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From the Stage to the High Seas: Concluding Thoughts on the Present and Future of EU Legal Studies
Part of:
Actors and Roles in EU Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 December 2022
Abstract
Difference between social science analyses of law and legal analyses – Theatre metaphor to understand the difference – Internal and external points of view – Necessity for legal analysis to use materials lying outside the classical pyramid of formal sources – Overview of the spectrum of legal research – Legally relevant texts and practices – Interdisciplinary approaches to law and lawyers’ disciplinary edge.
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- © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the University of Amsterdam
Footnotes
I am deeply indebted to Robin Gadbled and Elise Muir for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. All remaining errors are of course my own. The present paper contributes to the background methodological work for the RESHUFFLE research project hosted by KU Leuven and supported by the European Research Council (European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement No. 851621).
References
1 Understood as ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’. These professionals ‘have (1) a shared set of normative and principles beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs …; (3) shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence’: P.M. Haas, ‘Introduction. Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 46 International Organization (1992) p. 1 at p. 3.
2 See e.g. P. Moor, Le travail du droit. Essais sur l’Etat de droit (Presses Universitaires de Laval 2021) p. 9; N. Rogers, ‘The Play of Law: Comparing Performances in Law and Theatre’, 8 Queensland University of Technology Law & Justice Journal (2008) p. 429; O. Cayla, ‘La souveraineté de l’artiste “du second temps”’, 12 Droits, revue française de théorie juridique (1990) p. 129.
3 GC 22 March 2018, Case T- 540-15, De Capitani v European Parliament, paras. 83-84: ‘[T]he effectiveness and integrity of the legislative process cannot undermine the principles of publicity and transparency which underlie that process. Accordingly, the Court finds that no general presumption of non-disclosure can be upheld in relation to the fourth column of trilogue tables concerning an ongoing legislative procedure’.
4 See P. Ricoeur, ‘Expliquer et comprendre. Sur quelques connexions remarquables entre la théorie du texte, la théorie de l’action et la théorie de l’histoire’, 75 Revue philosophique de Louvain (1977) p. 126; P. Ricoeur, ‘Logique herméneutique ?’, in P. Ricoeur, Ecrits et conférences 2 – L’herméneutique (Seuil 2010) p. 123; and the excellent summary by J. Grondin, L’herméneutique (PUF 2006) at p. 81-86.
5 As Robin Gadbled aptly noted, one may wonder who sits in the audience if even citizens and workers are on stage. It is a good point that shows that this metaphor, just like any other, has its limitations. However, I think that it is fair to consider that most EU nationals only occasionally (and on very limited aspects) jump on stage as an EU Citizen, Worker or Service Recipient. We spend most of our lives off stage, watching (more or less carefully) other people’s performances in the EU play.
6 See e.g. A. Vauchez, ‘Le travail politique du droit ou comment réfléchir au ‘rôle politique’ de la Cour ?’, in L. Clément-Wilz, Le rôle politique de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2019) p. 39.
7 See e.g. U. Puetter, The Eurogroup: How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers Shape European Economic Governance (Manchester University 2006).
8 See e.g. A. Vauchez, L’union par le droit. L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe (Sciences Po 2013).
9 See e.g. T. Delreux and T. Laloux, ‘Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal-Agent Analysis of Trilogue Negotiations’, 56 Journal of Common Market Studies (2017) p. 300.
10 See e.g B. Oztas and A. Kreppel, ‘Power or Luck? The Limitations of the European Commission’s Agenda Setting Power and Autonomous Policy Influence’, 60 Journal of Common Market Studies (2022) p. 408.
11 See e.g. A. Tacea, ‘From Legal to Political Reasoning: National Parliaments’ Use of Reasoned Opinions in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 59 Journal of Common Market Studies (2021) p. 1573.
12 See e.g. E. Van den Hoogen et al., ‘What Does the EU Actually Mean to Citizens? An In-depth Study of Dutch Citizens’ Understandings and Evaluations of the European Union’, 60 Journal of Common Market Studies (2022) p. 1.
13 See e.g. C. Mcevoy, ‘The Role of Political Efficacy on Public Opinion in the European Union’, 54 Journal of Common Market Studies (2016) p. 1159.
14 See the papers by Anna Beckers and by Bruno de Witte.
15 Broadly defined here as what the speaker means to achieve while speaking (describe, request, promise, create, etc.). On this notion, see the seminal work by J. Austin, How To Do Things with Words (Oxford University Press 1962)
16 On that notion, see R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press 1986), especially ch. 6.
17 On the right answer thesis, see primarily Dworkin, Law’s Empire, ibid.
18 R. Ponsard, ‘Les moyens d’une analyse scientifiquement et juridiquement critique : l’exemple de l’étude des décisions du conseil constitutionnel’, 31 Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle (2016) p. 65.
19 Scholars can also give their interpretation of the script (say, of the EU legislative procedure) in the abstract, i.e. not in reaction to a specific performance by actors. Such descriptive accounts are in no way incompatible with the practice of art criticism: J. Elkins, ‘Art Criticism’, in J. Turner (ed.), Grove Dictionary of Art (Oxford University Press 1996).
20 See e.g. E. Herlin-Karnell et al., European Union Law in Context (Bloomsbury 2021).
21 See B. de Witte’s contribution to this issue.
22 See e.g. M. van den Brink, ‘Justice, Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union’, 82 Modern Law Review (2019) p. 293.
23 See e.g. P. Craig, ‘The Fall and Renewal of the Commission: Accountability, Contract and Administrative Organisation’, 6 ELJ (2000) p. 98.
