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Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Marc Moffett
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Abstract

According to one widely held view, a belief is fully justified only if it holds up against the strongest available counterarguments, and we can be appropriately confident that it does hold up only if there is free and open critical discussion of those beliefs between us and our epistemic peers. In this paper I argue that this common picture of ideal rational group inquiry interacts with epistemic problems concerning reasonable disagreement in a way that makes those problems particularly difficult to resolve. By focusing on this idealized context, we get a clearer picture of the epistemic principles at issue. In the end, I argue that the best way to resolve the resulting epistemic conflicts is by appeal to the underdetermination of theory by evidence together with a principle of epistemic conservatism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , October 2007 , pp. 352 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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