Intergenerational mobility—the association between parents’ and adult children’s economic wellbeing—is an important sociological concept because it provides information about inequality of opportunity in society, and it has gained relevance in the recent past due to the increase economic inequality in most of the affluent world. This article provides an overview of the different measures of mobility used by sociologists and economists, as well as main empirical findings about mobility. I then move to topics that push mobility analysis beyond its bivariate focus: The association between intergenerational mobility and economic inequality, the mechanisms for mobility, and the validity of mobility as a measure of inequality of opportunity. I suggest that the association between mobility and inequality is likely spurious, driven by varying institutional arrangements across countries, and that mobility analysis is most useful when focused on describing the bivariate intergenerational association across countries and over time.

The “performativity thesis” is the claim that parts of contemporary economics and finance, when carried out into the world by professionals and popularizers, reformat and reorganize the phenomena they purport to describe, in ways that bring the world into line with theory. Practical technologies, calculative devices and portable algorithms give actors tools to implement particular models of action. I argue that social network analysis is performative in the same sense as the cases studied in this literature. Social network analysis and finance theory are similar in key aspects of their development and effects. For the case of economics, evidence for weaker versions of the performativity thesis is quite good, and the strong formulation is circumstantially supported. Network theory easily meets the evidential threshold for the weaker versions. I offer empirical examples that support the strong (or “Barnesian”) formulation. Whether these parallels are a mark in favor of the thesis or a strike against it is an open question. I argue that the social network technologies and models now being “performed” build out systems of generalized reciprocity, connectivity, and commons-based production. This is in contrast both to an earlier network imagery that emphasized self-interest and entrepreneurial exploitation of structural opportunities, and to the model of action typically considered to be performed by economic technologies.

Why do similar modern nations accord religion different roles in their public institutions? This paper engages this question by examining trends in religious instruction in the public schools of the United States and Australia from 1850 to 1950. I find that American education secularized farther and faster than Australian education because of its decentralized system of educational administration. In the United States, decentralized educational administration facilitated challenges to religious exercises by religious minorities, fostered professional development among educators, and allowed novel educational practices oriented in new educational theories rather than religion to spread. In Australia, by contrast, centralized state control over education insulated majoritarian religious exercises from minority criticism, suppressed professional development, and helped maintain traditional educational practices that sustained religious instruction. The state thus has both mediating and constitutive effects on secularization, a finding which opens new directions for research into the dynamics of secularization.

In this paper, I use the case of financial economics to show how an innovative idea can shape a research agenda. I focus on why the efficient-market hypothesis, crystallized in Eugene Fama’s research, acquired core theoretical status in the discipline of financial economics, whereas the Capital Asset Pricing Model, championed by, among others, Fischer Black, did not. I draw attention both to differences in the networks propagating these models, in particular differences in cohesion and coherence, and to differences in the methodologies underlying the models. I argue that Fama’s use of “data-dredging” techniques and frequentist statistics increased the coherence of the intellectual circle around him, turning the analysis of efficiency into a collective project oriented towards the discovery of objective properties. By contrast, Black’s adoption of more subjectivist methods exacerbated the individualistic tendencies of his approach and his network, increasing the incoherence of his research group.

The notion of “economic development” dominates aid policy. A nation’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (gdp) determines whether that country is considered developed or less developed, and the standard measure of any developmental progress is gdp growth. This article investigates the evolution of the concept of economic development, as it emerged from a specific combination of modeling, statistics and political circumstances. In this story, Arthur Lewis played a decisive role, but only by building upon Colin Clark’s first global national income statistics, an indispensible foundation for Lewis’s seminal model of economic development. This model was embraced by policy makers longing for a theoretical framework to clarify and operationalize the hitherto vague concept of development. More importantly, however, the statistical indicator on which Lewis based his theory had already been universally accepted. In other words: statistics came before theory. This holds important lessons for alternative development ideas. It explains why the idea of economic development remains so firmly entrenched and suggests the conditions that might be necessary for an alternative theory to take hold.

Critics of secularization theory have recently focused upon religion’s public role to put forward theses about de-differentiation, post-secularity and desecularization. A strong defence of secularization theory has not been forthcoming because its proponents have tended to assume, rather than demonstrate, that religion has lost social significance. Drawing upon a neosecularization theoretical approach that highlights the scope of religious authority, this article examines evidence from qualitative studies of the attempts of English mainstream Christian organizations to bring religious messages into the public space and to engage in welfare provision. This re-assessment shows that religious organizations are increasingly co-opted by secular authorities, in ways neither anticipated by, nor explored in, orthodox accounts of secularization. But rather than blurring “the religious” and “the secular,” their distinction is heightened. This situation involves an interlinked and mutually-reinforced declining scope of religious authority at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels, which, it is proposed, constitutes a state of advanced secularization.

The trans-disciplinary New Institutional framework identifies the importance of incentive structures in preventing opportunism in market making. In recent decades this theoretical tradition has increasingly shifted its attention from formal institutions to identify the significance of cultural processes in countering uncertainty, bounded rationality, and information asymmetries. More specifically the New Institutional perspective tends to focus on the formal mechanisms producing and reproducing culture, as opposed to an examination of specific cultural content. This attention to formal mechanisms means that value-rational action and commitments in market making receive insufficient attention. In order to examine the problems entailed in this trend, the case study of a financial market in which market making was constituted by the values of loyalty, duty, and honor of traders is used.

