Social media summary: The shame display functions to appease others. Landers and Sznycer propose an additional function: to render us invisible.

The adaptive problem of shame: Information-triggered devaluation

Our hominin ancestors evolved in environments characterised by high rates of mortality (Burger, Baudisch, & Vaupel, Reference Burger, Baudisch and Vaupel2012), resource scarcity (Hill & Hurtado, Reference Hill and Hurtado1996), variance in food acquisition (Hill & Hurtado, Reference Hill and Hurtado1996; Kaplan & Hill, Reference Kaplan and Hill1985), disease and injury (Sugiyama, Reference Sugiyama2004), and aggression from predators and conspecifics (Keeley, Reference Keeley1997). In contrast to other animals, including our primate cousins, humans often relied on other members of their groups for the assistance necessary to survive and reproduce (Clutton-Brock, Reference Clutton-Brock2009; Schrock, Snodgrass, & Sugiyama, Reference Schrock, Snodgrass and Sugiyama2020). Such heavy reliance on mutual aid implies selection for incentivising one's mates, friends, allies and fellow group members to render assistance in times of hunger, incapacitation, or interpersonal conflict (Sugiyama, Reference Sugiyama2004). Because being positively valued by fellow group members would have led to being helped more and exploited less, how our ancestors were valued by those around them would have had considerable impact on their reproductive success (von Rueden & Jaeggi, Reference von Rueden and Jaeggi2016).

Research indicates that when new information comes to light that reveals an individual to be less socially valuable to others than previously supposed (e.g. lacking in skills, selfish, diseased, of reduced social status), audiences react by attaching less weight to that person's welfare (e.g. see Delton & Robertson, Reference Delton and Robertson2016; Sell, Reference Sell2005; Lim, Reference Lim2012; Sznycer, Reference Sznycer2010; Ermer, Reference Ermer2007; Sparrowe, Reference Sparrowe2020). Over evolutionary time, individuals devalued in this manner would have incurred fitness costs by, for example, being avoided, shunned, denied help and/or ostracised more often (Kurzban & Leary, Reference Kurzban and Leary2001; Hales et al., Reference Hales, Kassner, Williams and Graziano2016). For our ancestors, the adaptive problem of being devalued would therefore have made the difference between a long, successful life and an early, possibly violent demise.

The information threat theory of shame

The need to avoid the costs resulting from devaluation would have selected for regulatory adaptations to minimise the spread of negative information about the self and the costs associated with any ensuing devaluation that resulted from it (Gilbert, Reference Gilbert1997; Tooby & Cosmides, Reference Tooby, Cosmides, Lewis, Haviland-Jones and Barrett2008; Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016; Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999; Weisfeld & Dillon, Reference Weisfeld and Dillon2012). Over the millennia, those individuals who better attracted goodwill and avoided the indifference, censure and wrath of potential aid-givers would have more frequently survived and reproduced. This information threat theory of shame therefore posits that shame is an adaptation that evolved to defend against information-triggered devaluation (Landers, Sznycer & Al Shawaf, Reference Landers, Sznycer, Al-Shawaf, Al-Shawaf and Shackelford2022; Sznycer, Reference Sznycer2010; Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016; Sznycer, Sell, & Lieberman, Reference Sznycer, Sell and Lieberman2021; Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby, Reference Sznycer, Cosmides and Tooby2017; Robertson et al., Reference Robertson, Sznycer, Delton, Tooby and Cosmides2018; see also Gilbert, Reference Gilbert1997; Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999; Weisfeld & Dillon, Reference Weisfeld and Dillon2012; Baumeister & Tice, Reference Baumeister and Tice1990; Schlenker & Leary, Reference Schlenker and Leary1982). According to this account, the shame system is an adaptation designed to coordinate psychology, physiology and behaviour to: (a) inhibit actions likely to yield more costs from social devaluation than the benefits said actions would yield; (b) limit the spread of potentially discrediting information about the self; (c) minimise the degree and scope of any social devaluation that does occur; and, if devaluation occurs, (d) motivate actions geared toward mitigating its costs.

