, if it cannot explain important processes, it has to be discarded, either entirely, or partially. Unfortunately, this attitude has not prevailed among philosophers of history, who have thought of their theories in the spirit of quasi-religious revelations. The term “philosophy of history” is a fairly recent one, having apparently been introduced by Voltaire in 1756. But there have been philosophers of history of some sort or other from very much earlier times. In this essay one cannot consider all of them, of course.

The consolidation of China did not come immediately with China's unification. It was not fully accomplished until the middle of the Former (Western) Han. The monolithic2 nature of the political powers and a group of local elite3 were then forming. And the bureaucracy, becoming much elaborated during this era, served to link the two. The elite group functioned, on the one hand as the reservoir of candidates to officialdom, and on the other hand, as the leading element with education, prestige, and often wealth, in the community. Based on these concepts, this paper ventures to present the formation of the local elite group through the changing social base of political power during Western Han.

When Dutch rule in Indonesia came to an end in 1950 the new Republic inherited a complex legal system whose main component parts were Dutch criminal and civil law, Adat or customary law and Islamic law. The Dutch legists had been divided in their ideas about what the proper content of “Indies” law should be. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century most jurists favoured the establishment of a positive, unified legal system throughout the Netherlands East Indies, based on modern Dutch law, modified where necessary to suit local conditions. It was anticipated that as education, effective administration and new legislation progressed the authority and operation of the “irregular” or non-Western legal systems would diminish. The non-Western systems of law encompassed regional and tribal customary law, often combined with Islamic law, and the legal usages and practices of the “foreign oriental” minorities, mainly Chinese and Indian.

In the heyday of British imperialism some fifty years ago, when Lord Cromer could find that the empire was “the main title which makes us great”, imperialists were apt to compare the British with the Roman empire and to seek “in the history of imperial Rome for any facts or commentaries gleaned from ancient times which might be of service to the modern empire of which we are so justly proud”.1 A critic of imperialism, J. A. Hobson, sourly remarked of such enterprises that “history devises reasons why the lessons of past empires do not apply to our own”. Prima facie, however, the comparison was encouraging. Both the Romans and the modern imperial powers claimed that it was their purpose to govern in the interests of the subjects; both had undoubtedly established peace and order in a large part of the world; both had extended their own law and their own civilization.

Professor Smith has produced a comprehensive survey1 of the relations between state and religion in India which will be of great value to students of modern Indian government and politics as well as of religion. Moreover, this useful, stimulating and very readable study raises questions of compelling, interest for all who are concerned with problems of “church and state”. India, the seat of a civilization renowned for elaboration of religious thought and pervasiveness of religious observance has, even by Professor Smith's rigorous standards, successfully established a secular state. In this volume, Professor Smith has undertaken to explain how this has come about, to analyze the Indian achievement and the problems that accompany it and, finally, to indicate how India may advance to the full realization of that “true secularism” which he so enthusiastically endorses.

On December 14, 1821 the rebelliously faithful partisans of Louis XVIII, quand meme, finally assumed the office to which their uncontaminated past and heavenly justice entitled them. The power that had at last been gathered into the hands of an ultra ministry resided most of all in the apparatus of the centralized administrative state so often criticized by its new masters. This paper will examine the role and functions of the prefect as the most important local police official and political agent of the ministry at a time when the national administrative machine was operated with authentic Napoleonic rigor by former advocates of decentralization and local autonomies.

This article deals with an important chapter in the economic history of Mexico. Throughout its history Puebla was an industrial center. Well into the 19th century it was the prime center of the country's chief manufacture — textiles. The city became the commercial and industrial capital of New Spain within a few years of its foundation. I shall concentrate on the ways in which the several branches of the textile industry were organized, comparing their development with that of the textile industries of medieval and early industrial Europe.

All major Swiss cities are located north of the Alps. Their development can be understood best as part of the development of the North European cities—those of Germany, Flanders and France—and as part of the communal movement as it developed in those areas. Yet the cities that eventually became Swiss are those that accepted more of the characteristic institutions of Italian city-states than did the rest, and it is this acceptance of certain Italian practices—particularly the creation of a rural territory and thus eventually of a territorial city-state—that made those cities into city Cantons, able to take part in the formation of Switzerland.

Recent interpretations of slavery in the United States suggest that we may be entering a new phase of scholarship on slavery as new approaches and categories are introduced by historians, and as anthropologists and sociologists again take up the study of an institution that was of such concern to their nineteenth century predecessors.

I am greatly indebted to Professor Marc Galanter and Professor John T. Flint for their detailed and thoughtful reviews of India as a Secular State. One of the important objects of the book was to stimulate precisely this kind of serious discussion of problems, problems of both scholarly analysis and public policy. The two reviews are useful in sharpening certain of the issues, and I am grateful for this opportunity to comment on them.

As a new country of settlement origins Argentina, like the United States, belongs to a small group of historically favored nations. Since its economic development has differed to a considerable degree from that of others of the group, an examination of Argentina's experience and relative position may serve to raise questions of interest to students of comparative history.

“We seek a man, not money. Wellnigh every Christian region sendeth us money, but no land sendeth to us a prince. Therefore, we ask a prince that needeth money, not money that needeth a prince.” These words of the Patriarch of Jerusalem to King Henry II of England in April, 1185, reflect one of the chronic predicaments of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem throughout its entire history. By a “prince”, of course, the Patriarch meant an army, namely, manpower. Two years later, the collapse and surrender of most fortresses after the battle of Hittin was clearly a result of a grave manpower deficiency. Fortified cities did not usually fall overnight just because a large army was annihilated in the field, unless there was no one left to defend them. A city like Jerusalem, for example, could certainly have shown effective resistance if more than two knights had been left there for its defense.