1 The qualification as “private norms” refers to the private authors of the norm as opposite to state law. “Public goods” are usually defined as goods that are non-rival and non-excludable like a clean environment or social security. Within the traditional nation state, public goods are usually provided for by the state. In a transnational system, however, an exclusive state responsibility for public goods is less obvious.

2 International Organization for Standardization.

3 Unilateral business codes constitute an estimated 80 % of the transnational regimes, see Stelzl, Bernhard, “Codes of Conduct”, Arbeit im Betrieb 2001, pp. 149 et sqq., at p.150Google Scholar. On the various form of private regulation see also Herberg, Martin, Globalisierung und private Selbstregulierung (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 2007)Google Scholar; Dilling, Olaf, Herberg, Martin and Winter, Gerd (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and the Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).Google Scholar

4 United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381.

5 In the late 1980s, the fishing practice of chasing, encircling and netting of dolphins with purse seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean in order to get the beneath swimming tuna – which by then had killed an estimated 7 million dolphins – was made public by the US NGO “Earth Island Institute”. This led to consumer boycotts, a privately organised “dolphin-safe” labelling and monitoring scheme and legal interventions mainly in the US. The respective US provisions concerning import restrictions on tuna had already been subject to the famous “Tuna-Dolphin I” rulings, see United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Panel Report, 16 August 1991, I.L.M. 33 (1991), at pp. 1594 et sqq; United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Panel Report, 20 May 1994, I.L.M. 35 (1994), at pp. 839 et sqq, which were however never adopted. In these decisions only the US labelling provisions (at issue now) had not been condemned. In 1992, the Parties of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission agreed on a binding progressive reduction of dolphin mortalities in the tuna purse seine nets fi shery in the ETP by setting annual limits, see La Jolla Agreement, February 1992, available on the Internet at <http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/IATTC-Resolution-on-LJ-Agreement-Apr-1992.pdf> (last accessed on 12 July 2012); Panama Declaration, October 1995, available on the Internet at <http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Declaration_of_Panama.pdf> (last accessed on 12 July 2012); in 2001 this was followed by the “Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme” with its own “dolphin-safe” label.

6 United States Code, Title 16, Section 1385 (“Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act”); Code of Federal Regulations, Title 50, Section 216.91 (“Dolphin safe labelling standards”) and Section 216.92 (“Dolphin safe requirements for tuna harvested in the ETP [Eastern Tropical Pacifi c Ocean] by large purse seine vessels”); Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007). See also United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/ DS381/R, 15 September 2011, at pp. 2 et sqq.

7 For the EII label see http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer.

8 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Programme as last amended in October 2009, available on the Internet at <http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/AIDCP-amended-Oct-2009.pdf> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

9 AIDCP Resolution to Establish Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification of 20 June 2001; AIDCP Resolution to Adopt the Modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna of 20 June 2001.

10 Article 1 AIDCP “Resolution to Adopt the Modified System for Tracking and Verifi cation of Tuna”: “The terms used in this document are defined as follows: a. Dolphin safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which there is no mortality or serious injury of dolphins; b. Nondolphin safe tuna is tuna captured in sets in which mortality or serious injury of dolphins occurs (…)”. Article 1 of the AIDCP Resolution to Establish Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification states: “The terms used in this document are as defi ned in the AIDCP System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna (…)”.

11 E.g. Trüeb, Hans Rudolf, Umweltrecht in der WTO (Zurich: Schulthess, 2001), at p. 453 Google Scholar; Joshi, Manoj, “Are Eco-Labels consistent with World Trade Organisation Agreements”, 38(1) Journal of World Trade (2004), at pp. 69 et sqq.Google Scholar, sees no sufficient relation between a voluntary eco-label and a national measure – regardless of whether the label is privately or publicly administered. From Japan-Measures Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R, 31 March 1998, and Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, 11 February 2000, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/ AB/R, 31 May 2000, results that a relation between compliance with the label and a national benefit is necessary. Besides, voluntary labels are less trade restrictive than other measures which aim at legitimate goals like environmental or consumer protection.

