1 Alexandra Harney, “Primark Shows the Hidden Price of Cheap Fashion,” Times (London), June 20, 2008; available at http:\\www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4174985.ece.

2 There is a whole universe of fee-for-service-type organizations that conduct research on corporate social responsibility. Examples include Ethical Consumer, Accountability, and Maplecroft, as well as mainstream consulting organizations, such as KPMG and Deloitte LLP, which have developed business auditing practices around corporate responsibility principles.

3 Dan Clawson, The Next Upsurge: Labor and the New Social Movements (Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR/Cornell University Press, 2003); and Bill Fletcher, Jr. and Fernando Gapasin, Solidarity Divided (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2008).

4 Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities on the Edge of a Dream (Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR/Cornell University Press, 2006); and Michelle Camou, “Synchronizing Meanings and Other Day Laborer Organizing Strategies: Lessons from Denver,” Labor Studies Journal 34, no. 1 (March 2009), pp. 39–64.

5 Schaferhoff, Campe, and Kaan have defined PPPs as “institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the provision of collective goods,” in Marco Schaferhoff, Sabine Campe, and Christopher Kaan, “Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results,” International Studies Review 11, no. 3 (September 2009), p. 455. See also Paul A. Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics 36, no. 4 (1954), pp. 387–89. Samuelson's definition of public goods as non-rival and non-excludable may be suited to a provision of solutions to environmental problems, and a sizeable number of PPPs do focus on rule making in connection with environmental governance. But NGOs involved in labor-rights-monitoring PPPs have a hybrid character: they engage in activities with joint benefits to the private sector (i.e., the for-profit sector) and to the public sectors (i.e., government, and members of civil society, more generally). Labor rights PPPs thus better fit the subcategory of “joint-product” or “club” goods because they generate uneven benefits to participating companies and have some exclusionary characteristics. For more on “joint-product” or “club” goods, see Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, “Economics of Alliances: Lessons for Collective Action,” Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 3 (September 2001), pp. 869–96.

6 On human rights and the WTO, see Susan Ariel Aaronson and Jamie Zimmerman, Trade Imbalance: The Struggle to Weigh Human Rights Concerns in Trade Policymaking (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 4, 35. For an impassioned response to charges that the ILO lacks enforcement power, see remarks by Juan Somavia, Director-General of the ILO, excerpted in James Atleson, Lance Compa, Kerry Rittich, Calvin William Sharpe, and Marley S. Weiss, International Labor Law: Cases and Materials on Workers' Rights in the Global Economy (St. Paul, Minn.: Thompson West, The Labor Law Group American Casebook Series, 2008), pp. 88–90.

7 Shareen Hertel, “Human Rights and the Global Economy: Bringing Labor Rights Back In,” Maryland Journal of International Law 24 (2009), pp. 283–95; and Simon Zadek and Alex McGillivray, “Accountability Presents Responsible Competitiveness: Making Sustainability Count in Global Markets,” Harvard International Review 30, no. 2 (June 22, 2008), pp. 72–77.

8 Julie Elkins and Shareen Hertel, “Sweatshirts and Sweatshops: Labor Rights, Student Activism, and the Challenges of Collegiate Apparel Manufacturing,” in William T. Armaline, Davita Silfen-Glasberg, and Bandana Purkayastha, eds., In Our Own Backyard: Human Rights, Injustice, and Resistance in the United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming).

9 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, “Soccer Balls,” n.d.; available at http:\\www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat4/soccer.htm#top6567.

10 Deborah Leipziger, SA8000: The First Decade— Implementation, Influence and Impact (Sheffield, U.K.: Greenleaf, 2009).

11 David Vogel points out that the empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate social responsibility and profit is actually inconclusive. See David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. xvi–xvii, 13, and 28–33.

12 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

13 Ken Silverstein, “Shopping for Sweat: The Human Cost of a Two-Dollar T-Shirt,” Harper's 320, no. 1916 (January 2010), pp. 36–44.

