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Unexplained Deaths in Connecticut, 2002–2003:Failure to Consider Category A Bioterrorism Agents in Differential Diagnoses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2013

John P. Palumbo ,
James I. Meek ,
Darcy M. Fazio ,
Susan B. Turner ,
James L. Hadler  and
André N. Sofair
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Abstract

Background: Recognition of bioterrorism-related infections by hospital and emergency department clinicians may be the first line of defense in a bioterrorist attack.

Methods: We identified unexplained infectious deaths consistent with the clinical presentation of anthrax, tularemia, smallpox, and botulism using Connecticut death certificates and hospital chart information. Minimum work-up criteria were established to assess the completeness of diagnostic testing.

Results: Of 4558 unexplained infectious deaths, 133 were consistent with anthrax (2.9%) and 6 (0.13%) with tularemia. None were consistent with smallpox or botulism. No deaths had anthrax or tularemia listed in the differential diagnosis or had disease-specific serology performed. Minimum work-up criteria were met for only 53% of cases.

Conclusions: Except for anthrax, few unexplained deaths in Connecticut could possibly be the result of the bioterrorism agents studied. In 47% of deaths from illnesses that could be anthrax, the diagnosis would likely have been missed. As of 2004, Connecticut physicians were not well prepared to intentionally or incidentally diagnose initial cases of anthrax or tularemia. More effective clinician education and surveillance strategies are needed to minimize the potential to miss initial cases in a bioterrorism attack. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2008;2:87–94)

Keywords

unexplained deathsCategory A bioterrorism agentselectronic death datainfectious diseasepublic health preparedness/response
Type
Original Research and Critical Analysis
Information
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 87 - 94
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, Inc. 2008

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