24 See e.g. F. Ippolito, ‘Vulnerability as a Normative Argument for Accommodating “Justice” within the AFSJ’, 25 ELJ (2019) p. 544; L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions for its Realization’, 45 Common Market Law Review (2008) p. 1335.
25 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 1961).
26 See e.g. A. Bailleux, ‘Article 52-2. Portée et interprétation des droits et principes’, in C. Rizcallah et al. (eds.), Commentaire article par article de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, 3rd edn. (Bruylant forthcoming) at para. 24.
27 For a survey of AG Opinions’ references to Shakespeare writings, see G. Gadbin-George, ‘To Quote or Not to Quote: “Literature in Law” in European Court Decisions and Legal English Teaching’, 64 ASp (2013), ⟨https://journals.openedition.org/asp/3842⟩, visited 15 November 2022.
28 This notion famously comes from G. Teubner, Autopoietic Law. A New Approach to Law and Society (de Gruyter 1988), although he means something slightly different when he refers to the cognitive openness of law.
29 I am indebted to Elise Muir for drawing my attention to the need to introduce this distinction.
30 Leaving aside the notable exception of the European Court of Human Rights, the ECJ has proved rather reluctant to draw on international and foreign case law. See e.g. its dismissal of the UN Human Rights Committee findings in ECJ 17 February 1998, Case C-249/96, Grant, paras. 45-47.
31 ECJ 21 December 2016, Case C-104/16 P, Council v Front Polisario, paras. 91 and 105.
32 GC 8 September 2016, Case T-472/13, H. Lundbeck v Commission, para. 353.
33 In the same vein, but from a political science perspective, see J. Bailleux, ‘Comment l’Europe vint au droit. Le premier congrès international d’études de la CECA (Milan-Stresa 1957)’, 60 Revue française de sciences politiques (2010) p. 259.
34 Obviously, such practices (think about trilogues or lobbying) typically entail the production of texts. But my point is that it is the practice itself, and not its end result (say, the text agreed upon at the end of the trilogue phase), that is primarily relevant to legal analysis. That is what makes this category distinct from the ‘legally relevant texts’ category. I am grateful to Robin Gadbled for drawing my attention to this potential confusion.
35 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004) OJ L 24/1.
36 ECJ 24 October 2013, Case C-275/12, Elrick; ECJ 24 October 2013, Case C-220/12, Thiele Meneses.
37 Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 10 and 11 December 2020, EUCO 22/20.
38 C. Alcaraz et al., ‘Whatever it Takes: What’s the Impact of a Major Nonconventional Monetary Policy Intervention?’, ECB Working Paper Series No. 2249, March 2019, ⟨∼https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2249∼543dd2fbd3.en.pdf⟩, visited 15 November 2022.
39 J. Keller and T. Blancher, ‘Peut-on parler de coutume en droit de l’Union européenne ?’, in I. Hachez et al. (eds.), Les sources du droit revisitées – volume 1 (Anthemis – Université Saint-Louis 2012) p. 245-246.
40 In the same vein, see S. Besson, ‘General Principles and Customary Law in the EU Legal Order’, in S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill, General Principles of Law. European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017) ch. 7.
41 For seminal papers providing a good introduction to modern legal pluralism, see e.g. J. Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’, 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism (1986) p. 1; S.F. Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Object of Study’, 7 Law and Society Review (1973) p. 719; S.E. Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, 22 Law and Society Review (1988) p. 869.
42 L. François, Le problème de la définition du droit (Liège 1978) and Le cap des tempêtes. Essai de microscopie du droit (Bruylant – LGDJ 2012).
43 See e.g. B. Frydman, ‘Comment penser le droit global ?’, Série des Working Papers du Centre Perelman No. 2021/01, ⟨https://www.philodroit.be/Comment-penser-le-droit-global/?lang=en⟩, visited 15 November 2022.
44 Following St Augustine’s famous expression (The City of God, part I, IV, 4: ‘Without justice what are kingdoms but great bands of robbers? And what is a band of robbers but such a kingdom in miniature?’)
45 For an application of this Weberian category to contemporaneous legal developments, see M. Coutu, Max Weber’s Interpretive Sociology of Law (Routledge 2018).
46 Hart, supra n. 25, p. 79-110.
47 See G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments. Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 48-49: ‘private codes … attain their validity from an independent combination of primary and secondary norms’.
48 This communication drew on I. Solanke, ‘Diversity and Independence in the European Court of Justice’, 15 Columbia Journal of European Law (2008-2009) p. 89.
49 L. Azoulai, European Union Law and Forms of Life: Madness or Malaise? (Hart Publishing 2022).
50 A. Bailleux and E. Bernard (eds), Les récits judiciaires de l’Europe. Concepts et typologie (Bruylant 2019); A. Bailleux et al. (eds.), Les récits judiciaires de l’Europe. Dynamique et conflits (Bruylant 2021). A third (and last) volume, dedicated to the dissemination and reception of such narratives is forthcoming in 2023.
51 On the very possibility to embrace an external point of view on law while taking legal discourse seriously, see the doubts expressed by A.-J. Arnaud (‘La valeur heuristique de la distinction interne/externe comme grande dichotomie pour la connaissance du droit : éléments d’une démystification’, Droit et Société (1986), p. 141) and the reply by F. Ost and M. van de Kerchove (‘De la scène au balcon. D’où vient la science du droit?’, in Fr. Chazel and J. Commaille (eds.), Normes juridiques et régulation sociale (LGDJ 1991) p. 67-80).
52 The enduring success of the law & economics movement and the increasing use of quantitative analysis, for instance, are not discussed or represented in any of the papers.