¹ Gordon, Joy, “Revisiting Smart Sanctions,” Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011), pp. 315–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² This began with the article by Drezner, Daniel, “How Smart Are Smart Sanctions?” International Studies Review 5 (2003), pp. 107–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar; continued with Drezner, Daniel, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review 13 (2011), pp. 96–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lynch, Colum, “The End of Smart Sanctions,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2011Google Scholar; turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/06/the_end_of_smart_sanctions.

³ Space limitations and the need to prioritize issues for analysis has meant that I did not choose to discuss here another intriguing claim by Gordon that the reason the issues of effectiveness, ethics, and humanitarian impact are not fully addressed by UN practitioners or academics is that such targeted measures are more politically acceptable than the general trade sanctions.

⁴ In the not too distant future there will be a very direct empirical way to assess the outcomes and impacts of targeted sanctions. Under the guidance of Thomas Biersteker of the Graduate Institute at Geneva and Sue Eckert of the Watson Institute at Brown University, the Multilateral Target Sanctions Project is a case-intensive research venture, now coding and classifying each UN targeted sanctions case for dozens of variables. See graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp/home/ccdp-research/projects/current-projects/impact-multilateral-targeted-sanctions.html.

⁵ Daniel Drezner, as cited above. For a recent discussion of the movement from and contrast between trade and targeted sanctions that addresses some of these concerns, see Lopez, George A. and Cortright, David, “Sanctions as an Alternative to War,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L., eds., The Handbook on the Political Economy of War (U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 534–70.Google Scholar

⁶ Charron, Andrea, UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats (London: Routledge, 2011).Google Scholar

⁷ These cases are examined in detail in Brzoska, Michael and Lopez, George A., eds., Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes (Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group, 2009).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ See Cortright, David and Lopez, George A., Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), esp. pp. 115–32.Google Scholar

⁹ See Lopez, George A. and Cortright, David, “United Nations Sanctions and Nuclear Weapons,” in Boulden, Jane et al. , eds., The United Nations and Nuclear Orders (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009), pp. 111–31.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Jayshree Bajoria, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” Analysis Brief of the Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2011; http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480.

¹¹ This is a serious concern that my own research team has shared in recent years; see Cortright, David et al. , Friend Not Foe: Opening Spaces for Civil Society Engagement to Prevent Violent Extremism, May, 2011Google Scholar; http://www.sanctionsandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/Friend-not-Foe_Fnl_May.pdf.

¹² This point is emphasized in Carisch, Enrico and Rickard-Martin, Loraine, Global Threats and the Role of United Nations Sanctions (New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), pp. 8–11.Google Scholar

¹³ See Cortright, David et al. , Integrating UN Sanctions for Peace and Security, October 2010, esp. pp. 12–26Google Scholar; http://www.sanctionsandsecurity.org/integrating-un-sanctions-for-peace-and-security/.

¹⁴ This point is emphasized by Carisch and Rickard-Martin, Global Threats, pp. 17–20.

¹⁵ See especially Cortright et al., Integrating UN Sanctions for Peace and Security, pp. 11–16.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See Lopez, George A., “Imperfect Actions in an Imperfect World,” Peace Policy 11 (October 5, 2011)Google Scholar; peacepolicy.nd.edu/2011/10/05/imperfect-actions-in-an-imperfect-world/.