In line with this account, experimentally manipulating (potential or actual) devaluation reliably elicits shame (Smith et al., Reference Smith, Webster, Parrott and Eyre2002; Dickerson et al., Reference Dickerson, Mycek and Zaldivar2008; Robertson et al., Reference Robertson, Sznycer, Delton, Tooby and Cosmides2018). Being devalued – disliked, excluded, tortured, oppressed – by others elicits shame even when individuals know they haven't done anything wrong (Robertson et al., Reference Robertson, Sznycer, Delton, Tooby and Cosmides2018; Shapiro, Reference Shapiro2003; Levi, Reference Levi1989). The true elicitor of shame, therefore, appears to be neither objective wrongdoing nor one's causal attributions for one's wrongdoing (Tracy & Robins, Reference Tracy and Robins2004), but rather the threat or actuality of social devaluation (Robertson et al., Reference Robertson, Sznycer, Delton, Tooby and Cosmides2018). Wrongdoing so often triggers shame because wrongdoing reliably predicts the threat of being devalued, but wrongdoing is neither necessary nor sufficient for triggering shame.

The information threat theory proposes that the shame system operates by incorporating both an invariant architecture and open parameters. This is because the best-bet response to counter devaluation depends on the internal and external environments in which the shame adaptation finds itself: you may or may not have enough physical strength or high-status allies to resist an attack against you; you may or may not have personal qualities that could compensate for your devalued trait; by the time you hear the sound of footsteps approaching, you may or may not have enough time to sneak out of the room before you're caught red-handed. These open parameters take variable, dynamically updated inputs – e.g. an audience is present but not expressing displeasure (Dickerson et al., Reference Dickerson, Mycek and Zaldivar2008); ‘I am well-connected’ (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Takemura, Delton, Sato, Robertson, Cosmides and Tooby2012); ‘the audience has weapons’ – and feeds them into the invariant architecture. Utilising specialised concepts (e.g. AUDIENCE; Sznycer, Reference Sznycer2010), the invariant architecture then specifies the decision logic that matches sub-classes of inputs to sub-classes of behavioural outputs (e.g. terminate action, give excuse) to minimise the devaluative threat (Sznycer, Reference Sznycer2010; Lukaszewski et al., Reference Lukaszewski, Lewis, Durkee, Sell, Sznycer and Buss2020; Sznycer & Cohen, Reference Sznycer and Cohen2021; see Table 1).

Table 1. Hypothesised outputs of the shame system as a function of its mode of operation

Adapted from Sznycer (Reference Sznycer2010: 165).

Differences in the expression of the shame system across situations, individuals and populations can thus be interpreted as differences in the distributions of relevant inputs fed into the open parameters. For example, the cost of devaluation can be mitigated by forming new alliances. Therefore, the information threat theory predicts that individual differences in shame-proneness will depend in part on perceptions of the ease with which one can form new relationships (i.e. ‘relational mobility’; see Yuki et al., Reference Yuki, Schug, Horikawa, Takemura, Sato, Yokota and Kamaya2007) to compensate for lost or damaged relationships. Testing this prediction, Sznycer et al. (Reference Sznycer, Takemura, Delton, Sato, Robertson, Cosmides and Tooby2012) compared the shame responses of Western participants with those of East-Asian participants – traditionally thought to be more shame prone (Benedict, Reference Benedict1946) – and found that this ‘cultural’ difference was partially mediated by East-Asian participants’ perception of lower relational mobility (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Takemura, Delton, Sato, Robertson, Cosmides and Tooby2012).

