(1) Neo-elitists who do not differentiate between different classes are too many to list exhaustively. Let me mention a few. Eliot, T. S., SirRead, Herbert, Bell, Bernard Iddings, Crowd Culture (London, Harper, 1952)Google Scholar; the following contributors to the anthology Mass Culture (Glencoe, Free Press, 1957), edited by Rosenberg, B. and White, D. M.: Lowenthal, Leo (describing the consumer of mass-media as “half mutilated child and half standardized adult”, p. 57)Google Scholar, Macdonald, Dwight (mass society's “morality sinks to that of its most brutal and primitive members, its taste to that of its least sensitive and most ignorant”, p. 70Google Scholar, “mass-culture is not and can never be any good”, p. 69), Greenberg, Clement (“to fill the demand of the new urban masses a new commodity was devised: Erzatz culture, Kitsch, destined for those who, insensible to the values of genuine culture […]”, p. 102)Google Scholar, Dutscher, Alan (“cinema, radio, and television manifest from the first […] the quantification and moronization which have marked their development ever since […]”, p. 139)Google Scholarvan den Haag, Ernest (“The high and folk culture works, even when they are not physically altered, change their function when they are absorbed into the stream of popular culture”, p. 527)Google Scholar.

(2) An extremely interesting historical account of the development of the mass public of readers in XlXth century Britain can be found in Altick, Richard D., The Spread of Reading, in Larrabee, Eric and Meyersohn, Rolf, Mass Leisure (Glencoe, Free Press, 1958), pp. 43–53Google Scholar. Altick, refers to the beginning of working class reading thus. “The size of the audience that devoured the writings of Cobbett and the Chartists [1815–1850] is perhaps the best proof that working-class had not been reduced to a completely bestial condition” (p. 52)Google Scholar.

(3) Rosenberg, B., Mass Culture in America, in Rosenberg, and White, , op. cit. pp. 3–12Google Scholar; see esp. pp. 6–7.

(4) de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in america, originally published in French in 1835–1840: vol. II, chapter LXIGoogle Scholar. […] an innumerable multitude of men, a11 equal and alike, incessantly endeavouring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of the rest,—his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of man-kind […].

(5) Ibid. vol I, chapter XXIV. Here then is a motley multitude whose intellectual wants are to be supplied. Literature will not easily be subjected to strict rule. […] They prefer books which may be easily procured, quickly read, and which require no learned researches to be understood, They ask for beauties self-proffered and easily enjoyed; above all, they must have what is unexpected and new […] They require strong and rapid emotions […].

(6) SirRead, Herbert describes the passive consumer thus: “A dull-eyed, bored, and listless automaton whose one desire is for violence in some form or other—violent proaction, violent sounds, distractions of any kind, that can penetrate to its deadened nerves” (The Necessity of Art, Saturday Review, 12 6, 1969, pp. 24–27)Google Scholar.

(7) Artists joining in the neo-elitist chorus are too many to list exhaustively. Let me mention those who took part in a seminar sponsored jointly by the Taminent Institute and Daedalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, June, 1959, and whose contents were published in Culture for the Millions? Mass Media in Modern Society, edited by Jacobs, Norman with an introduction by Lazarsfeld, Paul, (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1961)Google Scholar: Jarrell, Randall (“The values of the Medium […] are business values: money, success, celeband rity […] the opposite of the world of then arts where commercial and scientific proaction, gress do not exist”, pp. 101–102)Google Scholar; Berger, Arthur (“Precisely because the outlets upon which our advanced composer must depend (symphony orchestras, recordings, opera-companies and organized networks for touring artists and chamber-groups) have become successful, mass-media, the efflorescence of vital new American music is seriously hampered”, p. III)Google Scholar; Baldwin, James (“[…] distressed about, when we speak of the state of mass-culture in this country, is the overwhelming torpor and bewilderment of the people […]”, p. 121)Google Scholar.

(8) See reference in note 6 above.