12 For an overview of the discussion, see e.g. Vranes, Erich, “Climate Labelling and the WTO”, 2 European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2011), pp. 205 et sqq, at pp. 207 f.Google Scholar; Joshi, “Are Eco-Labels consistent with World Trade Organisation Agreements”, supra note 11, at pp. 69 et sqq.; Pauwelyn, Joost, “Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt the WTO”, 15(3) European Journal of International Law 15 (2004), at pp. 575 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 See e.g. Puth, Sebastian, WTO und Umwelt – Die Produkt-Prozess- Doktrin (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), at pp. 217 et sqq.Google Scholar; Tietje, Christian, “Voluntary Eco-Labelling Programmes and Questions of State Responsibility in the WTO/GATT Legal System”, 29(5) Journal of World Trade (1995), pp. 123 et sqq, at 135Google Scholar; Joshi, “Are Eco-Labels consistent with World Trade Organisation Agreements”, supra note 11, at pp. 74 et sqq., 79 et sqq.; for deviating views see Vranes, Erich, Trade and the Environment, Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at pp. 319 et sqq., 342 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Conrad, Christiane, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law – Interfacing Trade and Social Goods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at pp. 385 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Against Pauwelyn, Joost, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation: Is the WTO ‘Missing the Boat’?”, in: Joerges, Christian and Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 199 et sqq, at p. 210.Google Scholar

15 See Panel Report, WTO Doc. WTO/DS381/R, at 7.71 et sqq.

16 Joost Pauwelyn, “Tuna: The End of the PPM distinction? The Rise of International Standards?”, available on the Internet at <http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/> (last accessed on 12 July 2012), therefore claims the end of the PPM distinction.

17 See e.g. Vranes, “Climate Labelling and the WTO”, supra note 12, at pp. 209 et sqq.; Joshi, “Are Eco-Labels consistent with World Trade Organisation Agreements”, supra note 11, at pp. 70 et sqq.; Puth, WTO und Umwelt – Die Produkt-Prozess-Doktrin, supra note 13, at pp. 40, 217; Trüeb, Umweltrecht in der WTO, supra note 11, at p. 448; Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law, supra note 13, at pp. 382 et sqq.

18 With one dissenting opinion, see Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 7.146 et sqq.

19 See Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 7.113 et sqq. For detailed analysis, see Arcuri, Alessandra, “Back to the Future: USTuna II and the New Environment-Trade Debate”, 3(2) European Journal of Risk Regulation (2012), pp. 177–189, at II.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R, 16 May 2012, at para. 187.

21 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R, at paras 188 et sqq. Hereby, the Appellate Body highlights the ruling in European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines that a regulation must apply to an identifiable product or group of products, it must lay down characteristics of the product, and “compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory” (EC – Sardines, at para. 176). According to the Appellate Body the situation in both cases is similar: Whereas in EC – Sardines other species of sardines could be marketed on the EC market, provided they are not called “sardines”, here, tuna products could be marketed, provided they are not called “dolphin-safe” (!), see Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R, at paras 183 et sqq., 198. On this see also the amicus curie submission by Robert Howse, available on the Internet at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/amicus/howsetunaamicus.pdf> (last accessed on 12 July 2012), at p. 4 et sqq., who highlights the point that it depends on the relevant “identifiable product” if a regulation could be regarded as mandatory. In EC – Sardines, the relevant product was “sardines” whereas here the relevant product was defi ned as “tuna” or “tuna products”, not as “dolphin-safe tuna” (!).

22 Another issue in this regard was the question whether de facto practice of private market actors, for example, their de facto adherence to voluntary labelling requirements, renders these voluntary requirements de facto mandatory. See WT/DS381/R, at 7.166 ff. For detailed analysis, see Arcuri, “Back to the Future”, supra note 19, at III.

23 Schepel, Harm, “The Empire's Drains: Sources of Legal Recognition of Private Standardisation under the TBT Agreement”, in: Joerges, Christian and Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 397 et sqq., at p. 405Google Scholar, however, has observed that the requirement of an international standard to be set up by an international body as such is not explicitly laid down in the TBT Agreement, which, therefore, would enable bodies or systems that are not open to national bodies to set up international standards.

24 ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991.

25 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R at paras 349 et sqq., in particular at para. 359. Herby the Appellate Body also clarifi es that a “body” (“legal or administrative entity that has specific tasks or composition” (ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, 4.1)) is sufficient to enact an international standard; it is not necessary to have an “organization” (“body that is based on the membership of other bodies or individuals and has an established constitution and its own administration” (ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, 4.2)), ibid., at paras 351 et sqq.