Additionally, the information threat theory predicts that individuals with highly valued (or feared) traits (e.g. resourcefulness, physical attractiveness, being well-connected) will be less prone to shame all else equal, because their superior position can be leveraged to (a) impose or threaten to impose more costs on others to incentivise less devaluation or prevent it altogether (Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, Reference Sell, Tooby and Cosmides2009) and (b) allow them to better weather the consequences of devaluation when they are devalued. As predicted, such individuals are less prone to shame (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Takemura, Delton, Sato, Robertson, Cosmides and Tooby2012). Similarly, variation in audience composition should affect the degree of shame activation: a high-status audience, for example, can impose greater costs on others (and withhold greater benefits), and so being devalued by such an audience should be more shame-provoking than being devalued by a low-status audience, all else equal. In line with this, Garland and Brown (Reference Garland and Brown1972) found that in a task where longer singing time increased participant payment, teenage girls who evaluated their singing as poor sang longer when their audience was described as made up of ‘poor singers’ than when their audience was described as made up of ‘excellent singers’ (Garland & Brown, Reference Garland and Brown1972). Likewise, Jackson and Latané (Reference Jackson and Latané1981) found that participants reported more nervousness at the prospect of singing in front of an audience of graduate students and professors from a music school than at the prospect of singing in front of tone-deaf undergraduates. In line with the information threat theory, the shame people experience seems well calibrated to the specifics of the threat posed by devaluation.

A novel prediction derived from the information threat theory

To minimise the threat of devaluation aptly, the shame system must operate not only reactively, when one knows the audience is expressing or has expressed devaluative responses, but also prospectively, in advance of any action likely to bring about social devaluation (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016; Leary, Reference Leary2015; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, Reference Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun and Burns2013; see also Fehr & Gächter, Reference Fehr and Gächter2000). To activate prospectively, the shame system needs accurate estimates of the degree to which fellow group members devalue a given act or personal characteristic. In short, the shame system needs to predict the precise magnitude of likely devaluation for a given act or trait, before any actual devaluation takes place, in order to guide decisions cost-effectively. According to the information threat theory, anticipatory feelings of shame internally transmit precise information about the predicted magnitude of audience devaluation one would incur were one to engage in an act disfavoured by the audience, weighted by the odds of being discovered by the audience (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016, see also Crockett, Siegel, Kurth-Nelson, Dayan, & Dolan, Reference Crockett, Siegel, Kurth-Nelson, Dayan and Dolan2017). This internal signal helps avoid the dual errors of prospective shame under-activation, whereby the individual mounts an insufficient response to prevent or diminish devaluation (and thus incurs excessive costs from others’ devaluation), and prospective shame over-activation, whereby the individual experiences so much shame that they refrain from taking actions that would yield more direct benefits than the costs they would incur from that devaluation.

This reasoning led to empirical tests of the hypotheses that the shame system is designed to (a) accurately forecast the magnitude of audience devaluation on an act-by-act basis, and (b) generate an internal signal of anticipatory shame in proportion to that forecast. Across three different cultures (the US, India and Israel), participants were presented with a set of socially devalued acts or traits (e.g. theft, sexual infidelity, poor table manners, lack of ambition) and were asked to rate in a between-subjects design, for each act or trait, either the intensity of shame they would feel if the act or trait were true of them or how negatively they would view another individual if the act or trait were true of that other individual (a measure of devaluation). In all three countries, the intensity of anticipatory shame closely tracked the magnitude of devaluation expressed by local audiences (Figure 1a–c). Furthermore, shame within each country tracked the magnitude of devaluation reported in the other two countries, suggesting universality in both the structure and content of shame (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016; see also Durkee, Lukaszewski, & Buss, Reference Durkee, Lukaszewski and Buss2019; Cohen, Chun, & Sznycer, Reference Cohen, Chun and Sznycer2020). Follow-up studies demonstrated that this close association is specific to shame: other negatively valenced emotions such as sadness and anxiety did not track audience devaluation (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016). Moreover, further follow-up studies conducted in 15 traditional small-scale societies around the world again found close associations between shame and audience devaluation: shame in each population closely tracked both the devaluation reported locally and the devaluation reported in each of the other 14 populations. Notably, measures of linguistic similarity, religious similarity, and geographic proximity – three common measures of cultural distance – each failed to account for the strength of between-community associations between shame and devaluation (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Xygalatas, Agey, Alami, An, Ananyeva and Tooby2018; Figure 1, d–r).