(9) Gasset, José Ortega y, The Revolt of the Masses [English edition], 1932: “The political innovations of recent times, signify nothing less than the political domination by the masses” [p. 18]Google Scholar. He calls this “hyper-admirademocracy”.

(10) For details concerning Western intellectuals and the history of their pinning cultural hopes on Soviet Russia and on Communism—as well as their disappointments—see Journal of Contemporary History, volume II, The Left Wing Intellectuals Between the Wars 1919–1939, edited by Laqueur, Walter and Mosse, George L., (New York, Harper Torch, 1966)Google Scholar. This is an interesting report on French, British, German, Austrian, Norwegian, Hungarian, and even Turkish, left-wing intellectuals between the wars.

(11) See Short, Robert S., The Politics of Surrealism, 1920–1936 inGoogle ScholarLaqueur, and Mosse, , op. cit. pp. 3–25Google Scholar. “Their admiration for Eastern and particularly for primitive peoples […]” was one of the factors leading the Surrealists into politics (p. 7). See also Baldwin, James, in Culture for the Millions? op. cit. says, “life in this country is appalling. Many of us [artists] are leaving […” for poorer countries” [p. 187]Google Scholar.

(12) For example see Dumazedier, Joffre, Vers une civilisation du loisir? (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1962), pp. 156, 157 and 171Google Scholar.

(13) A typical example of culture critics endorsing vague conspiracy theories of the media is Gilbert Seldes, The People and the Arts in Rosenberg, and White, , Mass Culture, op. cit. pp. 74–97Google Scholar; on p. 81 he quotes James T. Farrell, whom he calls, “an enemy of uninhibited capitalism”, to say, “American culture has been invaded by finance capital”. The movies, he says, “serve the finance capitalistic state because most of them distract the masses of the people from becoming more clearly aware of their real needs”. Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Merton, Robert K., Mass Communication, Popular Taste, and Organized Social Action, in Mass Culture, op. cit. pp. 457–473Google Scholar. while not fully subscribing to a conspiracy theory, nevertheless do claim, “the mass media […] operate toward the maintenance of the going social and cultural structure, rather than toward its change” [p. 473].

(14) Hughes, H. Stuart, Mass Culture and Social Criticism, in Culture for the Millions? op. cit. pp. 142–147Google Scholar. He compares today's workers passively consuming mass-culture with workers at the turn of the century: How different things were a couple of generations ago! One has only to conjure up the image of half-literate European workers patiently listening to the exegeses of Marxism texts for hours at a stretch (a common scene around 1900) to realize the difference in cultural climate […] They were convinced that the lengthy and largely incomprehensible speeches of their leaders and teachers were of moment to them [… they] believed it would make a difference in their own lives, or at least in the lives of their descendents [p. 145].

(15) Hoggart, Richard, The Uses of Literacy (London 1967)Google Scholar (first published 1957). “The remnants of what was at least in parts an urban culture ‘of the people’ are being destroyed; and […] the new mass culture is in some important ways less healthy than the often crude culture it is replacing” [p. 23]. “To live in the working-classes is even now to belong to an all-pervading culture […] formal and stylised” [p. 31]. Berger, Bennett M., Sociology of Leisure, Industrial Relations, I (1962), 31–45Google Scholar, quotes Hoggart, , to say, “The strongest objection to the more trivial popular entertainments is not that they prevent their [consumers…] from becoming high-brow, but that they make it harder for people without an intellectual bent to become wise in their own ways” [p. 276]Google Scholar.

(16) Bell, Bernard Iddings, Crowd Culture, op. cit. p. 19: “Bourgeois and proletarian have become [culturally] indistinguishable”Google Scholar.

(17) Birnbaum, Norman, The Crisis of Industrial Sotiety (New York, Oxford U. P., 1969), pp. 135–136Google Scholar:

The press and mass-media popular publications (whether politically censored or not) have propagated images of the world which have reinforced its dreadful immanence. They have conveyed crude versions of consensual ideologies, they have denied by impliest cation the Possibilities of realizing alternative social arrangements which would reverse or seriously alter the prevailing distribution of power, and above all they have mounted a savage attack on those powers of imagination and sensibility which alone could mobilize psychic energy for criticism or revolt.

