The collection of Abstracts was printed as pages iii–viii.

During the 1980s economic policy in the UK increasingly embraced free-market economics. For many, this was a necessary shift which improved economic performance, whereas previous periods of increased intervention, such as the 1930s, had harmed the UK economy. This article takes an alternative perspective. It argues that economic revival in the 1930s was primarily policy-induced; whereas economic growth in the 1980s can be largely explained by the unintentional demand side-effects of policy, with many of the free-market policies having, at best, a neutral impact and, in some cases, harming the long-run growth potential of the economy.

The article looks critically at attempts to explain the rise of National Socialism in Germany by trying to identify a peculiarly German tradition of antimodernism or reactionary modernism (by, among others, Jeffrey Herf). By looking at different critiques of civilisation in imperial Germany, it tries to show that most of them accepted the necessity of modern technology. What was new about the so-called ‘reactionary modernists’ in the Weimar Republic was not their willingness to use modern technology, but the full acceptance of the fact that modern technology could only exist on the basis of large technological systems, industrial production and fundamental social and cultural changes. They demanded that Germans unreservedly embrace all aspects of modernity, though without giving up their conservative political ideals.

While the ‘reactionary modernists’ tried to arrange the whole of society in accordance with an alleged technological functionality, National Socialism was politically more successful, exactly because its attitude towards technology and modernity was less coherent. As National Socialism had a purely pragmatic and open attitude towards technology, it could accept without hesitation that its goals were only achievable through the use of modern means, but that the cultural and private sphere should compensate for the deficits of a public life characterised by hardship and instrumental reason.

French anarchists were careful to distinguish between the Popular Front's leaders - the politicians - and its working-class supporters. They enthused over ‘the fraternity, the solidarity and the strength of the working class’ manifested in the extra-parliamentary antifascist movement of 1934–35. They took an active, and in some respects a leading part, in that movement. This article assesses the French anarchists' contribution to the antifascist movement and their critique of ‘Popular Frontism’. It also asks to what extent the anarchist movement can be said to have succeeded or failed in its objectives, and examines the ideological debates which the experiences of 1936–39 provoked between different anarchist currents over revolutionary strategy and tactics.

A total of 5,500 Danes joined the Waffen SS during the Second World War. They served primarily on the Eastern Front, often fighting under appalling conditions. The article follows the volunteers in action and examines in detail the Frikorps Danmark (Danish Legion), which provided a significant number of anti-Bolshevik, non-Nazi volunteers for the Waffen SS. The article analyses the behaviour of these men and focuses on the issue of ideological commitment. How did they react mentally to the context they operated in, and to the fact that they became more and more alienated in their homeland as the war progressed?

This article reviews recent literature on comparative fascism. It first examines the definition of fascism (the fascist minimum). The discussion of comparative fascism that follows focuses on the relationship between fascists and conservatives. It also analyses the comparability of various fascisms and National Socialism.

Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996 (reviewed in Pimlico edition, 1997), 923 pp., ISBN 0–150–24364–X.

Vladimir N. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Russian Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918–1922 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 455 pp., ISBN 0–691–03278–5.

Edward Acton, William G. Rosenberg and Vladimir Iu. Cherniaev, eds., Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914–1921 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 782 pp., ISBN 0–340–61454–4.

Ronald Kowalski, The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921 (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 269 pp., ISBN 0–415–12437–9.

André Liebich. From the Other Shore: Russian Social Democracy after 1921 (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1997), 476 pp., ISBN 0–674–32517–6.

Over eighty years after it occurred, the Russian Revolution continues to engender debate among professional historians as well as the interested public. If the French Revolution is any guide, this interest is very likely to continue indefinitely. Causes and consequences, the meaning and significance of individual component events, the interplay of social forces, and cultural, political, intellectual, economic and a myriad of other aspects have and will continue to be examined and sifted through. Last year – the eightieth anniversary – produced a number of important works on the revolution and its consequences. Those under review here, including an older one from 1994, represent a range of approaches, from introductory accounts for the general reader to summations of the state of knowledge to histories of the revolution's ‘losers’.

Jean-Marie Mayeur, La question laïque (XIXe–XXe siècle) (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 239 pp., 95 FF. IBSN 2–213–60013–9.