Figure 1. Shame tracks devaluation. The intensity of anticipatory shame tracks the intensity of audience devaluation. Scatterplots A–C: data from three mass societies (adapted from Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016). The stimuli were a set of brief hypothetical scenarios describing socially devalued actions and personal characteristics. The scenarios were phrased either from the perspective of the focal individual (e.g. ‘You are not generous with others’; shame condition) or from the perspective of an observer vis-à-vis the focal individual (e.g. ‘He is not generous with others’; audience condition; between-subjects design). For each scenario, participants rated either their feeling of shame if they took those actions or had those characteristics (shame), or the degree to which they would negatively view the individual in the scenarios if the individual took those actions or had those characteristics (audience). Each point represents the mean shame rating and mean devaluation rating of one scenario. Data from (number of scenarios): A, US (29); B, India (29); C, Israel (24). Scatterplots D–R, data from 15 small-scale societies (adapted from Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Xygalatas, Agey, Alami, An, Ananyeva and Tooby2018). Same experimental design, but with a set of 12 scenarios that were different from the ones used in Sznycer et al. (Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016). D, Cotopaxi, Ecuador; E, Morona-Santiago, Ecuador; F, Coquimbo, Chile; G, Drâa-Tafilalet, Morocco; H, Enugu, Nigeria; I, Chalkidiki, Greece; J, Ikland, Uganda; K, Le Morne, Mauritius; L, La Gaulette, Mauritius; M, Dhading, Nepal; N, Tuva, Russia; O, Khövsgöl, Mongolia; P, Shaanxi, China; Q, Farming Communities, Japan; R, Fishing Communities, Japan. In all cases, shame ratings and devaluation ratings were given by different participants. Effect sizes: r ² linear.

The information threat theory can account for many known features of shame

The hypothesis that shame's adaptive function is to mitigate the threat of devaluation can explain many published findings on shame. For instance, being devalued causes people pain (MacDonald & Leary, Reference MacDonald and Leary2005; Eisenberger, Reference Eisenberger2012); people generally avoid actions that could exacerbate devaluation (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, Reference De Hooge, Breugelmans and Zeelenberg2008; Fehr & Gächter, Reference Fehr and Gächter2000); among students and depressed patients, shame proneness correlates with perceptions of low status and submissive behaviour (Gilbert, Reference Gilbert2000a); people tend to hide reputationally damaging information (Rockenbach & Milinski, Reference Rockenbach and Milinski2011; Sznycer, Schniter, Tooby, & Cosmides, Reference Sznycer, Schniter, Tooby and Cosmides2015); and when other people discover reputationally damaging information about them, shamed individuals withdraw (Leach & Cidam, Reference Leach and Cidam2015), appease those who know it (Keltner, Young, & Buswell, Reference Keltner, Young and Buswell1997) and apologise to them (Schniter, Sheremeta, & Sznycer, Reference Schniter, Sheremeta and Sznycer2013). Furthermore, shame is exacerbated when failing at easy (vs. difficult) tasks – expected if low competence elicits more devaluation and warrants more shame (Lewis et al., Reference Lewis, Alessandri and Sullivan1992). Some evidence suggests that shame increases with severity of disease, perhaps because severe diseases are impairing or communicable, and individuals suffering from such diseases are less capable of aiding others or defending their own interests (Leary, Rapp, Herbst, Exum, & Feldman, Reference Leary, Rapp, Herbst, Exum and Feldman1998; Homayoon et al., Reference Homayoon, Hiebler-Ragger, Zenker, Weger, Unterrainer and Aberer2020).

