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2 Daniels, Norman, “Two Approaches to Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” in Morality, Reason and Truth, edited by Copp, David and Zimmerman, David (Ottawa: Rowman and Allan Held, 1985), p. 121Google Scholar. See also Daniels, Norman, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979): 256–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedian Points,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1980): 83–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics,” Philosophical Studies, 37 (1980): 21–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Lycan, William G., “Epistemic Value,” Synthese, 64 (1985): 137–64 (esp. p. 139–40).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Thagard, Paul, “From the Descriptive to the Normative in Psychology and Logic,” Philosophy of Science, 49 (1982): 24–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Ibid.

6 Cf. Rawls's, John claim in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar that a Reflective Equilibrium “is not necessarily stable.” “It is liable to be upset by further examination of the conditions which should be imposed on the contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us to revise our judgments” (p. 20–21).

7 Rawls, John, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (1974–75), Vol. 48, p. 5–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Ibid., p. 7.

9 I use the term ‘perceived’ to indicate that explication of the point of the collocation must make essential reference to our beliefs (considered judgments, understood in a sense to be explained), whether or not these are “true.” I do not suggest that this point is perspicuous to all who successfully employ the value-concept in question.

10 For the contrast between Nietzsche's views and various egalitarian views, see Nielsen, “Grounding Rights and a Method of Reflective Equilibrium.”

11 Campbell, John and Pargetter, Robert, “Goodness and Fragility,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 23 (1986): 155–65.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., p. 163.

13 Ibid.

14 Ewin, Robert E., Co-operation and Human Values: A Study of Moral Reasoning (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 15.Google Scholar

15 Here I assume that we take humility to be a virtue, being connected in some way with human flourishing.

16 Raz, Joseph, “The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium,” Inquiry, 25 (1982): 307–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 See Gallie, W. B., “Essentially Contested Concepts,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 56 (1955–56): 167–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 See, e.g., Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 English, Jane, “Ethics and Science,” in Proceedings of the 16th World Congress of Philosophy 1978 (forthcoming).Google Scholar

20 Nielsen, Kai, “On Needing a Moral Theory,” Metaphilosophy, 13 (1982): 97–116, esp. p. 99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 Aristotle, Topica 1.1.100b. 21–23. For more on this notion, see Owen, G. E. L., “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” in Articles on Aristotle, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Schofield, Malcolm and Sorabji, Richard (London: Duckworth, 1975), p. 113–26Google Scholar; and Nussbaum, Martha Craven, “Saving Aristotle's Appearances,” in Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 267–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A longer version of this paper is Chapter 8 of Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

22 See above and Swanton, Christine, “Is the Difference Principle a Principle of Justice?,” Mind, 90 (1981): 415–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “The Concept of Overall Freedom,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1979): 337–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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25 Ibid., p. 276.

26 Copp, David, “Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory,” in Copp, and Zimmerman, , eds., Morality, Reason and Truth, p. 141–68.Google Scholar

27 See further, Cooper–s, W. E. attack on “constructivist” models of Reflective Equilibrium in “Taking Reflective Equilibrium Seriously,” Dialogue, 20 (1981): 549–55.Google Scholar

28 Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.”

29 Rawls claims in “The Independence of Moral Theory”: “Even should everyone attain wide reflective equilibrium, many contrary moral conceptions may still be held.” Nor is it the case that one will necessarily “win out over the rest” (p. 9).

30 Cf. Ellis, Brian, Rational Belief Systems (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 4Google Scholar: “An ideally rational belief system is one which is in equilibrium under the most acute pressures of internal criticism and discussion.”

31 Berry, Brian, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).Google Scholar

32 Nussbaum, “Saving Aristotle's Appearances,” p. 277.

33 Parent, “Freedom as the Non-Restriction of Options.”

34 See Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).Google Scholar