Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-17T06:54:08.955Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

WHOSE IMPARTIALITY? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF VEILED STAKEHOLDERS, INVOLVED SPECTATORS AND DETACHED OBSERVERS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2013

Fernando Aguiar ,
Alice Becker  and
Luis Miller
Fernando Aguiar
Affiliation:
Spanish National Research Council (IESA-CSIC), Spain
Alice Becker
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Germany
Luis Miller
Affiliation:
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Spainluismiguel.miller@ehu.es
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We present an experiment designed to investigate three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. We consider a first-person procedure, inspired by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, an involved spectator and a detached observer. First-person veiled stakeholders and involved spectators are affected by an initially unfair distribution that, in the stakeholders’ case, is to be redressed. We find substantial differences in the redressing task. Detached observers propose significantly fairer redistributions than veiled stakeholders or involved spectators. Risk preferences partly explain why veiled stakeholders propose less egalitarian redistributions. Surprisingly, involved spectators, who are informed about their position in society, tend to favour stakeholders holding the same position as they do after the initial distribution.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 29 , Issue 2: Experiments in economics and philosophy , July 2013 , pp. 155 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P.. 2011. Preferences for redistribution. In Handbook of Social Economics, ed. Benhabib, J., Bisin, A. and Jackson, M., 93–131. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Amiel, Y., Cowell, F. and Gaertner, W.. 2009. To be or not to be involved: a questionnaire-experimental view on Harsanyi's utilitarian ethics. Social Choice and Welfare 32: 299–316.Google Scholar
Barr, A., Burns, J., Miller, L. and Shaw, I.. 2011. Individual's notions of distributed justice and relative economic status. IFS Working Paper Series 11/19.Google Scholar
Barry, B. 1995. Justice as Impartiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Becker, A. and Miller, L.. 2009. Promoting justice by treating people unequally: an experimental study. Experimental Economics 12: 437–449.Google Scholar
Chavanne, D., McCabe, K. and Paganelli, M.. 2010. Shared experience and third-party decisions: a laboratory result. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1534942. Retrieved 24 July 2012.Google Scholar
Croson, R. and Konow, J.. 2009. Social preferences and moral biases. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 69: 202–212.Google Scholar
Dasgupta, N. 2004. Implicit ingroup favoritism, outgroup favoritism, and their behavioral manifestations. Social Justice Research 17: 143–169.Google Scholar
Devos, Th., and Banaji, M.. 2005. Implicit self and identity. In Handbook of Self and Identity, ed. Leary, M. and Tangney, J., 153–178. New York: Guilford Press.Google Scholar
Dohmen, Th., Falk, A., Human, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J. and Wagner, G.. 2011. Individual risk attitudes: measurement, determinants and behavioral consequences. Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (3): 522–550.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 2002. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Firth, R. 1952. Ethical absolutism and the Ideal Observer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XII: 317–345.Google Scholar
Fischbacher, U. 2007. Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics 10: 171–178.Google Scholar
Freeman, S. 2012. Original Position. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), ed. Zalta, E. N.. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/original-position/.Google Scholar
Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J.. 1992. Choosing Justice. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Greiner, B. 2004. An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In: Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen. GWDG Bericht 63: 79–93.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1953. Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk taking. Journal of Political Economy 61: 434–435.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1955. Cardinal welfare, individualist ethics and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy 63: 309–321.Google Scholar
Herne, K. and Suojanen, M.. 2004. The role of information in choices over income distribution. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48: 173–193.Google Scholar
Jollimore, T. 2011. Impartiality. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/impartiality/.Google Scholar
Konow, J. 2008. The moral high ground: an experimental study of Spectator Impartiality. Mimeo. http://myweb.lmu.edu/jkonow/Moral%20High%20Ground.pdf.Google Scholar
Konow, J. 2009. Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An Impartial Spectator analysis of justice. Social Choice and Welfare 33: 101–127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liebrand, W. 1984. The effect of social motives, communication and group sizes on behavior in an n-person multi stage mixed motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology 14: 239–264.Google Scholar
Michelbach, P., Scott, J., Matland, R. and Bornstein, B.. 2003. Doing Rawls justice: an experimental study of income distribution norms. American Journal of Political Science 47: 523–539.Google Scholar
Offermann, T., Sonnemans, J. and Schram, A.. 1996. Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal 106: 817–845.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. 2002. Egalitarianism against the Veil of Ignorance. Journal of Philosophy XCIX 4: 167–184.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Scott, J., Matland, R., Michelbach, P. and Bornstein, B.. 2001. Just deserts: an experimental study of distributive justice norms. American Journal of Political Science 45: 749–767.Google Scholar
Selten, R. 1967. Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschrankt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments. In Beitrage zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. I, ed. Sauermann, Heinz, 136–168. Tubingen: Mohr (Siebeck).Google Scholar
Sen, A. 2002. Open and Closed Impartiality. Journal of Philosophy XCIX: 445–469.Google Scholar
Smith, A. 1976 [1759]. Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tajfel, H. 1970. Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American 223: 96–102.Google Scholar
Traub, S., Seidl, C., Schmidt, U. and Levati, M.. 2005. Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or somebody else? Social Choice and Welfare 24: 283–309.Google Scholar