The information threat theory can explain the link between being victimised and feeling shame – an ethical and scientific puzzle, since victims are often victimised through no fault of their own. Some evidence indeed suggests such a link. For instance, being a victim of torture (Shapiro, Reference Shapiro2003), marital violence (Andrews & Brewin, Reference Andrews and Brewin1990), rape (Notman & Nadelson, Reference Notman and Nadelson1976) and physical and sexual abuse during childhood (Andrews & Hunter, Reference Andrews and Hunter1997) elicit shame and self-blame. Both literary and sociological data (Hovannisian, Reference Hovannisian1986; Levi, Reference Levi1989; Totten, Reference Totten2009) indicate that shame is prevalent in victims of wanton subjugation, where ‘on a rational plane, there should not have been much to be ashamed of’ (Levi, Reference Levi1989, p. 77). Yet while this link between victimisation and shame may seem odd or anomalous if shame is triggered as a result of attributing negative outcomes to the self (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, Reference Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow1992) or violating a norm (Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999), from the perspective of the information threat theory, victimisation can meet the input conditions of devaluation: after all, being victimised often results from being devalued by others, and the inability to resist victimisation may indicate low personal formidability or status – personal characteristics that meet the input conditions of the shame programme.

When it comes to behavioural outputs, shame can produce a wide and seemingly paradoxical array of actions. For instance, shame can generate both enhanced cooperativeness and hostile tactics, such as shifting blame to victims, scapegoating third parties and threatening or mobilising aggression (Leach & Cidam, Reference Leach and Cidam2015; Fessler, Reference Fessler, Selten and Gigerenzer2001; Scheff, Reference Scheff and Lewis1987; Elison et al., Reference Elison, Garofalo and Velotti2014; Zhu et al., Reference Zhu, Xu, Tang, Liu, Wang, An, Mai and Liu2019), making amends (De Hooge et al., Reference De Hooge, Breugelmans and Zeelenberg2008; De Hooge, Breugelmans, Wagemans, & Zeelenberg, Reference De Hooge, Breugelmans, Wagemans and Zeelenberg2018; Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Schniter, Tooby and Cosmides2015), avoiding others (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, Reference Barrett, Zahn-Waxler and Cole1993), feeling depressed (Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow1992; Cheung, Gilbert, & Irons, Reference Cheung, Gilbert and Irons2004) and attempting to improve oneself (De Hooge et al., Reference De Hooge, Zeelenberg and & Breugelmans2010). Such heterogeneous tactics can interfere with each other if deployed concurrently (e.g. cooperation and aggression) but have the capacity to minimise the threat of devaluation if deployed in the right situations or sequences.

Forms and functions of the shame display

One hallmark of shame is a characteristic display that includes slumped posture, gaze aversion, downward head tilt (Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999; Keltner et al. Reference Keltner, Young and Buswell1997; Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, Reference Tracy, Robins and Schriber2009; see Figure 2) and behavioural inhibition, including reduced speech (Gilbert, Reference Gilbert, Gilbert and Andrews1998; Price & Sloman, Reference Price and Sloman1987; Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999). The shame display is produced when people experience personal failure (Tracy & Matsumoto, Reference Tracy and Matsumoto2008; Witkower, Mercadante, & Tracy, Reference Witkower, Mercadante and Tracy2020), and shame displayers are correspondingly perceived by observers as having suffered a reduction in their social status (Shariff, Tracy, & Markusoff, Reference Shariff, Tracy and Markusoff2012). The shame display develops reliably; it is produced by young children (Barrett, Reference Barrett, Mascolo and Griffin1998; Lewis et al., Reference Lewis, Alessandri and Sullivan1992; Stipek et al., Reference Stipek, Recchia and McClintic1992) and congenitally blind adults (Tracy & Matsumoto, Reference Tracy and Matsumoto2008). The shame display also affords teachable moments: people infer from expressions of shame what fellow group members devalue and correspondingly downgrade their inclination to perform those devalued actions or activities (Schaumberg & Skowronek, Reference Schaumberg and Skowronek2022).

