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Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2020

K. Merrick Olivier Open the ORCID record for K. Merrick Olivier [Opens in a new window]
K. Merrick Olivier*
Affiliation:
School of Divinity, History and Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK Email: olivier.kevin@abdn.ac.uk
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Abstract

Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct and provide an analysis of a case that challenges Counter-Closure, and defend the case against various possible objections, including some that feature in mainstream Counter-Closure literature. I contend that, if my analysis is accepted, Greco is left with two options: either he rejects Counter-Closure, or he must substantially revise his view in such a way as to preserve Counter-Closure in light of cases of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief.

Keywords

Grecovirtue epistemologycounter-closureagent reliabilismGettier
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 130 - 145
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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