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Evolution of the Social Contract, Brain Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1996, xii + 143 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Ken Binmore
Ken Binmore
Affiliation:
University College, London
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Type
Reviews
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , October 1997 , pp. 352 - 354
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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References

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