Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-07T17:24:50.115Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Identity Statements and Conversationally Salient Content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2014

PETER ALWARD
PETER ALWARD*
Affiliation:
University of Saskatchewan
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that viewing Frege’s puzzle through a semantic lens results in the rejection of solutions to it on irrelevant grounds. As a result, I develop a solution to it that rests on a non-semantic sense of context-sensitivity. And I apply this picture to Frege’s puzzle when it arises through the use of identity statements designed to establish that distinct speakers are talking about the same thing.

Dans cet article, je soutiens que considérer le puzzle de Frege à travers une lentille sémantique conduit à rejeter des solutions pour des motifs non pertinents. Par conséquent, je développe une solution à ce problème qui repose sur un sens non-sémantique de la sensibilité au contexte. J'applique cette solution à l'énigme de Frege lorsqu’elle surgit à travers l'utilisation d’énoncés d’identité visant à établir que des locuteurs distincts parlent de la même chose.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 121 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alward, Peter 2000“Simple and Sophisticated ‘Naïve’ Semantics,” Dialogue, 39: 101–121.Google Scholar
Alward, Peter 2009“Cluster Theory: Resurrection,” Dialogue, 48.2: 269–289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie 2005 Insensitive Semantics, Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crimmins, Mark 1992 Talk About Belief, MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
Donnellan, Keith 1966“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Philosophical Review 75.3: 281–304.Google Scholar
Frege, Gottlob 1997“On Sense and Reference,” in The Frege Reader, Beaney, M., ed., Blackwell: 151–172.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul 1980 Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul 1988“A Puzzle about Belief,” in Propositions and Attitudes, Salmon, Nathan and Soames, , eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press: 102–48.Google Scholar
Richard, Mark 1990 Propositional Attitudes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, Bertrand 1905“On Denoting,” Mind, 56: 479–93.Google Scholar
Salmon, Nathan 1986 Frege’s Puzzle, Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Schiffer, Stephen 1992“Belief Ascriptions,” The Journal of Philosophy 89: 499–521.Google Scholar
Searle, John 1958“Proper Names,” Mind 67: 166–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Searle, John 1983 Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wettstein, Howard 1986“Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?” The Journal of Philosophy 85.4: 185–209.Google Scholar