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The Role of Judicial Craft in Improving Democracy’s Resilience: The Case of Party Bans in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia

Part of: Militant Democracy, Populism, Illiberalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2022

Max Steuer
Max Steuer*
Affiliation:
O.P. Jindal Global University, Jindal Global Law School, India; Comenius University in Bratislava, Department of Political Science, Slovakia; email: ms2632@cantab.ac.uk.
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Abstract

The unsuccessful petition to ban Slovakia’s extreme right parliamentary party – the value of focusing on judicial craft for studies of militant democracy and courts – statutory frameworks as intervening variables and their overview in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia – key components of judicial craft endogenous to courts: consistency, legal reasoning skills, problem-solving abilities, creativity – the cases of Workers’ Party (Czechia), Slovak Togetherness–National Party (Slovakia), People’s Party Our Slovakia (Slovakia) and Hungarian Guard (Hungary) – the decisions of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (2009) and the Slovak Supreme Court (2019) – re-evaluating what counts as ‘success’ with party bans: judicial craft affects the effectiveness of the statutory framework for party bans – a court-centric perspective on militant democracy when courts face illiberal assaults

Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 18 , Issue 3 , September 2022 , pp. 440 - 465
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the University of Amsterdam

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Footnotes

The valuable feedback of the editors of the special issue as well as of the Review, the anonymous reviewers, the participants of the workshop ‘Militant Democracy: New Challengers and Challenges’ at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 2021 and of Professor Peter Cane to earlier drafts are very much appreciated, as is the research assistance of Shubh Sahai. The usual disclaimer applies. All translations from Czech, Hungarian and Slovak are the author’s, unless indicated otherwise. Developments until August 2022 were considered. All online sources were visited 5 September 2022. The early phases of this research were supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV-16-0389.

References

1 A. Sajó, ‘Militant Constitutionalism’, in A. Malkopoulou and A. Kirshner (eds.), Militant Democracy and Its Critics: Populism, Parties, Extremism (Edinburgh University Press 2019) p. 187 at p. 187.

2 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, 4 Volpp/1/2017 (2019).

3 E.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI Country Report: Slovakia, ⟨https://bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_SVK.pdf⟩; A. Kazharski, ‘The End of “Central Europe”? The Rise of the Radical Right and the Contestation of Identities in Slovakia and the Visegrad Four’, 23 Geopolitics (2018) p. 754.

4 M. Colborne, ‘Marian Kotleba Wants to Make Slovakia Fascist Again’, Foreign Policy, 2020, ⟨https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/28/marian-kotleba-slovakia-election-right-wing-fascism/⟩.

5 M. Hailbronner, ‘Combatting Malfunction or Optimizing Democracy? Lessons from Germany for a Comparative Political Process Theory’, 19 I•CON (2021) p. 495 at p. 510.

6 The petition was generally limited to references to party documents and selected statements by key party representatives alongside an expert witness statement from a different case prepared by the author of this article: Petition of the attorney general of the Slovak Republic, VI/2 Gc 137/16/1000 – 97, 2017, available at ⟨https://www.scribd.com/document/408062884/Znenie-%C5%BEaloby-na-rozpustenie-%C4%BDSNS#download&from_embed⟩, p. 3, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17.

7 Petition, supra n. 6, p. 2.

8 E. Harris, ‘Nation Before Democracy? Placing the Rise of the Slovak Extreme Right into Context’, 35 East European Politics (2019) p. 538 at p. 553.

9 J. Krempaský, ‘Vraj ho porazí vrece zemiakov. Ficovi je dobrý už aj Kotleba’, Sme, 12 February 2019, ⟨https://domov.sme.sk/c/22051558/vraj-ho-porazi-vrece-zemiakov-ficovi-je-dobry-uz-aj-kotleba.html⟩; M. Steuer, ‘On the Brink of Joining Poland and Hungary: The Night of Surprises in the Slovak Parliament’, Verfassungsblog, 25 October 2018, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/on-the-brink-of-joining-poland-and-hungary-the-night-of-surprises-in-the-slovak-parliament/⟩.

10 Petition…, supra n. 6, p. 17.

11 Ibid., p. 18.

12 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, supra n. 2, § 156.