(18) Gorz, André, Stratégie ouvriére et néocapitalisme (Paris 1964), pp. 105–124Google Scholar. Mallet, Serge, La nouvelle classe ouvriére (Paris 1963)Google Scholar. Both hope for a renewal of a radical socialist consciousness in the working class. See also Gold-Thorpe, John H., Lockwood, David, Bech-Hofer, Frank, and Platt, Jennifer, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (Cambridge [Cambridge Studies in Sociology, no. 3], 1969)Google Scholar, who tentatively predict the coming of a new radical phase for the British worker.

(19) Leacock, Eleanor, Distortions of Working-Class Reality in American Social Science, Science and Society, XXI (1967), pp. 1–21Google Scholar.

(20) Leacock, Eleanor, Communications: Working-Class Reality in Social Science: A Discussion II, Science and Society, XXII (1968), pp. 82–88Google Scholar.

(21) See Linton's, Thomas E. review of Brody, Eugene B. (ed.), Minority Group Adolescents, ap. Psychiatry and Social Science Review, III (1969), p. 37: “Adolescents cannot legally drink, they are the first to be risked in our wars, cannot vote, and are manipulated by a mass-media [sic] that knows exactly what it is trying to do to them”Google Scholar.

(22) The reformist-socialist attitude towards the media is described and analyzed by Lazassfeld, Paul F. and Merton, Robert K. inBryson, Lyman (ed.), The Communication of Ideas (New York, Harper, 1948), esp. pp. 99–100Google Scholar. Whyte, William H. Jr, in The Organisation Man (New York 1956), P. 342nGoogle Scholar, describes this attitude of disappointment in the worker thus: This kind of disappointment has been very strong in England. For years liberal intellectuals fought to extend middle-class security to the workers, and now that they are succeeding they are discomfited. Writing in The Spectator (January 20, 1936). Charles Curran talks of life in the vast municipal housing estates where so many workers now live. He speaks of how they read the tabloids exclusively because the tabloids “offer a simple, cheerful, manageable universe, a warm cozy place of sex, excitement, triviality and fantasy […] the daydream heaven of wealth, luxuries, and sexual attraction to which the football-pool coupon will one day provide a ticket of admission. An interior life of this kind and on this scale is something that has not previously existed in England. It contrasts sharply with the expectations that buoyed up the social reformers—that once the manual worker was free from the clutches of poverty and insecurity, he would begin to participate in our social heritage. Nothing of the kind has happened”,

(23) Zweig, Ferdynand, The Worker in an Affluent Society (London 1961), p. 95Google Scholar.

(24) For the reformist concern with a rise of the generally low degree of civic participation and leadership of the industrial worker see Dumazedier, Joffre and Latouche, Nicole, Work and Leisure in French Sociology, Industrial Relations, I (1962), 13–30 esP. PP 27, 28, 30Google Scholar.

(25) The following are the most significant French studies of workers' leisure: 1. Halbwachs, M., La classe ouvrére et les niveaux de vie (Paris, F. Alcan, 1912), pp. 446–447. 2Google Scholar. Friedmann, G., Problémes humains du machinisme industriel (Paris, Gallimard, 1946). 3Google Scholar. Crozier, M., Petits fonctionnaires au travail (Paris, CNRS, 1955). 4Google Scholar. de Lauwe, P. H. Chombart, La vie quotidienne des families ouvriéres (Pans, CNRS, 1958). 5Google Scholar. Frish-Gau-Thier, Jacqueline and Louchet, P., La colombophilie chez les mineurs du Nord (Paris, CNRS, 1961)Google Scholar. 6. Research carried out by the group on the sociology of leisure and popular culture of the Centre d'etudes sociologiques, e.g. the Annecy Study, carried out in 1957. 7. Friedmann, G. and Naville, P. (eds), Traité de sociologie du travail (Paris, Colin, 1961). 8Google Scholar. Dumazedier, J. and Latouche, N., Travail et loisir (Paris, CNRS, 1963)Google Scholar.

