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NATO after the Cold War, 1991–1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2008

Kori Schake
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Extract

With the end of the Cold War, opportunities long foreclosed to Europe came back into view on the horizon. The prospect of Western Europe providing for its own security became a realistic proposition for the first time in fifty years. The French government developed a strategy for replacing US power with a more cohesive European Union security and defence identity which garnered substantial support from other European NATO countries, especially Germany, resulting in an intensive four-year competition over which institution would form the basis of Europe's security and defence capabilities. By the end of 1995, NATO had decisively won this contest, due to rapid reconfiguration of NATO's military structures and the test for both organisations of responding to Yugoslavia's collapse. In the final analysis, it was the military capability of NATO that defeated the French alternative security structure. This article tells the story of that evolution.

Type
Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , November 1998 , pp. 379 - 407
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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