13 See, e.g., A. Malkopoulou, ‘Greece: A Procedural Defence of Democracy against the Golden Dawn’, 17 EuConst (2021) p. 177.

14 E.g. M. Graber et al. (eds.), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (Oxford University Press 2018).

15 J.E. Moliterno and P. Čuroš, ‘Recent Attacks on Judicial Independence: The Vulgar, the Systemic, and the Insidious’, 22 German Law Journal (2021) p. 1159.

16 K. Kovács and K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland – and the European Union’, 51 Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2018) p. 189.

17 See A. Bourne and F. Casal Bértoa, ‘Mapping “Militant Democracy”: Variation in Party Ban Practices in European Democracies (1945-2015)’, 13 EuConst (2017) p. 221 at p. 234-236.

18 M. Mareš, ‘Czech Militant Democracy in Action: Dissolution of the Workers’ Party and the Wider Context of This Act’, 26 East European Politics and Societies (2012) p. 33 at p. 39; T. Nociar, ‘Right-Wing Extremism in Slovakia’ (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2012) p. 4 ⟨http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09567.pdf⟩; M. Varga, ‘Hungary’s “Anti-Capitalist” Far-Right: Jobbik and the Hungarian Guard’, 42 Nationalities Papers (2014) p. 791 at p. 796.

19 A. Bourne, Democratic Dilemmas: Why Democracies Ban Political Parties (Routledge 2018) p. 8.

20 See the STNP decision below.

21 See the first Workers’ Party decision below.

22 E.g. B. Bugarič and T. Ginsburg, ‘The Assault on Postcommunist Courts’, 27 Journal of Democracy (2016) p. 69; Moliterno and Čuroš, supra n. 15, p. 1190.

23 S. Suteu, Eternity Clauses in Democratic Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2021) p. 21.

24 The literature on defective democracies is vast : see, e.g., W. Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’, 11 Democratization (2004) p. 33.

25 Cf B. Rijpkema, Militant Democracy: The Limits of Democratic Tolerance (Routledge 2018) p. 31-49.

26 Ibid., p. 25-31.

27 D.J. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Oxford University Press 2018) p. 704-712.

28 L. Sólyom, Pártok és érdekszervezetek az alkotmányban (Rejtjel 2004) p. 96.

29 Q. Jing and Z. Qingfeng, ‘The Dissolution of the Hong Kong National Party: Constitutionality under the “Militant Democracy” Theory’, 7 The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law (2019) p. 413 at p. 417.

30 A. Bourne, ‘Militant Democracy and the Banning of Political Parties in Democratic States: Why Some Do and Why Some Don’t’, in A. Ellian and B. Rijpkema (eds.), Militant Democracy (Springer 2018) p. 23 at p. 39.

31 A. Jakab, European Constitutional Language (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 181.

32 B. Rijpkema, ‘Militant Democracy and the Detection Problem’, in Malkopoulou and Kirshner, supra n. 1, p. 169 at p. 183-184.

33 See also C.R. Kaltwasser, ‘Militant Democracy Versus Populism’, in Malkopoulou and Kirshner, supra n. 1, p. 72 at p. 84-88.

34 J. Rak, ‘The Global Authoritarian Turn, Democratic Vulnerability, and Geo-Digital Competition’, 27 Geopolitics (2022) p. 680 at p. 684.

35 Cf G. Frankenberg and H. Alviar García, ‘Authoritarian Structures and Trends in Consolidated Democracies’, in A. Sajó et al. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (Routledge 2021) p. 164 at p. 168-169.

36 J.W. Müller, ‘The Problem of Peer Review in Militant Democracy’, in U. Belavusau and A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias (eds.), Constitutionalism Under Stress (Oxford University Press 2020) p. 259; T. Vincents Olsen, ‘Citizens’ Actions against Non-liberal-democratic Parties’, 18 EuConst (2022) p. 1; M. Steuer, ‘Militant Democracy and COVID-19: Protecting the Regime, Protecting Rights?’, 2 Hong Kong Journal of Law and Public Affairs (2020) p. 131 at p. 135-136 and references therein.

