The word “encyclopedia” comes to us from the Greek or, more precisely, is the deformed transcription, through Latin, of a erase in which we recognize a word composed of two elements, enkyklios and paideia, found in Quintilian in the ancient editions of De institutione oratoria (I, 10, 1). The expression itself, enkyklios paideia, appears only later, in the Hellenistic Age, under Roman domination, beginning with Dionysius of Halicarnassus (around the first century B.C.), but the concept goes back to the Eleatics, especially to Hippias of Elis who, if we can believe the account in Plato's Dialogues, taught this total knowledge, later known with the term enkyklopaideia.

Stratification, that is, the structuring of society on the basis of differential social status of various groups, is a common feature of human societies. But the traditional pattern of social stratification in India has certain characteristics which are rather unique, and these have attracted and intrigued many scholars all over the world. The structural and cultural characteristics of the traditional pattern of stratification in India have deep roots in the past. They have stemmed from certain peculiar ethnic constellations that came into being some three thousand years ago, and they have been given many twists and turns by numerous socio-cultural currents and cross currents through all these millennia.

There is, at first glance, nothing easier than to summarize the history of one's life. Every human life, as the cliché puts it, is a true story, and everyone should be capable of writing the story of his own life. We are obviously not thinking of the resumés which are sometimes requested of us for professional or administrative reasons, in which we only mention major and even spectacular events; here we are referring to longer and more detailed descriptions, to writings in which the author tells the story of his life, to autobiographies. Is it difficult to compose them? In any case it is easier than writing a sonnet; to do that, one must know at least the rules for poetry, the construction of rhymes and the form for sonnets. The same is true for writing odes, epigrams and tragedies. Certain norms must be learned which codify the literary genre being used. Apparently there is nothing similar in the case of autobiographies. For who is not capable of recounting the important events of his existence to an attentive listener, events which he remembers and among which he can choose, leaving aside what is not important and speaking only of the essential? One need only have a certain gift for story-telling and know how to write. And even this second condition, in fact, is not essential, since an oral description can be transcribed by someone else, an author or an ethnographer, who respects the descriptions given by the autobiographer more or less faithfully.

It has become banal to say that the object of the art of theatre, its artifact, is particularly fragile, that a theatrical performance— necessarily limited in time and not reproducible—is an ephemeral phenomenon. And yet it is a fact that the evanescence of the theatre arts explains better than any other circumstance the universality and the importance of iconography in this area. What could be more natural than the forever manifested desire to prolong the length of the theatrical phenomenon, to immortalize it in a certain sense.

Three main issues are of cardinal interest in this paper. The first issue relates to the canons of discourse—the parameters that inform and guide any discussion—in African philosophy. These canons are accepted in one form or the other by the philosophers who have actually formulated some of them and those who have devoted their academical careers to the promotion of the positive study of African philosophy. Consequently this paper should be viewed in the same light as C.E.M. Joad's A Critique of Logical Positivism in which the “Great Tradition” in philosophy is classically expounded and defended against the onslaught of the philosophical exuberance and extraordinary claims of the logical positivists in the sense that it is a rejoinder to the attack on African philosophy by those who actually may want to be known as African logical neo-positivists.

The purpose of this paper is to present a commentary on the current state of contemporary African philosophy and to offer some criticisms and recommendations. The question concerning African philosophy has been debated for some years now and one has witnessed a number of interesting works on this topic.

What should we understand by African philosophical thought if not a philosophy expressed by African thinkers, based on their own experience with the means and within the limits of that experience? A closer inspection will show, however, that this truism calls for rethinking. If we abide by the writings of our contemporary philosophers, African and non-African, who have endeavored to put the essence of African thought into one of the Occidental languages or a Westernized indigenous language, we soon see the perplexity in which we find ourselves when it is a matter of transcribing the systems of thought that are properly African, that resemble no other system of thought and that Africans alone are able to expound and understand. This was for a long time the questionable affirmation of the advocates of Negritude and is still questionable today, because we cannot judge the value of the written formulation of such a system of thought unless we put ourselves into the circumstances in which it was born and in which it lived. Though the existence of a dialectic relationship between a collective consciousness and its formulation as a philosophical system is conceivable, obviously the philosophical thought captured, so to speak, at the source and the oral or written forms in which this thought is preserved and transmitted are two totally different things. To opt for one or the other or for both can involve tasks which many hands share in varying degrees. It is not necessary that a philosopher formulate and express his philosophy in writing or that someone else gather his statements and give them form for his philosophy to be valid and durable. Moreover, although he transmits it orally he never does so with the same words, even if they are always recognizable anmemorable among all others. Platonic, Hegelian and Scholastic philosophies remain themselves whether we write about them or read the works of their founders. Consider Pyrrho, Socrates, Jesus: oral tradition has sufficed to bring their message down through the centuries to us even though they wrote nothing. Why should it not be the same for the oral philosophical traditions of Africa?