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Business Failure and the Agenda of Business History
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2015
Extract
Is it really useful to focus the interest of business historians on major companies that failed in recent years, like Parmalat in Italy or Enron in the United States? What can we learn from studying cases like that of the French company Schneider, a first mover in metallurgy, armaments, and nuclear energy, which for almost 150 years dominated the company town Le Creusot, where the Business History Conference held its fiftieth anniversary meeting in 2004, but which has now disappeared?
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References
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