(26) Dumazedier, and Latouche, , op. cit. P. 30:Google Scholar We fear particuiarly a useless and costly profusion of summary information and vulgar diversion sold by the great mass media of communication. Could such a development not have, in the long run, destructive effects on the free social and cultural develpoment of the masses?

(27) Dumazedier, , op. cit. (note 12 above), pp. 155–156Google Scholar, notes that in France only 29 % of the television programs are ‘distracting’ as compared to 60—75 % in the United States.

(28) See notes 15 and 23 above. Zweig adds: “We may hope that the rise in his cultural standards will come about in due course, provided that he is not deflected by vested interests into the marshlands of the candy-floss world”.

(29) Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man (London 1964), p. 5Google Scholar, “superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression”. See also Marcuse, H., “Liberation From the Affluent Society”, in Cooper, David (ed.), The Dialectics of Liberation (London 1968)Google Scholar.

(30) Gorz, André, op. cit. pp. 58–69, 111–118Google Scholar.

(31) McLeod, Jack, Ward, Scott, and Tancill, Karen, Alienation and Uses of the Mass Media, Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX, (1965–1966), pp. 583–594CrossRefGoogle Scholar. “The hypothesis of a positive association of alienation and interest in sensational head-lines was not supported” [p. 589]. “Little support is given to the prediction that alienation will be positively correlated with time spent using the mass-media. The subsidiary part of this prediction, that the alienated would give special attention to the “fantasy-oriented” media, is given some rather weak support” [p. 587]. As to comic strips and alienation, a study by Bogart, Leo, Comic Strips and the Adult Reader, in Rosenberg, and White, , Mass Culture, op. cit. pp. 189–198Google Scholar, concludes, “no evidence that those whose interest in the comics is high have more reason or desire for escapist fantasy than those whose interest is low” [p. 197].

(32) Goldthorpe, John et al. , op. cit. pp. 183–184Google Scholar: “We would simply observe that it is not to us self-evident why one should regard our respondents concern for decent, comfortable houses, for labour-saving devices, and even for such leisure goods as television sets and cars, as manifesting the force of ‘false’ needs”.

(33) Norman Birnbaum, loc. cit.

(34) The arguments for the theory that the media inhibit the use of printed material, especially for education and self-improve ment purposes, are discussed by Berelson, Bernard, Who Reads Books and Why?, in Rosenberg, and White, , Mass Culture, op. cit. pp. 119–125Google Scholar. See especially pp. 120–125.

(35) Bogart, Leo, The Mass Media and The Blue Collar Worker, in Shostak, Arthur B. and Gomberg, William (eds), Blue Collar World: Studies of the American Worker (Englewood Cliffs 1964), pp. 416–428Google Scholar. “According to 1959 Newsweek survey of the three leading news magazines [News-week, Time, U. S. News and World Report] these have a negligible readership among unskilled workers, but their readership among skilled, craftsmen, supervisory, and semi-skilled blue-collar workers, is actually higher than the national average”.

(36) The quote is from an address delivered by Hutchins, Robert M. (of the Center For The Study of Democratic Institutions), Washington, D. C., 06 1, 1961Google Scholar.

(37) White, D. M., Mass Culture in America: Another Point of View, in Rosenberg, and White, , Mass Culture, op. cit. pp. 13–21Google Scholar.

(38) Dumazedier, , op. cit. p. 144Google Scholar.

(39) Hoggart, , op. cit. p. 101–109Google Scholar. “Peg's paper and all that”, magazines published by the Amalgamated Press, the Newnes Group, and Thomson and Leng.