Figure 2. Prototypical shame display. Reprinted from Martens et al. (Reference Martens, Tracy and Shariff2012), copyright (2022) by Taylor & Francis. Reprinted with permission.

The human shame display appears to be phylogenetically ancient; it resembles the displays of submission produced by non-human species in aggressive contests over dominance (Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, Reference Martens, Tracy and Shariff2012; Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, Reference Tracy, Robins and Schriber2009). Behavioral homologues or analogues of human shame occur widely across species (Gilbert, Reference Gilbert, Gilbert and Bailey2000b): in barbary macaques (Deag, Reference Deag1977), rhesus monkeys (Møller, Harlow, & Mitchell, Reference Møller, Harlow and Mitchell1968), chimpanzees (Nishida, Reference Nishida1983), lemurids (Pereira & Kappeler, Reference Pereira and Kappeler1997), mice, guinea-pigs and golden hamsters (Grant & Mackintosh, Reference Grant and Mackintosh1963), laboratory rats (Blanchard & Blanchard, Reference Blanchard and Blanchard1977), canids (Darwin, Reference Darwin1872/2009; Fox, Reference Fox1969), pigs (McGlone, Reference McGlone1985), lizards (Carpenter, Reference Carpenter1962), black-crowned night herons (Noble, Wurm, & Schmidt, Reference Noble, Wurm and Schmidt1938), fish (Grosenick, Clement, & Fernald, Reference Grosenick, Clement and Fernald2007; Lorenz, Reference Lorenz1966) and stone crabs (Sinclair, Reference Sinclair1977).

Compared with non-human animals, status in humans depends less heavily on fighting ability or readiness to submit to the powerful (Gilbert, Reference Gilbert1997; Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999) and more heavily on the individual's ability and willingness to confer benefits (Durkee, Lukaszewski, & Buss, Reference Durkee, Lukaszewski and Buss2020; Eisenbruch, Grillot, Maestripieri & Roney, Reference Eisenbruch, Grillot, Maestripieri and Roney2016; von Rueden, Gurven, Kaplan, Reference von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplan2008) and to abide by the coordinated values of fellow group members (Gilbert, Reference Gilbert1997; Fessler, Reference Fessler and Hinton1999). This difference has led some researchers to question the adaptive value of the shame display in modern humans: the gaze avoidance and general submissive stance delivered by the shame display may have been useful for signaling submission and deterring further attacks in our ancestral past, but may now no longer serve such a function in our modern, coordinated, prestige-driven societies (Gilbert & McGuire, Reference Gilbert, McGuire, Gilbert and Andrews1998; Gilbert, Reference Gilbert1997; see also Curtis & Miller, Reference Curtis and Miller1986). From an adaptationist standpoint, however, one might ask: are there features in the human shame display that seem improbably well-designed to solve an adaptive problem – here, defend against the threat of devaluation – relative to what chance would produce (Williams, Reference Williams1966)? An affirmative answer to this question seems quite plausible. The human shame display seems well-engineered to cost-effectively address two distinct sub-problems related to information-triggered devaluation: (a) mollifying observers when one has been identified as a transgressor; and (b) reducing observers’ ability to identify one as a transgressor in the first place.