37 J.W. Müller, ‘Citizens as Militant Democrats, Or: Just How Intolerant Should the People Be?’, 34 Critical Review (2022) p. 85 at p. 86, 90, 92.

38 A. Kirshner, ‘Militant Democracy Defended’, in Malkopoulou and Kirshner, supra n. 1, p. 56.

39 A. Sajó and R. Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press 2017) p. 439-440. ‘[Militant democratic measures] turn out to be a most useful tool to destroy constitutionalism in the hands of illiberal political forces.’

40 A. Malkopoulou and L. Norman, ‘Three Models of Democratic Self-Defence: Militant Democracy and Its Alternatives’, 66 Political Studies (2018) p. 442 at p. 448-450.

41 S. Baume, Hans Kelsen and the Case for Democracy (ECPR Press 2013) at p. 14-15 ff; L. Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press 2007) p. 101-144.

42 C.I. Accetti and I. Zuckerman, ‘What’s Wrong with Militant Democracy?’, 65 Political Studies (2016) p. 182 at p. 194. Loewenstein criticised this view as an expression of ‘legalistic complacency and suicidal lethargy’: K. Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I’, 31 American Political Science Review (1937) p. 417 at p. 432.

43 E.g. M. Chou, Democracy Against Itself: Sustaining an Unsustainable Idea (Edinburgh University Press 2014) p. 50-76.

44 A. Sajó, ‘The Self-Protecting Constitutional State’, 12 East European Constititional Review (2003) p. 78 at p. 81-83.

45 Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, PL. ÚS 5/92 (1992) p. 92; Czech Constitutional Court, IV. ÚS 2011/10 (2011) § 25; Slovak Constitutional Court PL. ÚS 5/2017 (2019) § 89.

46 G. Capoccia, ‘Legislative Responses against Extremism. The “Protection of Democracy” in the First Czechoslovak Republic (1920-1938)’, 16 East European Politics and Societies (2002) p. 691.

47 D. Kosař et al., ‘The Twin Challenges to Separation of Powers in Central Europe: Technocratic Governance and Populism’, 15 EuConst (2019) p. 427 at p. 438-439.

48 Notably Act No. 201/1933 Coll. on suspending the activities and dissolving of political parties. See Capoccia, supra n. 46, p. 717-721. For details on the two judgments of the Czechoslovak Supreme Administrative Court, which addressed appeals to the dissolution of several parties by the executive, see A. Roztočil, ‘Legislativa a judikatura k rozpouštění politických stran v první republice’, 18 Jurisprudence (2009) p. 21 at p. 24-27.

49 J. Osterkamp, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Tschechoslowakei (1920-1939) (Klostermann 2009) p. 84-92.

50 G. Capoccia, Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press 2007) p. 242-245.

51 P. Harvey, ‘Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights’, 29 European Law Review (2004) p. 407 at p. 419; a landmark case was that of the Turkish Welfare Party where the ECtHR essentially confirmed the validity of a ban, substantially extending the militant model. See P. Macklem, ‘Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox of Self-Determination’, 4 I•CON (2006) p. 488; see also A. Sajó, ‘Militant Democracy and Emotional Politics’, 19 Constellations (2012) p. 562 at p. 564.

52 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Guidelines on Prohibition of Political Parties and Analogous Measures (1999) ⟨https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-INF(2000)001-e⟩.

53 E.g. M.R. Madsen, ‘Resistance to the European Court of Human Rights: The Institutional and Sociological Consequences of Principled Resistance’, in M. Breuer (ed.), Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments – A New Paradigm? (Springer 2019) p. 35 at p. 46-47.

54 A. Kirshner, A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combatting Political Extremism (Yale University Press 2014); Rijpkema, supra n. 25; L. Vinx, ‘Democratic Equality and Militant Democracy’, 27 Constellations (2020) p. 685.

55 Rijpkema, supra n. 25, p. 194.

56 Malkopoulou and Norman, supra n. 40, p. 453.

57 S. Choudhry, ‘Resisting Democratic Backsliding: An Essay on Weimar, Self-Enforcing Constitutions, and the Frankfurt School’, 7 Global Constitutionalism (2018) p. 54 at p. 61-63.