(40) Hoggart, , op. cit. p. 100Google Scholar. This includes the celebrated B.B.C. series Mrs. Dale's Diary, The Archers, and Huggetts; also variety programs which present “the people to the people” like Wilfred Pickles' Have A Go and Richard Dimbleby's Down Your Way, as well as Norman Evans' music hall style programs.

(41) Hoggart, , op. cit. p. 201Google Scholar.

(42) According to Hoggart, at the end of the fifties there still existed three thousand working-men's clubs in Britain, where this kind of repertoire was performed quite regularly.

(43) Hoggart, , op. cit. p. 22Google Scholar: “The purposive, the political, the pious and the self-improving minorities in the working classes”.

(44) Berger, Bennett M., Working-Class Suburb (Berkeley 1960)Google Scholar, conclusion: “The increasingly sharp distinctions between the upper middle-class and the lower middle-class (which are not merely distinctions of income) suggest that a similar phenomenon may be occurring on lower levels of society”. Also Handel, Gerald and Rainwater, Lee, Persistence and Change in Working-class Life Style in Shostak, and Gomberg, , Blue-Collar World, op. cit. pp. 36–41Google Scholar. “What seems to be a bifurcation of the working-class” [p. 41]. GOLDTHORPE et al., op. cit. use the terms “traditional and modern working class” systematically.

(45) Hoggart, op. cit. pp. 220–201Google Scholar: Inhibited now from insuring the ‘degradation’ of the masses economically, the logical processes of competitive commerce. […] are ensuring that working-people are culturally robbed […] Since these processes can never rest. the holding down, the constant pressure not to look outwards and upwards, becomes a positive thing, becomes a new and stronger from of subjection. this subjection promises to be strongerthan the old because the chains cultural subordination are both easier to wear and harder to strike away than those of economic subordination.

(46) Shils, Edward, Mass Society and Its Culture, in Jacobs, Norman (ed.), Culture for the Millions? op. cit. pp. 1–27Google Scholar, observes: It would be a mistake […] to think that the culture possessed by these classes, the industrial working class and the rural population, is exhausted by what comes to them through the mass media. A large amount of traditional religious culture (and of sectarian variants of traditional religious culture) flourishes in all the non intellectual classes. Much of regional and class culture, maintained by family, by colleagues, neighbors, and friends and by local institutions, survives and is unlikely to be supplanted by the larger culture which emanates from the center, This places limits on what is incorporated from the current flow of the mass media.

(47) Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society (New York, Vintage Books, 1967), p. 379Google Scholar.

(48) Friedmann, Georges, Industrial Society, The Emergence of the Human Problems of Automation (Glencoe 1955)Google Scholar, chapter 1: “Taylorisra and the Human Sciences”. See also his The Anatomy Work: Labor, Leisure, and the Implications of Automation (Glencoe 1964), pp. 30–39Google Scholar, for American reactions against orthodox Taylorism.

(49) Friedmann, , The Anatomy of Work, op. cit. pp. 110–111Google Scholar.

(50) G. Friedmann, Preface to Jacqueline Frish-Gauthier and Louchet, P., op. cit. quoted also in Dumazedier, and Latouche, , op. cit. p. 14Google Scholar:

Leisure activities bring different compensations: professional compensations for work with a limited horizon, emotional compensations for the crudity of social relations in a mass of people, social compensations through the success which this leisure-time activity can provide [and, Dumazedier and Latouche continue], finally, far from being a compensation, leisure is more often an extension of occupational life. Louchet's study shows that there is a tendency for the most frustrating work. However, in the case of the pigeon cultivators, the intellectual level and quality of training introduce a new type of conditioning, [They quote Friedmann again:] Better trained intellectually, [they] can participate more fully in discussions and in the organization of meetings.

(51) Blauner, Robert, Alienation and Freedom: the Factory Worker and His Industry (Chicago/London 1964)Google Scholar.

