In a famous passage from his Logic, Kant says that three questions — What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? — ultimately hang on the third one, which is the question of Man. This paper examines the nature of this special link between the very ends of philosophy and the question of Man. Its intent is to show how Culture, as receptive to Ideas, provides both the unity of the different definitions of Man given by Kant, and the condition of possibility for the questioning of philosophy. This distinctive quality of man, according to Kant, is the precondition for Metaphysics, Ethics, and Religion. In the end, philosophy's principle of unity lies not in the limitation or finiteness of man, but in the fact that man, according to Kant, is always in relation with some form of infinity, whether it is that of Ideas (metaphysics), that of the Law (ethics), or that of the ultimate Good (religion).

The “sceptical” solution to the paradox which Kripke attibutes to Wittgenstein is supposed to lead to the conclusion that there is a sense in which thought and language are essentially social phenomena. In the following, I argue that both the “sceptical” and the “communautarian” character of this solution can be questioned, though without having to agree with Davidson, according to whom the solution to this paradox does not depend on any notion of a common language.

Rousseau develops a genealogical reflection on political domination. The intelligibility of the genealogy does not rest on the psychological category of craving for power. That is why Rousseau differentiates between tyranny and despotism. Rousseau stresses this difference in two works: Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes and Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques. Tyranny and despotism differ in that the latter produces an ideological speech. Political domination depends upon a double process. In the first process, ruling implies creating inequality in the political order, thus excluding people from political decisions. In order to mask this political inequality, the ideological speech produces two fictions: the fiction of the guaranty and the fiction of the community. In the second process, ruling implies generating public opinion which, in turn, adheres to this political order.

This book is the second volume of a critical edition of the writings of Thomas Reid, an edition that will include many of his manuscript remains as well as his previously published works. These volumes are intended to displace the heretofore standard 8th edition of Reid's works edited by Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856). Hamilton's edition is marred by his numerous, often intrusive, and obtuse footnotes. Reid's spelling and punctuation were also sometimes “corrected” by Hamilton, so his edition does not present a fully accurate version of the original editions whose publication was superintended by Reid. The type in the Hamilton edition is also archaic and very small, making reading the text excessively difficult. The present and subsequent volumes are intended to present canonical texts free of the flaws in the Hamilton text. This volume succeeds admirably in that project.