The grip of austerity in European politics since 2008 presents a double puzzle: electorally weak center-left parties offering no definite alternative, and the surprisingly efficient pursuit of “fiscal consolidation”. To understand this double puzzle this article investigates the institutional bases of alternative economic thinking during the 1930s versus the post-2008 crisis years. Noting the recent prominence of a new social type, the European economist-technocrat (eet), I highlight the historically specific order to which the eet is indigenous: rarefied, international professional circuits that tend to work over, not through, party politics. This contrasts sharply with the nationally-based, party-connected economists who developed new economic orthodoxies between the 1930s and 1960s, including Keynes himself. Approaching the study of economic culture in the public sphere in a Polanyian moral markets framework, I argue that the linkages between European economics and financial technocracies help to explain Europe’s double puzzle. Theoretically, I argue that a focus on expertise and parties, and not just states, is central to our understanding of economic culture in the public sphere.

Comparative welfare and production regime literature has so far neglected the considerable cross-country differences in the sphere of housing. The United States became a country of homeowners living in cities of single-family houses in the twentieth century. Its housing policy was focused on supporting private mortgage indebtedness with only residual public housing. Germany, on the contrary, remained a tenant-dominated country with cities of multi-unit buildings. Its housing policy has been focused on construction subsidies to non-profit housing associations and incentives for savings earmarked for financing housing. The article claims that these differences are the outcome of different housing institutions that had already emerged in the nineteenth century. Germany developed non-profit housing associations and financed housing through mortgage banks, both privileging the construction of rental apartments. In the United States, savings and loan associations favored mortgages for owner-occupied, single-family house construction. When governments intervened during housing crises in the 1920/1930s, they aimed their subsidies at these existing institutions. Thus, US housing policy became finance-biased in favor of savings and loan associations, while Germany supported the housing cooperatives.

This article examines public debates on the legitimacy of banking profits in the 2008 credit crunch. A content analysis of 957 newspaper articles published in Germany and the UK in the early weeks after the Lehman Brothers collapse examines critical statements directed at illegitimate forms of financial profit in order to identify the cultural legitimacy of financial capitalism. The conceptual framework provided by the French sociology of justification points to the role of shared orders of value as a normative reference for public discourses. In both national debates, four important boundaries for legitimate profits were drawn that concerned the problems of ownership, risk-management capacities of traders, fraudulent client relations, and speculative gambling. The meaning of this classical moral criticism of banks was transformed in the context of the 2008 crisis: a line between “normal” and “excessive” financial profits was drawn, defining an area of legitimate profit-seeking that hewed to the basic assumptions of the market model. Economic theory was used as a scheme of public economic morality. The seemingly harsh critical debate effectively reproduced a legitimate image of a functioning financial market, deflecting public attention away from the structural ambivalences of financial profit-seeking and granting legitimacy to the institutional status quo of financial capitalism.

Understanding money requires that we first grasp what makes money so significant—so valuable—to us. The article thus examines the sociology outlined by Geoffrey Ingham and criticises its ontology of money as a measure of value underpinned by state authority. By contrast, it argues that money ought to be primarily intended as value in itself. Accordingly, money’s most specific attribute is none of its canonical functions but rather purchasing power: the power not to pay, or else the power to buy time. The latter is not the mere product of state (fiscal) agency, but is entangled from the start with the production of liquidity and the construction of speculative markets for debt. Thus the paper emphasises the importance of concrete bank discounting vis-à-vis abstract accounting in concrete processes of monetisation, and shows how modern money, far from cancelling debts, is historically constructed within liquid financial relations so as to “buy time” and systematically procrastinate the final “rendering of accounts” for debtors. As a result, money cannot exist without the simultaneous existence of a debt that it will never discharge.

The paper considers the impact of the current economic crisis on post-socialist welfare capitalist states through an examination of two most different cases: neo-liberal Estonia and neo-corporatist Slovenia. The crisis prompted the most sustained political contestation with respect to each model in two decades. Considering national public sphere discussions within a broader European context, the paper shows how transnational advocates of austerity reinforced Estonia’s neoliberal model but emboldened critics of the Slovenian model to roll back the state. While public sphere debates within small, peripheral states must be understood within transnational contexts, in both cases we can observe more continuity than change in the collective ideas underlying each model.

This paper uses theories of small states (e.g. Katzenstein) and nationalism (e.g. Gellner) to explain why Denmark and Ireland responded to the 2008 financial crisis in different ways. In Denmark, a coordinated market economy with considerable corporatism and state intervention, the private sector shouldered much of the financial burden for rescuing the banking sector. In Ireland, a liberal market economy without much corporatism or state intervention, the state shouldered the burden. The difference stems in large part from the fact that Denmark had comparatively thick institutions and a strong sense of nationalism whereas Ireland did not. Lessons for the theories of small states and nationalism are explored.