14 Rainer Braun and Judy Gearhart, “Who Should Code Your Conduct? Trade Union and NGO Differences in the Fight for Workers Rights,” Development in Practice 14, nos. 1–2 (February 2004), pp. 183–96.

15 For an extensive bibliography on labor union organizing globally, and particular insights on regulations in contemporary China, see Labornet, “Report on Chinese Labor Scholars Collective Bargaining Study Tour to U.S.,” February 25, 2009; available at http:\\www.labornet.org/cgi-bin/ib/cgi-bin/ib.cgi?action=read&id=292.

16 William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzeul, “NGOing: Practice, Bridging, and Power,” in William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzeul, eds., The NGO Challenge for International Theory (unpublished manuscript, 2009), p. 33.

17 Elkins and Hertel, “Sweatshirts and Sweatshops.”

18 Gay Seidman, Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transnational Activism (New York: American Sociological Association/Russell Sage Foundation, 2007); Shareen Hertel, Unexpected Power: Conflict and Change Among Transnational Activists (Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR/Cornell University Press, 2006); and Marc Ellenbogen, “Can the Tariff Act Combat Endemic Child Labor Abuses? The Case of Côte d'Ivoire,” Texas Law Review 82, no. 5 (April 2004), pp. 1315–47.

19 Collective action problems stem from the challenge of managing decision making and rules enforcement when the number of actors involved in these processes increases. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

20 Martin Khor, “How the South Is Getting a Raw Deal at the WTO,” in Sarah Anderson, ed., Views from the South: The Effects of Globalization and the WTO on Third World Countries (Chicago: LPC Group, 2000), pp. 7–53.

21 Robert Reich, Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007); and Ellen Ruppel Shell, Cheap: The High Cost of Discount Culture (New York: Penguin Press, 2009).

22 Aaron Berstein and Christopher Greenwald, “Benchmarking Corporate Policies on Labor and Human Rights in Global Supply Chains,” Capital Matters Occasional Paper Series 5 (Cambridge, Mass.: Pensions and Capital Stewardship Project, Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law School, November 2009), p. 3.

23 Seidman, Beyond the Boycott.

24 Schaferhoff, Campe, and Kaan, “Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations,” p. 465.

25 Ibid.

26 Detail on the IPEC can be found at International Labor Organization, International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, “The Programme”; available at http:\\www.ilo.org/ipec/programme/lang-en/index.htm.

27 See Vogel, The Market for Virtue; Jeffrey Barber, “Mapping the Movement Towards Sustainable Production and Consumption in North America” (unpublished manuscript); available at http:\\isforum.org/pubs/documents/copyofmappingthemovement.pdf; Roseann Casey, “Meaningful Change: Raising the Bar in Supply Chain Workplace Standards,” Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper 29 (Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2006); Marsha A. Dickson, Suzanne Loker, and Molly Eckman, Social Responsibility in the Global Apparel Industry (New York: Fairchild Books, 2009); Rory Sullivan, ed., Business and Human Rights: Dilemmas and Solutions (Sheffield, U.K.: Greenleaf Publishing, 2003); and Simon Zadek, Doing Good and Doing Well: Making the Business Case for Corporate Citizenship (New York: Conference Board, 2000).

28 The full text for these and other UN human rights treaties are available from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at www2.ohchr.org/english/law/.

29 For analysis of current benchmarks included in codes globally, see John G. Ruggie, “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. Addendum: Human Rights Policies and Management Practices: Results from Questionnaire Surveys of Governments and Fortune 500 Firms” (United Nations: Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, February 28, 2007); and Bernstein and Greenwald, “Benchmarking Corporate Policies on Labor and Human Rights.”

30 Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005); and Oona Hathaway, “Why Do Nations Join Human Rights Treaties?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 4 (2007), pp. 588–621.

31 DeMars and Dijkzeul, “NGOing: Practice, Bridging, and Power,” p. 17; see also Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).