(52) A few of the theoreticians of the leisure society are quoted in Gross, Ronald, The Future of Toil, in Shostak, and Gomberg, , op. cit. pp. 573–575Google Scholar, including J. Kenneth Galbraith: “We are on the brink of a workless world; leisure will move to the centre of men's lives […], and Gerald Piel: “Blue collar workers will be as scarce as farmers by the year 2000”. See also Rosenberg, Bernard, in Rosenberg, and White, , Mass Culture, p. 4Google Scholar, “with imminent automation […] manual labor is becoming obsolete”.

(53) See Rosenberg, , op. cit. p. 7Google Scholar: Contemporary man commonly finds that his life has been emptied of meaning, that it has been trivialized. He is alienated from his work, from his community, and possibly from himself—although this ‘self’ is hard to locate. At the same time he has an unprecedented amount of time on his hands which, as van den Haag has pointed out, he must kill lest it kill him. Society abhors a vacuum, and quickly fills this one with diversion.

(54) For Britain see: Boston, Richard, What Leisure? New Society, 26 12, 1968, no. 938Google Scholar. “Average hours worked […] (that is, in effect, ‘normal’ hours plus over-time), dropped by only 1.3, that is, form 47.7 to 46.4 hours per week—between 1938 and 1966. Male manual workers would appear to have gained half-an-hours leisure a week since 1948 […] the official statistics reveal nothing about ‘double-jobbing’ or (as it is more picturesquely called in the U.S.) ‘moonlighting’. A Gallup poll carried out for the Sunday Telegraph in 1964 showed that one worker in six has a second job […] time given to the second job averaged 12 hours a week […] the amount of moonlighting is still increasing […] most workers in Britain get about 2 weeks paid holiday a year […] the age of leisure is then, still some way off”.

(55) Dumazedier, J., Réalites du loisir et idéologies, Esprit, XXVII (1959), 866–893Google Scholar. found, p. 879, that 25 % of this sample of industrial workers were moonlighting. Friedmann, , Anatomy of Work, op. cit. p. 108Google Scholar. “[…] wage earning occupation is not the only compulsory activity […] other kinds of duties […] eat into their ‘free time’ […]”. Zweig, , The Worker in an Affluent Society, op. cit. pp. 99, 100Google Scholar. observes that the Bristish ‘affluent’ worker is not leisured: he works a good deal of overtime; he is not bored; in fact he is under a good deal of pressure to keep up his home and garden; he spends more money on ‘constructive hobbies’; cars take time; “the weekend is often considered as the most exacting period of the whole Caliweek—for many it is not a period of relaxation but a second job—that of homecraft”. Wolfbein, Seymour L., Occupational Information, A Career Guidance View (New York, Random House, 1968), pp. 72–74Google Scholar. observes that American workers do engage in a great deal of overtime work, not necessarily because they like the idea of putting in long hours, but perhaps because in recent years one out of every nine dollars in a factory-worker's pay-check was generated by the premium pay for overtime work; on the other hand, in the U. S. “only about 5 % of the employed workforce are multiple job-holders […] the great majority of these people work on their second jobs during the day or weekends, not at night”. Milton M. Gordon and Charles H. Anderson, The Blue-Collar Worker at Leisure, in Shostak, and Gomberg, , op. cit. pp. 407–416Google Scholar. describe, on pp. 411–412, and 415, for their sample of Massachusetts workers leisure-time budgets of home improvement, gardening, and car repairs, similar to those of Bennett M. Berger's Southern Caliweek fornians.

(56) Dubin, Robert, Industrial Workers Worlds: A Study of the ‘Central Life Interest’ of Industrial Workers, Social Problems, III (1955–1956), pp. 131–142Google Scholar; reprinted in Larrabee and Meyerson, Mass Leisure, op. cit. pp. 215–228.

(57) Berger, Bennett M., The Sociology Leisure: Some Suggestions, Industrial Relations, I (1962), 31–45Google Scholar.

(58) Dumazedier, , Vers une civilisation du loisir? op. cit. chapter on leisure and books, pp. 175–204, esp. p. 196Google Scholar.