58 E.g. A. Bourne, ‘The Proscription of Parties and the Problem with “Militant Democracy”’, 7 Journal of Comparative Law (2012) p. 196 at p. 208-210. This tendency is visible in the title of a prominent early study: K. Loewenstein, ‘Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies I’, 38 Columbia Law Review (1938) p. 591.

59 Choudhry, supra n. 57, p. 70.

60 R. Car, ‘A Reply to Sujit Choudhry’s “Resisting Democratic Backsliding”: Weimar Legacy and Self-Enforcing Constitutions in Post-WWII Left-Wing Constitutional Theory’, 8 Global Constitutionalism (2019) p. 391 at p. 399-400, 414-415, 416.

61 M. Lerner, ‘Constitution and Court as Symbols’, 46 Yale Law Journal (1937) p. 1290 at p. 1291.

62 G. Maddox, ‘Karl Loewenstein, Max Lerner, and Militant Democracy: An Appeal to “Strong Democracy”’, 54 Australian Journal of Political Science (2019) p. 490 at p. 498 ff.

63 M. Lerner, It Is Later than You Think: The Need for a Militant Democracy (The Viking Press 1939).

64 J.W. Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (Yale University Press 2011) p. 147.

65 R. Møller Stahl and B.A. Popp-Madsen, ‘Defending Democracy: Militant and Popular Models of Democratic Self-Defense’, Constellations (2022) p. 1 at p. 16.

66 Kirshner, supra n. 54, p. 14.

67 An exception is the examination of selected case law of the German Constitutional Court and the ECtHR to test a (conceptually derived) theory of militant democracy: Rijpkema, supra n. 25, p. 141-156.

68 E. Özbudun, ‘Party Prohibition Cases: Different Approaches by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights’, 17 Democratization (2010) p. 125; S. Tyulkina, Militant Democracy: Undemocratic Political Parties and Beyond (Routledge 2015) p. 95-104.

69 S. Basabe-Serrano, ‘The Judges’ Academic Background as Determinant of the Quality of Judicial Decisions in Latin American Supreme Courts’, 40 Justice System Journal (2019) p. 110 at p. 112.

70 M. Galanter, ‘The Radiating Effects of Courts’, in K.O. Boyum and L. Mather (eds.), Empirical Theories About Courts (Quid Pro 2015) p. 117.

71 L.M. Friedman, Impact: How Law Affects Behavior (Harvard University Press 2016) p. 42.

72 C. Smulovitz, ‘Law and Courts’ Impact on Development and Democratization’, in P. Cane and H.M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 729 at p. 741-744.

73 D. Landau and R. Dixon, ‘Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy’, 53 UC Davis Law Review (2020) p. 1313 at p. 1338-1345.

74 R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment’, 43 Yale Journal of International Law (2018) p. 1 at p. 82.

75 Z. Fleck, ‘How to Measure? An Essay on the Social Context of Measuring Quality’, in M. Bencze and G.Y. Ng (eds.), How to Measure the Quality of Judicial Reasoning (Springer 2018) p. 43 at p. 43-44.

76 Ibid.

77 See also M. Florczak-Wątor, ‘Introduction’, in M. Florczak-Wątor (ed.), Constitutional Law and Precedent: International Perspectives on Case-Based Reasoning (Routledge 2022) p. 1.

78 This includes the capacity to convincingly address objections raised by dissenting judges, if any. See, in the ECtHR context, M. Goldhaber, The People’s History of the European Court of Human Rights (Rutgers University Press 2008) p. 93, discussing the Turkish Welfare Party cases.

79 H.M. Kritzer, ‘Toward a Theorization of Craft’, 16 Social & Legal Studies (2007) p. 321 at p. 333-337.

80 A. Reichman, ‘The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of the Scholar’, 95 California Law Review (2007) p. 1619.

81 Ibid., p. 1625.

82 Ibid., p. 1662.

83 Ibid.

84 R. Dixon, ‘Strong Courts: Judicial Statecraft in Aid of Constitutional Change’, 59 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2021) p. 299.

85 R. Mann, ‘Non-Ideal Theory of Constitutional Adjudication’, 7 Global Constitutionalism (2018) p. 14 at p. 41-43.

86 Cf Dixon, supra n. 84, p. 302.

87 Cf, for the US Supreme Court context, M.E.K. Hall, What Justices Want: Goals and Personality on the U.S. Supreme Court (Cambridge University Press 2018).