Mollifying observers

Gaze avoidance is a hallmark of the shame display, but people generally judge gaze-avoiders unfavourably (Larsen & Schackelford, Reference Larsen and Shackelford1996). This raises the question of why a component of the shame system – putatively designed to counter devaluation – would produce actions that increase devaluation. This puzzle may be solved, however, when considering that the relevant comparison is not between observer evaluations of gaze seekers and gaze avoiders generally, but rather between observer evaluations of gaze seekers and gaze avoiders whom observers know have committed disreputable behaviour. When evaluated against this more relevant standard, gaze avoidance appears to have positive (less negative) effects for gaze avoiders: indeed, when an individual commits a moral infraction of which observers are aware, individuals who subsequently gaze-avoid are judged more favourably than those who gaze-seek. And audiences’ responses toward individuals known to have transgressed are more forgiving when the transgressor produces the gaze-avoiding shame display than when the transgressor fails to produce gaze-avoidance (De Jong, Reference De Jong1999; Keltner, Young, & Buswell, Reference Keltner, Young and Buswell1997; Semin & Manstead, Reference Semin and Manstead1982). For example, Keltner and colleagues (Reference Keltner, Young and Buswell1997) found that audience members were more sympathetic toward students whom they were told had failed a presentation when those students exhibited the shame display rather than an embarrassment display (Keltner et al., Reference Keltner, Young and Buswell1997). And in a follow-up experiment, it was found that observers judged a convicted criminal to be less guilty and assigned them less prison time when criminals displayed shame or embarrassment compared with neutral expressions. Similarly, Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, and Brown (Reference Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa and Brown2008) found that when told of a CEO who verbally apologised on behalf of his company for a chemical spill, audiences were more accepting of the apology when he expressed shame than when he expressed guilt or no emotion (Giner-Sorolla et al., Reference Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa and Brown2008). Further, in experiments asking participants to assign penalties to fictitious sex offenders, Proeve and Howells (Reference Proeve and Howells2006) found that audiences were more lenient when told the offenders expressed shame than when they expressed sadness or remorse (Proeve & Howells, Reference Proeve and Howells2006). These findings demonstrate the effect of the gaze-avoidant shame display to mollify the angry reactions of observers, and suggest, contra mismatch arguments, that shame-driven gaze avoidance need not be a vestigial feature on its way to being selected out (see Sznycer, Reference Sznycer2010).

The mollifying effect of gaze avoidance (and the general submissive stance) on audiences has been interpreted as appeasement (Keltner et al., Reference Keltner, Young and Buswell1997) – the evolutionarily conserved inhibition of another's aggression by signaling that one withdraws from a contest (Fessler, Reference Fessler, Tracy, Robins and Tangney2007; Sloman, Price, Gilbert, Gardner, Reference Sloman, Price, Gilbert and Gardner1994; Weisfeld & Dillon, Reference Weisfeld and Dillon2012). However, positive evaluations of gaze avoidance have also been observed in contexts in which there is no apparent transgression. For example, gaze-avoidance is judged less favourably than gaze-seeking when the target is physically attractive or expressing happiness, but gaze-avoidance is judged more favourably when the target is physically unattractive or expressing disgust (Main, DeBruine, Little, & Jones, Reference Main, DeBruine, Little and Jones2010; Rall, Greenspan, & Neidich, Reference Rall, Greenspan and Neidich1984). The latter effects may still fall under the rubric of appeasement, however, if gaze avoidance signals the pre-emptive rejection of a claim for attention or social valuation perceived as undeserved. Nevertheless, more research is needed to affirm the appeasement hypothesis.

The invisibility hypothesis

While a sizeable literature deals with the appeasing function of the shame display, no research we are aware of has elaborated on the possibility that the shame ‘display’ might serve another function: evasion from identification (and thus from devaluation). We use quotation marks around ‘display’ here because according to this hypothesis, the characteristic constellation of shame actions functions not to elicit a forgiving response from audiences, but to evade recognition and evaluation by the audience. That is, in some contexts the shame ‘display’ may function as camouflage rather than as a signal (Smith & Harper, Reference Smith and Harper2003). In what follows, we describe the logic behind this idea (what we term the invisibility hypothesis), suggest ways the shame system could realise this function, and offer questions that future research could address.