26 Annex 3: Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards.

27 See also Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at p. 210.

28 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex IV, G/TBT/9, 13 November 2000, at 24–26.

29 Section A of the Committee Decision, supra note 28.

30 See also Falke, Josef, Internationale Normen zum Abbau von Handelshemmnissen (St. Augustin: KAN, 2002), at pp. 85 et sqq.Google Scholar

31 See e.g. Harm Schepel, “The Empire's Drains”, supra note 23, at pp. 397 et sqq., 402 et sqq., who calls this “private intergovernmentalism” and argues in favour of the ISO as the relevant standardisation organisation.

32 See, for example, WT/DS381/R, at 7.685, 7.687.

33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna of 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679.

34 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at para. 371.

35 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at para. 372.

36 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at paras 361, 376.

37 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at paras 390 et sqq.

38 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at para. 394.

39 Committee Decision, supra note 28, at 6.

40 “The AIDCP membership was open for signature from 21 May, 1998 until 14 May, 1999 to States whose vessels fished for tuna in the Agreement Area. Given that there were no limitations to or prohibitions of fi shing in the agreement area, provided that the vessels did not operate in the EEZ of one of the coastline countries of the agreement area, any country whose fishing fleet was operating in the ETP could have signed the AIDCP. Thus the AIDCP was indeed open to signature on a non-discriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members in accordance with the principle of openness as described in the TBT decision. In addition, the AIDCP remains open to accession to any States or regional economic integration organization that is invited to accede to the Agreement on the basis of the parties’ decision. To this day, the AIDCP membership is therefore open on a non-discriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members in accordance with the principle of openness as described in the TBT Committee Decision.” (at 7.691).

41 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at paras 396 et sqq.

42 Committee Decision, supra note 28, at 8: “All relevant bodies of WTO Members should be provided with meaningful opportunities to contribute to the elaboration of an international standard so that the standard development process will not give privilege to, or favour the interests of, a particular supplier/s, country/ies or region/s.”

43 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at paras 383 et sqq., in particular para. 384.

44 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at paras 381 et sqq , for details, see infra, at VIII. 2. a).

45 For details see Schepel, Harm, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrated Markets (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at pp. 185 et sqq.Google Scholar

46 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at pp. 190 et sqq. with further references. Of course this confl ict does not only concern regulatory philosophies but also economic interests in the dissemination of technologies. As a consequence of the membership based composition the EU has an important influence on the work of the ISO, whereas the US American standards are adopted by private (professional) organisations and are widely recognised, see Schepel, ibid., at pp. 191 et sqq.

47 Section B of the Committee Decision, supra note 28.

48 See infra, at VII.

49 See Gerald Spindler, Unternehmensorganisationspflichten (Cologne et al.: Heymann, 2001), at pp. 500 et sqq.; Sobczak, Christian, Normung und Umweltschutz im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 2002), at pp. 68 et sqq Google Scholar. For a description of the regulatory system of the ISO see Falke, Josef, Rechtliche Aspekte der Normung in den EG-Mitgliedstaaten und der EFTA, vol 3: Deutschland (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2000), at pp. 198 et sqq.Google Scholar; Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at pp. 183 et sqq.

50 See e.g. Clapp, Jennifer, “The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing World”, 4 Global Governance (1998), pp. 295 et sqq., at pp. 302 et sqq.Google Scholar; Wallach, Lori M., “Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards”, 50 University of Kansas Law Review (2002), pp. 823 et sqq., at pp. 838 et sqq.Google Scholar; Robinson, Nicholas A., “The Transnational Practice of Environmental Law: Global Access and Due Diligence”, American Law Association – American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education 1997, pp. 123 et sqq., at pp. 145 et sqq.Google Scholar; Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, “Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, and the ISO 14001 Environmental Management Standard”, 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (1997), pp. 583 et sqq., at p. 586Google Scholar; Murray, Paula C., “The international Environmental Management Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an Emerging Global Environmental Policy?”; 18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law (1997), pp. 577 et sqq., at pp. 581 et sqq Google Scholar. See also Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at pp. 185 et sqq.; Krut, Riva and Gleckmann, Harris, ISO 14001 – A Missed Opportunity for Sustainable Global Industrial Development (London: Earthscan, 1998), at pp. 43 et sqq.Google Scholar

51 See also Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at pp. 28, 35.

52 See Meidinger, Errol, “Multi-Interest Self-Governance through Global Product Certification Programmes”, in: Dilling, Olaf, Herberg, Martin and Winter, Gerd (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and the Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 259 et sqq.Google Scholar; Bizer, Kilian, “Kooperative Umweltpolitik im internationalen Kontext – Global Law Making am Beispiel nachhaltiger Forstwirtschaft”, in: Hansjürgens, Bernd, Köck, Wolfgang and Kneer, Georg (eds), Kooperative Umweltpolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), pp. 55 et sqq., at p. 57Google Scholar, regarding the “Forest Stewardship Council”.