88 For example, she highlights the importance of the timing of the decision, which would be included in Kritzer’s sensitivity towards political context, or the importance of diverse narratives, akin to Kritzer’s judicial creativity.

89 Ibid., p. 321.

90 Ibid., p. 326-327.

91 In Hungary, segments of leadership of Jobbik – a popular contemporary opposition party – overlapped with the Hungarian Guard.

92 A.L.P. Pirro et al., ‘Close Ever, Distant Never? Integrating Protest Event and Social Network Approaches into the Transformation of the Hungarian Far Right’, 27 Party Politics (2021) p. 22 at p. 23. On Slovakia, see J. Marušiak, ‘“Slovak, Not Brussels Social Democracy”’, 38 Czech Journal of Political Science (2021) p. 37.

93 A. Ellinas, Organizing Against Democracy: The Local Organizational Development of Far Right Parties in Greece and Europe (Cambridge University Press 2020) p. 33.

94 F. Casal Bértoa and I. van Biezen, ‘Party Regulation and Party Politics in Post-Communist Europe’, 30 East European Politics (2014) p. 295 at p. 296-300.

95 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Art. 5.

96 P. Smuk, ‘European Constitutions as Sources of Party Law and the Fundamental Law of Hungary’, 4 Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de León (2017) p. 51 at p. 62-64.

97 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Art. 29 sec. 2-3.

98 This can include sanctions for non-democratic party structures. See Y. Mersel, ‘The Dissolution of Political Parties: The Problem of Internal Democracy’, 4 I•CON (2006) p. 84.

99 E.g. Mareš, supra n. 18, p. 39-41.

100 F. Casal Bértoa et al., ‘Limits of Regulation: Party Law and Finance in Slovakia 1990–2012’, 30 East European Politics (2014) p. 351 at p. 357.

101 R. Uitz, ‘Hungary’, in M. Thiel (ed.), The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracies (Ashgate 2009) p. 162. On developments post-2010, see I. Halász and A. Horváth, ‘Politikai közösség (nemzet, nemzetiségek, határon túli magyarok, pártok)’, in I. Halász (ed.), Alkotmányjog (Dialóg Campus Kiadó 2018) p. 153.

102 Party Act (Law XXXIII of 1989).

103 Fundamental Law, Art. C) sec. 2.

104 Civil Act (Act CLXXV of 2011), §3 sec. 3.

105 P. Smuk, ‘Pluralism Confined? Party Law Case Studies from Hungary’, in C. Santos Botelho et al. (eds.), Constitutionalism in a Plural World (Universidade Católica Portuguesa 2018) p. 80 at p. 89.

106 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Art. 142 sec. 2(b).

107 T. Drinóczi and G. Mészáros, ‘Hungary: An Abusive Neo-Militant Democracy’, in J. Rak and R. Bäcker (eds.), Neo-Militant Democracies in Post-Communist Member States of the European Union (Routledge 2022) p. 98 at p. 103.

108 J. Hogan, ‘Analyzing the Risk Thresholds For Banning Political Parties After NPD II’, 23 German Law Journal (2022) p. 97 at p. 113.

109 Czech Code of Administrative Justice, No. 150/2002 Coll. §16 sec. 2 a).

110 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Art. 131 sec. 1 (Slovakia); Act on the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, No. 182/1993 Coll. §11 sec. 2 e) (Czechia); Smuk, supra n. 105, p. 89 (Hungary).

111 According to the Venice Commission, the question of initiating the proceedings against antidemocratic parties is the ‘most important’ one from ‘the procedural perspective’. Reproduced in Venice Commission, Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Political Parties (2016), ⟨https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2016)003-e⟩ p. 61.

112 R. Pataj, ‘Žilinka je na ceste bez návratu, sprevádzajú ho na nej Ficovi, Kotlebovi a Putinovi fanúšikovia’, Denník N, 8 February 2022, ⟨https://dennikn.sk/2712274/newsfilter-zilinka-je-na-ceste-bez-navratu-sprevadzaju-ho-na-nej-ficovi-kotlebovi-a-putinovi-fanusikovia/⟩.