Etienne Fouilloux, Les chrétiens français entre crise et libération (1937–1947) (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 293 pp, 130 FF. ISBN 2–020–28131–7.

Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 300 pp., £15.95. ISBN 0–8014–8320–4.

Emiel Lamberts, ed., Christian Democracy in the European Union (1945–1995) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), 511 pp. ISBN 9–061–86808–4.

‘Christians and political life’ (taking the latter term in its widest sense) is a theme which continues to attract a great deal of interest among contemporary historians, in terms of both detailed research and broader surveys. René Rémond and Aline Coutrot demonstrated the interconnectedness of the two domains of religion and politics when they abandoned the restricted subject of relations between states and the Roman Catholic church and initiated the study of religion as an integral part of history, and the social sciences, as a whole. Approaches since 1966 have been greatly modified, as shown by the treatment of the material in the four works now to be reviewed.

Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie (‘The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy’), 6 vols. (Universitetsforlaget, 1995–7), NOK 298 – per volume ISBN 8–200–22639–5.

Volume I: Narve Bjørgo, Øystein Rian and Alf Kaardtvedt: Selvstendighet og union. Fra middelalderen til 1905 (1995), 416 pp., ISBN 8–200–22393–0.

Volume II: Roald Berg: Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920 (1995), 401 pp., ISBN 8–200–22394–9.

Volume III: Odd-Bjørn Fure: Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940 (1996), 434 pp., ISBN 2–200–22534–8.

Volume IV: Jakob Sverdrup: Inn i storpolitiken 1940–1949 (1996), 389 pp., ISBN 8–200–22531–3.

Volume V: Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1965 (1997), 505 pp., ISBN 8–200–22894–0.

Volume VI: Rolf Tamnes: Oljealder 1965–1995 (1997), 568 pp., ISBN 8–200–22893–2.

It is a tempting thought that there is a contrast between, on the one hand, this voluminous, painstakingly thorough and admirably documented publication and, on the other hand, the size of its subject. A foreign policy history is a prestigious project that is traditionally associated with the great and powerful states of Europe. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry has approached the project with no less austere a mind than the authorities of more populous European states. Well financed, well led and with stunningly generous access to even contemporary archive materials – up till 1995 – this particular foreign policy history might even be the one with the best official backing to date. Moreover, of the Scandinavian countries Norway is the one with the strongest tradition of international history, and most of the best minds in the field have been members of the team of authors. But why then, some would cry, throw this impressive weight into a history of one of Europe's smallest states, 4.5 million souls, placed at the outskirts of the European continent, not a member of the European Union and with fewer than 100 years of independent foreign policy at that?

Robert Mark Spaulding, Osthandel und Ostpolitik. German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer (Oxford and Providence: Berghahn, 1997), 546 pp., £60, ISBN 1–57181–039–0.

Volker R. Berghahn, ed., Quest for Economic Empire. European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century (Oxford and Providence: Berghahn, 1996), 224 pp., £35:00 (hb), £16.50 (pb), ISBN 1–57181–027–7.

Meung-Hoan Hoh, Westintegration versus Osthandel. Politik und Wirtschaft in den Ost-West-Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949–1958, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995), ISBN 3–631–49003–8.

Friedrich von Heyl, Der innerdeutsche Handel um Eisen- und Stahl, 1945–1972. Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen im Kalten Krieg. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), DM 64, ISBN 3–412–03897–0.

Research into the history of foreign trade relations languishes in a grey area between the history of foreign policy and economic history. This is particularly true of German trade relations with eastern Europe during the Cold War, even though this was precisely the time when the topic was the focal point of public interest. Before Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel introduced their New Ostpolitik, the Federal Republic's trade with the East (Osthandel) was one of the most controversial issues in foreign policy. The reasons for this were, in no small measure, historical, closely tied up with the ‘ghost of Rapallo’ and the myth of red trade. The treaty concluded between the German empire and Soviet Russia at the economic conference of Genoa in 1922 created the fatal impression that this was a case of two underdogs in the international community getting together to undermine the status quo established by the Treaty of Versailles. From then on, whenever the ‘ghost of Rapallo’ was invoked what was meant was that Germany could be sure of Soviet support for the implementation of its revisionist claims in the East, and thus have greater room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the West.