53 Meidinger, “Multi-Interest Self-Governance”, supra note 52, at pp. 279 et sqq. Steve Charnovitz, “International Standards and the WTO”, GWU Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 133, available on the Internet at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=694346> (last accessed on 12 July 2012), at p. 30, also argues in favour of a promotion of these private standards by WTO law in order to achieve more sustainable development.

54 See e.g. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at pp. 101 et sqq.; id. “The Empire's Drains”, supra note 23, at pp. 399 et sqq.

55 http://www.wssn.net/WSSN. See Meidinger, “Multi-Interest Self- Governance”, supra note 52, at pp. 279 et sqq.

56 In Bolivian law and Brazilian administrative practice, e.g., enterprises which have been certifi ed by the “Forest Stewardship Council” are assumed to manage their forests in in a sustainable way in accordance with the legal requirements. For Brazil, see Derani, Cristiane and Costa, José Augusto Fontoura, “State and Private Sector in a Cooperative Regulation: The Forest Stewardship Council and other Product Labels in Brazil”, in: Dilling, Olaf, Herberg, Martin and Winter, Gerd (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and the Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 293 et sqq., at p. 301Google Scholar; for Bolivia, see Meidinger, Errol, “Forest Certifi cation as Environmental Law Making by Global Civil Society”, in: Meidinger, Errol, Elliott, Chris and Oesten, Gerhard (eds), Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification (Remagen: Kessel, 2003), pp. 293, at p. 315Google Scholar. Acre, a Brazilian federal state, even requires the certification of the “Forest Stewardship Council” as a precondition for foresting; see Meidinger, Errol, “Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think”, 31 The Environmental Law Reporter (2001), pp. 10162 et sqq., at p. 10166Google Scholar. For more details see Meidinger, “Multi-Interest Self-Governance”, supra note 52, at pp. 275 et sqq.

57 Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at p. 210.

58 Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at pp. 217 et sqq.

59 See e.g. Meidinger, “Multi-Interest Self-Governance”, supra note 52, at pp. 278 et sqq.; Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at pp. 404 et sqq.

60 Another obstacle is seen in the requirement for a non-governmental body of having “legal power to enforce a technical regulation”, according to Annex 1 Point 8. See Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at pp. 210, 221 et sqq., according to whom the competence to enforce a private standard (instead of a mandatory technical regulation) might not be considered to be sufficient.

61 See e.g. Meidinger, “Multi-Interest Self-Governance”, supra note 52, at p. 279.

62 See e.g. Charnovitz, “International Standards and the WTO”, supra note 53, at p. 13, who also highlights the value of a diversity of standards and of some regulatory competition.

63 See e.g. Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at p. 212.

64 E.g. Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at pp. 219 et sqq. See infra, at VI.

65 See in particular Schepel, “The Empire's Drains”, supra note 23, at pp. 397 et sqq., with a view to European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 September 2002. See also Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at p. 212.

66 See e.g. Bachmann, Gregor, Privatrecht als Organisationsrecht – Grundlagen einer Theorie privater Rechtssetzung, Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler (JbjZivRWiss) 2002, pp. 9 et sqq , at p. 13Google Scholar; id., Private Ordnung (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2006), at 163 et sqq., 179 et sqq. with further references.

67 In particular von Bogdandy, Armin, “Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 2001, pp. 609 et sqq., at pp. 618 et sqq., 624 et sqq Google Scholar. See also Markus Krajewski, “Legitimizing global economic governance through transnational parliamentarization: The parliamentary dimensions of the WTO and the World Bank”, TranState Working Papers No 136 (Collaborative Research Centre 597, Bremen, 2010), at pp. 11 et sqq.; id., Verfassungsperspektiven und Legitimation des Rechts der Welthandelsorganisation (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), at pp. 244 et sqq, 272.