113 Uitz, supra n. 101, p. 164-165.

114 Act on association in political parties and political movements, No. 424/1991 Coll. §15 sec. 1.

115 S. Sottiaux and S. Rummens, ‘Concentric Democracy: Resolving the Incoherence in the ECtHR’s Case Law on Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association’, 10 I•CON (2012) p. 106 at p. 122.

116 Act, supra n. 114, §14 sec. 1.

117 Slovak Administrative Procedure Code, Act No. 162/2015 Coll, § 388.

118 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, 2To/10/2018 (2019). See overview in M. Steuer, ‘Democratic (Dis)Armament’, Verfassungsblog, 17 December 2019, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/democratic-disarmament/⟩.

119 T. Ginsburg et al., ‘The Law of Democratic Disqualification’, 111 California Law Review (forthcoming) p. 1 at p. 23, ⟨https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3938600⟩.

120 For Slovakia, see J. Drgonec, Ústava Slovenskej republiky: Teória a prax (CH Beck 2019) p. 726; for Hungary, Sólyom, supra n. 28, p. 101.

121 Drgonec, supra n. 120, p. 724-725.

122 Act on the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, No. 314/2018 Coll. §180 in connection with §183; for Czechia and Hungary, see supra n. 110.

123 The relationship between courts and judges is mutually constitutive: ‘[…] institutions have an important role in shaping the development of individuals within their role’: J. Bell, Judiciaries within Europe: A Comparative Review (Cambridge University Press 2006) p. 350.

124 Kritzer, supra n. 80.

125 Act No. 84/1990 Coll.

126 Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, Pst 1/2008 – 66 9-11, (2009) § 50, 54, 59.

127 Ibid., § 79, also § 86, on the effort to obtain power by ‘undemocratic means’, § 91, on violation of the Assembly Act as an insufficient ground for the prosecution of the party.

128 J. Filip, ‘Návrh na rozpuštění Dělnické strany před NSS’, 18 Jurisprudence (2009) p. 14 at p. 20.

129 Mareš, supra n. 18, p. 42-43.

130 Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic, Pst 1/2009 – 348 (2010) §§ 663-664.

131 Ibid., §§ 626-628.

132 Czech Constitutional Court, PL. ÚS 13/10 (2010).

133 See Kritzer, supra n. 79. The first of the two judgments may be argued to be creative in taking up the role of providing advice to the executive. However, the analysis here evaluates all judgments in a single case together, rather than separately.

134 For example, M. Vrzgulová, ‘Memories of the Holocaust: Slovak Bystanders’, 23 Holocaust Studies (2017) p. 99 at p. 103-105.

135 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, 3Sž/79/2005 (2005).

136 Ibid., p. 2.

137 N.W. Barber, ‘Self-Defence for Institutions’, 72 The Cambridge Law Journal (2013) p. 558 at p. 571.

138 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, 6Sr/1/2009 (2009).

139 M. Mareš, ‘How Does Militant Democracy Function in Combating Right-Wing Extremism? A Case Study of Slovakian Militant Democracy and the Rise of Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia’, in Ellian and Rijpkema, supra n. 30, p. 61 at p. 72.

140 M. Steuer and M. Kovanič, ‘Militarisation of Democracy in Slovakia’, in Rak and Bäcker, supra n. 107, p. 165.

141 M. Steuer, ‘Militant Democracy on the Rise: Consequences of Legal Restrictions on Extreme Speech in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary’, 44 Review of Central and East European Law (2019) p. 162 at p. 192-194.

142 Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, supra n. 2, § 156.

143 Ibid., § 136.

144 Supreme Court, supra n. 2, § 163.

145 Ibid., pp. 20–28.

146 Tyulkina, supra n. 68, p. 95-98; Rijpkema, supra n. 25, p. 151-153.

147 Ibid., § 151-152.

148 Ibid., § 167.

149 Ibid., § 135-136.

150 Marušiak, supra n. 92; Z. Gál and D. Malová, ‘Slovakia in the Eurozone: Tatra Tiger or Mafia State inside the Elite Club?’, in K. Arató et al. (eds.), The Political Economy of the Eurozone in Central and Eastern Europe: Why In, Why Out? (Routledge 2021) p. 165 at p. 176.