32 DeMars and Dijkzeul “NGOing: Practice, Bridging, and Power,” p. 36.

32 See the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances; available at http:\\www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.47.133.En?OpenDocument; ILO Conventions 129 and 105 (regarding forced labor); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8 (regarding forced labor); and the ICCPR arts. 6, 14, and 15 (regarding extrajudicial killing).

34 Cynthia A. Williams, “Civil Society Initiatives and ‘Soft Law’ in the Oil and Gas Industry,” Journal of International Law and Politics 36, nos. 2–3 (Winter/Spring 2004), pp. 457–502; and Carola Kantz, “The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the Kimberley Process,” Business and Politics 9, no. 3 (December 2007), pp. 1–20.

35 Vogel, The Market for Virtue.

36 Examples of private indices of corporate social responsibility include ratings of corporate performance, such as the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index (colloquially referred to as the Domini Social Index). See http:\\www.kld.com/indexes/index.html.

37 Detailed information on the mandate of each organization can be accessed, respectively, at Global Reporting Initiative, http:\\www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/, and the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, http:\\www.business-humanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription.

38 McCubbins and Schwartz developed the concept of “fire brigade” monitoring to explain third-party monitoring as a means of congressional oversight, in Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1984), pp. 165–79.

39 Information on the organizations referenced above is available electronically, as follows: International Labor Rights Forum, http:\\www.laborrights.org/about-ilrf; National Labor Committee, http:\\www.nlcnet.org/index.php; United Students Against Sweatshops, http:\\usas.org/; Clean Clothes Campaign, http:\\www.cleanclothes.org/; and Third World Network, http:\\www.twnside.org.sg/. For a related history of North-South consumer activism, see Matthew Hilton, Prosperity for All: Consumer Activism in an Era of Globalization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009).

40 Xiaohua Yang and Cheryl Rivers, “Antecedents of CSR Practices in MNCs' Subsidiaries: A Stakeholder and Institutional Perspective,” Journal of Business Ethics 86, supp. 2 (March 2009), pp. 163.

41 See Seidman, Beyond the Boycott; and Kathryn Sikkink, “Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code,” International Organization 40, no. 4 (1986), pp. 815–40. Information on the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility is available at http:\\www.iccr.org/.

42 Joe Bandy, “Paradoxes of Transnational Civil Societies Under Neoliberalism: The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras,” Social Problems 51, no. 3 (2004), pp. 410–31.

43 Discussion of the activism of the Comité Fronterizo de Obreras (CFO) in this case is available in English at http:\\www.cfomaquiladoras.org/maquilaworkerscelebratevictory.en.html. See Hertel, Unexpected Power, for a broader treatment of the work of the CFO.

44 This institutional history is related both in Leipziger, SA8000: The First Decade, and by Social Accountability International itself; see http:\\www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=938&grandparentID=472&parentID=490&nodeID=1.

45 A recent survey of over 150 transnational NGOs with offices in the United States found that the leadership of these organizations differentiated between “two basic types of collaboration—networks and partnerships.… A network connotes an informal relationship or a loose affiliation of individuals or organizations sharing primarily information. Partnerships are formalized, usually based on a binding or contractual relationship.… [NGO] leaders identify a possible lack of commitment and waste of resources as the main limitations associated with networks, while the primary challenges in partnerships are unequal power relations and other forms of inequality.” Jesse D. Lecy, George E. Mitchell, Margaret Hermann, Christiane Page, and Hans Peter Schmitz, “Challenges Facing Leaders of Transnational NGOs: Introducing New Qualitative and Quantitative Datasets” (paper prepared for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana), p. 22, emphasis added.

46 Hertel, “Human Rights and the Global Economy,” pp. 287–88.

47 Vogel, The Market for Virtue; and Seidman, Beyond the Boycott.

48 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

49 Hertel, Unexpected Power.