68 E.g. von Bogdandy, “Law and Politics in the WTO”, supra note 67, at pp. 618 et sqq., 624 et sqq.; in this sense also Christian Joerges, “Perspektiven einer kollisionsrechtlichen Verfassung transnationaler Märkte”, TranState Working Papers No. 146 (Collaborative Research Centre 597, Bremen, 2011), at pp. 32 et sqq.

69 See in particular European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006.

70 See e.g. von Bogdandy, “Law and Politics in the WTO”, supra note 67, at pp. 633 et sqq. with further references.

71 See Jürgen Habermas, “Ein Pakt für oder gegen Europa”, April 2011, available on the Internet at <http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Habermas%20PDF.pdf> (last accessed on 12 July 2012), at p. 5.

72 See e.g. Koch, Hans-Joachim, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Europäischen Umweltrecht (Boorberg, Stuttgart, 2005), at pp. 44 et sqq.Google Scholar; Gerd Winter, “Subsidiarität und Legitimation in der europäischen Mehrebenenverwaltung”, TranState Working Paper No. 6 (Collaborative Research Centre 597, Bremen, 2004), at pp. 10 et sqq. See also Scott, Joanne, “International Trade and Environmental Governance: relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO”, 15 European Journal of International Law (2004), pp. 307 et sqq., at pp. 350 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who also highlights the principles of fl exibility and transparency in the context of the WTO.

73 See e.g. Denninger, Erhard, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Normsetzung im Umwelt- und Technikrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), at pp. 170 et sqq.Google Scholar; Lübbe-Wolff, Gertrude, “Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Normsetzung und der Normkonkretisierung im Umweltrecht”, 6 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung (1991), pp. 219 et sqq., at pp. 232 et sqq.Google Scholar; id., “Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht”, 60 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (2001), pp. 246 et sqq.; Schmidt-Preuß, Matthias, “Normierung und Selbstnormierung aus der Sicht des öffentlichen Rechts”, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 1997, pp. 249 et sqq., at pp. 256 et sqq.Google Scholar; Hoffmann-Riem, Wolfgang, “Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige Auffangordnungen – Systematisierung und Entwicklungsperspektiven”, in: Hoffmann-Riem, Wolfgang and Schmidt-Aßmann, Eberhard (eds), Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige Auffangordnungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), pp. 261 et sqq., at pp. 319 et sqq.Google Scholar; Falke, Rechtliche Aspekte der Normung, supra note 49, at pp. 248 et sqq.; Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, supra note 45, at p. 406.

74 See e.g. Delbrück, Jost, “Exercising Public Authority beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?”, 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2003), pp. 29 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tietje, Christian, “Die Staatslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes: Konsequenzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung”, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 2003, pp. 1081 et sqq., at p. 1095Google Scholar; Peters, Anne, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), at pp. 580 et sqq.Google Scholar

75 Here, only the self-commitment or the consent of the authors of the private rule or standard is required. Examples of legal effects would be the protection of trust in private (business) regulation in contract law or advertising law through openly worded provisions. See Glinski, Carola and Rott, Peter, “Umweltfreundliches und ethisches Konsumverhalten im harmonisierten Kaufrecht”, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2003, pp. 649 et sqq.Google Scholar; Glinski, Carola, “Produktionsaussagen und Vertrauensschutz im Kauf- und Werberecht”, in: Winter, Gerd (ed.), Die Umweltverantwortung multinationaler Unternehmen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 187 et sqq Google Scholar. Moreover, commitments by business could gain legal relevance in relation to states, according to the respective public law or to public international law. For the legal status of transnational enterprises in public international law, see e.g. Dahm, Georg, Delbrück, Jost and Wolfrum, Rüdiger, Völkerrecht, vol. I/2, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), at pp. 246, 250Google Scholar; Hillemanns, Carolin F., Transnationale Unternehmen und Menschenrechte (Zürich: Diss., 2004), at 31 Google Scholar; Tietje, “Die Staatslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes”, supra note 74, at p. 1091. For more details see Glinski, Carola, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der privaten Regulierung globaler Produktionsstandards (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), at pp. 112 et sqq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76 For detailed analysis of the following see Glinski, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der privaten Regulierung globaler Produktionsstandards, supra note 75, at pp. 95 et sqq. with further references; id., “Recht und globale Risikosteuerung – ein Drei-Stufen-Modell”, in: Scharrer, Jörg et al. (eds), Risiko im Recht – Recht im Risiko (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), pp. 241 et sqq., at pp. 249 et sqq. Google Scholar

