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The Weights of Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Dale A. Nance
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Abstract

Interest in the Keynesian concept of evidential weight has led to divergent views concerning the burden of proof in adjudication. It is argued that Keynes's concept is properly engaged only in the context of one special kind of decision, the decision whether or not the evidence is ripe for a decision on the underlying merits, whether the latter decision is based on probability, relative plausibility, coherence or otherwise. As a general matter, this question of ripeness is appropriately assigned to the judiciary for resolution as part of the burden of production, rather than to the jury or other factfinder as part of the burden of persuasion.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , October 2008 , pp. 267 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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