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William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2020

P.D. Magnus Open the ORCID record for P.D. Magnus [Opens in a new window]
P.D. Magnus*
Affiliation:
University at Albany, State University of New York, New York, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: pmagnus@fecundity.com
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Abstract

William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism and show that it is sometimes permissible to believe in the absence of compelling evidence. However, the two considerations have different scope and force. Doxastic efficacy applies in only some cases but allows any values to play a role in determining belief; risk applies in all cases but only allows particular conditional values to play a role.

Keywords

William JamesWilliam Cliffordwill to believeevidentialismdoxastic efficacyinductive risk
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 146 - 158
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press.

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