(59) Ibid. chapter on the functions of leisure and moviegoing, pp. 143–152.

(60) Dumazedier, and Latouche, , op. cit. pp. 23–24Google Scholar.

(61) Ibid. p. 23.

(62) Ibid. pp. 24–26.

(63) Ibid. p. 28.

(64) Ibid. p. 30.

(65) Dumazedier, , Vers une civilisation du loisir? op. cit. p. 171Google Scholar.

(66) Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society op. cit.

(67) Ibid. p. 95

(68) Ibid. p. 110.

(69) Ibid. pp. 108, 109.

(70) Bogart, Leo, The Mass Media and the Blue-Collar Worker in Shostak, and Gomberg, , op. cit. pp. 416–428, p. 423Google Scholar. Bogart quotes a 1961 study which reveals that American semi-skilled blue-collar workers (lower-class) are more concerned with the entertainment value of television, spend more time on television, find commercials helpful, are most indiscriminate viewers, have least explicit standards, are most readily influenced by commercials, are most involved in and indiscriminate versus commercials. For contrary evidence see notes 77–79 below.

(71) Zweig, , op. cit. p. 110Google Scholar.

(72) Mayer, Kurt, Diminishing Class Differentials in the U.S., Kyklos, XII (1959), 605–628CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Until recently, intense preoccupation with status symbols was typical only of the white collar groups. Blue collar workers tended to be mainly concerned with basic necessities and job security. However, as blue collar families have begun to arrive in the suburbs where they come into closer contact with white collar neighbors they have become infected with the latters' status consciousness [p. 624].

(73) Hamilton, Richard F., The Behavior and Values of Skilled Workers, in Shostak, and Gomberg, , op. cit. p. 49Google Scholar.

(74) Wolfenstein, Martha and Leitfs, Nathan, A Analysis of Themes and Plots in Motion Pictures, in Schramm, Wilbur (ed.), Mass Communications (Urbana 1960) pp. 380–381Google Scholar.

(75) Arnheim, Rudolf, The World of the Day Time Serial, in Schkamm, Wilbur, op. cit. (1949 edition), pp. 360–378, esp. p. 362Google Scholar.

(76) Gans, Herbert, The Urban Villagers, (Glencoe, Free Press, 1962), p. 188Google Scholar: “The women prefer just the opposite. They like musical programs, soap-operas, and other stories that deal with romance or with family situations and problems, even middle-class ones”.

(77) There are however, also on American television some less frequent attempts at guidance: loc. cit. “Whereas both sexes used the media for entertainment, the women may occasionally watch dramas and even documentaries that show them how upholdfamily problems are to be handled”.

(78) According to Herbert Gans' perceptive study of a Boston working-class neighborhood of Italian origin, these rather traditional working-class media consumers are not at all passive or defenseless objects of the media and their messages: “the adults keep television set on all evening long […] Preferences in mass media programmings and performers, however, are highly selective […] they accept themes that mirror their own values, and reject others as illustrating the immorality and dishonesty of the outside world” [op. cit. p. 187]. Men watch action programs. “While his [the hero of the action program class's] background is usually not defined, many of the norms and methods he uses to produce social benefits and to achieve personal success are those of the working-class culture […] The hero with middle-class characteristics is rejected” [p. 189]. “A program upholding paternal authority and wisdom, such as ‘Father Knows Best’, receives more favorable response” [p. 191]. As to commercials Gans reports: “Television commercials are sometimes watched raptly, and then bombarded with satirical comments which question exaggerated or dishonest claims and meaningless statements” [p. 194].

(79) Mayer, Kurt, Recent Changes in the Class Structure of the U.S., Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology (London 1956) vol. III, pp. 66–88Google Scholar; Diminishing Class Differentials in the U.S., Kyklos, XII (1959), 605–628Google Scholar; The Changing Shape of the American Class Structure, Social Research, XXX (1963), 458–468Google Scholar.