151 See Kritzer, supra n. 79.

152 In August 2022, the attorney general indicated that he will not initiate another petition to ban the PPOS, despite, a few months earlier, Kotleba’s conviction for defamation of nation, race and belief being affirmed by the Slovak Supreme Court. The attorney general argued that the party’s popularity is decreasing and also substantively it no longer presents claims that would be a threat to democracy: Generálna prokuratúra Slovenskej republiky, K dôvodom nepodania žaloby na rozpustenie politickej strany ĽSNS (2022) ⟨https://www.genpro.gov.sk/spravy-2ed7.html?id=3021⟩.

153 Ellinas, supra n. 93, p. 36-37.

154 Varga, supra n. 18, p. 794-797.

155 Budapest Court of Appeals, 5.Pf.20.738/2009/7 (2009) p. 21.

156 Supreme Court of Hungary, Kfv.X.37.783/2009/6 (2009) p. 10, 19.

157 H. Küpper, ‘A Legfelsőbb Bíróság ítélete a Magyar Gárda feloszlatása ügyében’, 1 Jogesetek magyarázata (2010) p. 17 at p. 17-18.

158 Budapest Court of Appeals, supra n. 155, p. 21.

159 ECtHR 9 July 2013, No. 35943/10, Vona v Hungary.

160 Küpper, supra n. 157, p. 22-23.

161 W.M. Downs, Political Extremism in Democracies: Combating Intolerance (Palgrave 2012) p. 192.

162 Küpper, supra n. 157, p. 20-22.

163 See, e.g., E. De Giorgi et al., ‘New Challenger Parties in Opposition: Isolation or Cooperation?’, 74 Parliamentary Affairs (2021) p. 662 at p. 668-669.

164 Pirro et al., supra n. 92, p. 30-31.

165 This development is similar to that in Slovakia. There, STNP leader Kotleba, instead of ceasing partisan activities in the aftermath of the ban on STNP, spearheaded PPOS which became more successful than its predecessor.

166 P. Castillo-Ortiz, ‘The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe’, 15 EuConst (2019) p. 48.

167 D. Collier and S. Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research’, 49 World Politics (1997) p. 430; Merkel, supra n. 24, p. 34-35.

168 B. Rothstein, ‘Political Institutions: An Overview’, in R.E Goodin and H. D. Klingemann (eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford University Press 1998) p. 133.

169 B. Magyar and B, Madlovics, The Anatomy of Post-Communist Regimes: A Conceptual Framework (CEU Press 2020) p. 157-161.

170 P. Craig, ‘Democracy’, in R. Masterman and R. Schütze (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2019) p. 201 at p. 217.

171 See Dixon, supra n. 84, p. 308.

172 Z. Kühn, ‘Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement’, 52 American Journal of Comparative Law (2004) p. 531 at p. 558-561. Interestingly, Professor Kühn was one of the judges in the Workers’ Party cases.

173 K. Möller, ‘Justifying the Culture of Justification’, 17 I•CON (2019) p. 1078.

174 Acceptance is important as courts themselves are not immune from the social contexts in which they operate: P. Cane, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 508.

175 S. Verdugo, ‘How Judges Can Challenge Dictators and Get Away with It: Advancing Democracy While Preserving Judicial Independence’, 59 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2021) p. 554 at p. 577-585; Y. Roznai, ‘Who Will Save the Redheads? Towards an Anti-Bully Theory of Judicial Review and Protection of Democracy’, 29 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal (2020) p. 1.

176 M. Steuer, ‘Authoritarian Populism, Conceptions of Democracy, and the Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Case of Political Participation’, 26(7) International Journal of Human Rights (2022) p. 1207.

177 Dixon, supra n. 84, p. 308.

178 C.W. Clayton and D.A. May, ‘A Political Regimes Approach to the Analysis of Legal Decisions’, 32 Polity (1999) p. 233.

179 Turkey is a particularly pertinent case in connection to this practice, see, e.g., Özbudun, supra n. 68, p. 125.

180 A. Przeworski, Crises of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2019) p. 162-164.