77 This concept has first been developed for the internal regulation of private associations, where no direct approval of each internal rule by every member can be organised, e.g. in professional associations. Here, consensus is regarded as the basis for legitimacy, but is complemented by the concept of “group welfare” or “group interest”. See Bachmann, “Privatrecht als Organisationsrecht”, supra note 66, at pp. 19 et sqq. For similar considerations concerning an erga omnes effect of public international law acts, see Delbrück, Jost, “Prospects for a “World (internal) Law”?: Legal Developments in a Changing International System”, 9 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2002), pp. 401 et sqq., at pp. 417 et sqq.Google Scholar

78 For acceptability as a criterion of legitimacy, see Habermas, Jürgen, Faktizität und Geltung, 4th ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), at p. 151 Google Scholar; see also Hart, Dieter, “Ärztliche Leitlinien – Definitionen, Funktionen, rechtliche Bewertungen”, Medizinrecht 1998, pp. 8 et sqq., at p. 10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

79 Bachmann, Private Ordnung, supra note 66, at pp. 206 et sqq.

80 On this see German Constitutional Court, 14/7/1987, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 76, pp. 171 et sqq., at p. 185 – Professional rules for lawyers, with general concerns related to suffi cient representation; similarly Constitutional Court, 9/5/1972, BVerfGE 33, pp. 125 et sqq., at pp. 158 et sqq. – Medical specialist; discussed in Bachmann, Private Ordnung, supra note 66, at pp. 60 et sqq. See also the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), 7/2/2006, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 2006, pp. 1113 et sqq., at p. 1116 – Trial subscription. Comprehensive analysis by Carola Glinski, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der privaten Regulierung globaler Produktionsstandards, supra note 75, at pp. 279 et sqq.

81 The classical case is the concretisation of public law requirements for the protection of health and safety and the environment by private or semi-private norms.

82 See the references supra note 73.

83 See e.g. Steffek, Jens, “Legitimacy and Activities of Civil Society Organizations”, TranState Wortking Paper, No. 156 (Bremen: Collaborative Research Centre 597, 2011), at pp. 3 et sqq.Google Scholar

84 Steffek, “Legitimacy and Activities of Civil Society Organizations”, supra note 83, at pp. 8 et sqq., has developed the criteria of participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability for the relation NGOs – represented interests, and independence from other interests. His respective results are rather disillusioning with respect to the NGOs examined.

85 See e.g. Steffek, “Legitimacy and Activities of Civil Society Organizations”, supra note 83, at pp. 2 et sqq.; Bäckstrand, Karin, “Democratizing Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder Democracy after the World Summit on Sustainable Development”, European Journal of International Relations 2006, pp. 467 et sqq., at pp. 473 et sqq., both with further references.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

86 Charnovitz, “International Standards and the WTO”, supra note 53, at p. 17, calls this legal effect “presumption” of conformity. See also Scott, “International Trade and Environmental Governance”, supra note 72, at pp. 325 et sqq. Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at pp. 213 et sqq., goes even further and discusses whether the TBT agreement in effect amounts to “real” minimum standards which may not be undercut.

87 Article XXVI AIDCP: “This Agreement shall remain open to accession by any State or regional economic integration organization that meets the requirements in Article XXIV, or is otherwise invited to accede to the Agreement on the basis of a decision by the Parties.”; Art. XXIV AIDCP: “This Agreement is open for signature at Washington from May 21, 1998, until May 14, 1999 by States with a coastline bordering the Agreement Area and by States or regional economic integration organizations which are members of the IATTC or whose vessels fi sh for tuna in the Agreement Area while the Agreement is open for signature.”

88 See also Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS/381/AB/R, at paras 383 et sqq., in particular at para. 384.

89 See <http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

90 Which is more than 300 companies.

91 See <http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/> (last accessed on 12 July 2012); <http://www.earthisland.org/dolphin- SafeTuna/Dolphin SafeCanners.html> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

92 By the way, this problem related to ex post recognition (after the drafting procedure) is not reserved to private standards. As Charnovitz, “International Standards and the WTO”, supra note 53, at p. 3, puts it: “Just as a private actor may be pressured into following an industry standard, a nation state may be pressured into ratifying a treaty.”