(80) Whyte, op. cit: Middle-class, college-educated organization people give the communities their dominant tone, but there are other residents for whom arrival in the suburb […] is […] a crossing of the tracks […] The new suburbs […] have become the second great melting pot […] As the newcomers to the middle class enter suburbia, they must discard old values […] Figures rather clearly show that people from big, urban Democratic wards tend to become Republican and, if anything, more conservative than those whose outlook they are unconsciously adopting [p. 331]

(81) B. Berger, in Working-Class Suburb, op. cit., has pointed out correctly that Whyte had described the easy acculturation not of genuine blue-collar workers but of persons who had already previously moved occupationally into the middle-class, i.e. into white-collar jobs.

(82) Lenski, Gerhard, The Religious Factor (New York, Doubleday 1961), p. 44Google Scholar:

[…] not only has the middle class been increasing in size relative to the working class, but its social standards are permeating the working class more and more with each passing year thanks to the growing influence of the mass media. As a result an ever increasing number of people who are objectively manual workers think and act like the middle class. This is especially true of the upper stratum of the working class: skilled and supervisory workers.

(83) Bogart, in Shostak and Gomberg, op. cit.

(84) Miller, S. M. and Riessman, Frank, Are Workers Middle-Class ? Dissent, VIII (1961)Google Scholar. In their later paper, The Working-Class Subculture: A New View, in Shostak, and Gomberg, , op. cit. pp. 24–36Google Scholar, they point out, however, the new emphasis on stability and the increased aspirations for children.

(85) Richard F. Hamilton, The Behavior and Values of Skilled Workers, in Shostak and Gomberg, op. cit.

(86) In Berger's sample of 100 Ford auto workers there were: 50 semi-skilled line workers; 26 semi-skilled off line workers; 9 skilled workers; 12 foremen; 3 others. In the Goldthorpe et al. final sample of 229 workers in 3 Luton plants there were: 86 assemblers, i.e. semi-skilled, traditional; 41 machinists, i.e. semi-skilled, traditional; 23 process-workers, i.e. semi-skilled, modern; 23 setters, i.e. some skill, not high, traditional; 45 craftsmen, skilled, traditional; 11 craftsmen, skilled, modern. Only 34 worked in a technologically advanced plant; only 56 were skilled.

(87) The level of education of Berger's 100 workers was as follows: Last grade of schooling completed: 1–6: 8; 7–8: 31; 9–11: 35; 12: 19; 12 plus trade school: 1; 12 plus college (non-grad.): 6. Only 26 or ¼ of the sample were high-school graduates or above. Of the Luton sample, 85 % had left school at the minimum legal school-leaving age of 15. Only 15 % had received any subsequent part-time instruction of a vocational kind.

(88) Bennett M. Berger, ibid. pp. 95, 96: The organized well-paid industrial workers […] seem to have taken over the style of the oid middle class with its emphasis on respectability, without, however, inheriting mantle of mobility. Yearnings of factory workers for ‘a little business of my own’ do not […] represent social mobility to them […] would not change their style of life.

(89) Berger, op. cit. p. 21. Goldthorpe, et al. , op cit. pp. 137–140Google Scholar.

(90) Goldthorpe et al. ibid. p. 184.

(91) Hamilton, , op. cit. pp. 49, 53Google Scholar.

(92) Berger, Zweig, Gordon and Anderson, as well as Goldthorpe et al., all point out the considerable decline of drinking as a working-class leisure activity; which is connected with the new family and home centered style of life.

(93) Gans, op. cit. examined not only the acceptance of middle-class values by workers via the media, but also the acceptance of values from the American culture by second and third generation Italian-Americans. His conclusion is this: They—at least the adults—make highly selective use of the popular culture. Among the vast variety of available consumer goods, movies, television programs, and reading matter, their choices are structured so as to filter out themes that do not support or enhance the life of the peer group society (p.182). The defences which they set up against the undesired themes and values are strong. Whether some of the values get through in spite of the defences is impossible to say wlthout much more intensive study [p. 105].