93 See e.g. Herberg, Globalisierung, supra note 3, at pp. 75, 214 et sqq., concerning the reciprocity of consumer expectations and codes of conduct and other business commitments.

94 Therefore, it has also been discussed if the practice of the US retailers could be regarded as a national private standard. For detailed analysis see Arcuri, “Back to the Future”, supra note 19, at III.

95 The de facto conduct of the US retailers, however, has decidedly been considered as not being caused by US regulation, see Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 7.180 et sqq.; see also Arcuri, “Back to the Future”, supra note 19, at III.

96 The USA, however, has not yet put forward this argument. They might fear that the recognition of NGO-standards as “international standards” in WTO law could be a precedent, which might lead to the recognition of further NGO-standards to the disadvantage of US regulation.

97 For the relevance of market segments in unfair commercial practices law see Case C-112/99, Toshiba Europe GmbH v. Katun Germany GmbH [2001] ECR I-7945, at para. 52.

98 “Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, (…)”. See also European Communities – EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/ DS26/AB/R, 16 January 1998; European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R.

99 See e.g. von Bogdandy, “Law and Politics in the WTO”, supra note 67, at pp. 636 et sqq. Another consequence of this binding legal effect is that negotiations have politicised and some members are “less willing to compromise their interests for the sake of an agreement”, see Pauwelyn, “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation”, supra note 14, at p. 211, with further references.

100 Therefore, Charnovitz, “International Standards and the WTO”, supra note 53, at p. 15, calls this legal effect a “requirement” to use international standards.

101 “As a basis for” means that an international standard is a “principal constituent” or a “fundamental principle” of a national regulation but not complete identity; see EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (1998), at paras 163–166; European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R, at paras 242, 244. See also Masson-Matthee, Marielle, The Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards (The Hague: Asser, 2007), at pp. 142 et sqq. with further references.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

102 See European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R, at paras. 242, 244, 248, 285; see also Masson-Matthee, The Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards, supra note 101, at pp. 149 et sqq.

103 See Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 7.491 et sqq.

104 See e.g. Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment, supra note 13, at p. 308. See also Scott, “International Trade and Environmental Governance”, supra note 72, at pp. 328 et sqq.

105 Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 7.721–7.740.

106 Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 7.453–7.623.

107 For detailed critique of the argument of the panel, see Arcuri, “Back to the Future”, supra note 19, at V.

108 Annex 1, Art. 4 TBT; Section B, Committee Decision.

109 The US argued that “other Members who may have an interest other than fishing (such as consumer or conservation interests) were ineligible to become parties to the AIDCP”, see Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R, at para. 34.

110 See supra, at IV.

111 See e.g. Gesellschaft zur Rettung der Delphine e.V., <http://www.delphinschutz.org/projekte/safe-delfinsicherer-thunfisch/nachrichten-uebersicht/20-lug-und-trug-bei-edeka-und-wwf> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

112 See e.g. <http://www.label-online.de/label-datenbank?label=72> (last accessed on 12 July 2012). See also <http://www.br.de/fernsehen/bayerisches-fernsehen/sendungen/kontrovers/thunfisch-delphin-tierschutz100.html> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

113 See e.g. the submission by the US government, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, at 4.72, 4.108, and the conclusion at7.738.

114 See also <http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/IATTClabelAlert.html> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

115 See <http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/> (last accessed on 12 July 2012); <http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/DolphinSafeCanners.html> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).

116 See e.g. <http://www.delphinschutz.org/projekte/tunfisch/index.htm>; <http://www.greenpeace.de/themen/meere/fischerei/artikel/zertifizierungen_glaubwuerdige_standards_fuer_die_nachhaltigkeit_von_fischprodukten/> (last accessed on 12 July 2012); <http://www.label-online.de/label-datenbank?label=581> (last accessed on 12 July 2012). Apparently it is supported by around 180 NGOs. However, WWF and Greenpeace also criticise that the label does not foster sustainable fi shery beyond dolphin protection, see e.g. <http://www.oceancare.org/de/pressecenter/2006/11/label.php> (last acccessed on 12 July 2012); <http://www.greenpeace.de/themen/meere/fischerei/artikel/greenpeace_bewertung_von_dolphin_safe_delfinfreundlich_gefangen> (last accessed on 12 July 2012).