If shame functions to diminish costs owing to devaluation as the information threat theory suggests, then one powerful way to accomplish that goal would be to prevent identification or recognition of the transgressor in the first place. Or, to paraphrase Sun Tzu (Reference Tzu2010), the most effective form of appeasement for one's transgressions is the one not required. If caught committing a harmful, immoral, or disgraceful act, appeasing those who discover you might be prudent. However, you'd be even better served to evade detection and identification entirely, thus saving yourself the cost of appeasement (itself an admission of reduced status or social value) and any ensuing reduction in status or esteem. As Zhu and colleagues have shown (2019), people prefer not to appease: when feeling shame, people tolerate being treated poorly by others when others know why they feel ashamed but angrily protest that same poor treatment when it can be portrayed credibly as undeserved – that is, when people know others are in the dark about their transgression (Zhu et al., Reference Zhu, Xu, Tang, Liu, Wang, An, Mai and Liu2019).

The view of the shame ‘display’ as a means to achieve invisibility can be found in Darwin's Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals:

Incidentally, we note that the hunger for invisibility – to act free of the threat of others’ devaluation and aggression, to gain information about others unmolested by reputational concerns, to snoop around without being regarded as a snoop (Rockenbach & Milinsky, 2011; Dana, Weber & Kuang, Reference Dana, Weber and Kuang2007) – appears to be a human universal. Allusions to this desire can be found across time and cultures, from Plato's Ring of Gyges, Tolkien's The One Ring, Rowling's Cloak of Invisibility, Wells’ Invisible Man and Marvel Comics’ Invisible Woman, to the Daoist texts on goddess Jiutian Xuannü and Persian mythology's Khrafstra.

The idea that the shame system may be designed to evade devaluation by rendering one invisible (Tooby, personal communication) may seem odd or hyperbolic, but shame can render people invisible to audiences in the literal sense that shame operates preemptively and anticipatorily (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016, Reference Sznycer, Xygalatas, Agey, Alami, An, Ananyeva and Tooby2018), leading people to interrupt their disgraceful actions, hide, flee or destroy incriminating evidence when they perceive an audience looming. Thus, the shame system can motivate behaviour that makes invisible one's disgraceful act. However, when evading observers is impractical, the static shame ‘display’, or camouflage, may still confer some measure of invisibility, albeit to a lesser (and less literal) degree. This camouflage may be effective at interfering with the audience's attention, face-processing, identification, recognition, encoding and other information-gathering pre-requisites for devaluing wrongdoers or ‘undesirables’ (i.e. via down-regulation of welfare tradeoff ratio; see Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, Reference Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman and Sznycer2008; Delton & Robertson, Reference Delton and Robertson2016) and thus at interfering with the behaviours that result from that devaluation (e.g. disassociation, condemnation, banishment). The static shame ‘display’-as-camouflage may confer its producer a measure of invisibility both when occluding one's face with a top hat (see Figure 3) and in less extreme cases such as in the prototypical shame ‘display’ (Figure 2).

Figure 3. Concealment through total occlusion of the face. A. Fellig (1944). ‘In The Paddy Wagon’ (photograph by Weegee/International Center of Photography). Via Getty Images. https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/premium-rates-apply-not-to-be-used-for-postcards-news-photo/2716706?adppopup=true

The shame system can produce invisibility in various ways: leading one to forgo actions that may result in being devalued, interrupting one's actions when detection by others is imminent, hiding, fleeing, equivocating, deceiving, justifying one's actions, and concocting other ruses for concealing oneself in plain sight. How might the static shame ‘display’, or camouflage, confer invisibility? We suggest two possible ways.

Concluding remarks

An adaptationist approach to shame paints a unique picture of this emotion: rather than a maladaptive source of hostility and psychopathology, shame is a messenger, one that defends the individual by transmitting devaluation-relevant information to an array of countermeasures against devaluation. The information threat theory can explain many known facts about shame and generate novel predictions. Some of these have received broad support across cultures (Sznycer et al., Reference Sznycer, Tooby, Cosmides, Porat, Shalvi and Halperin2016, Reference Sznycer, Xygalatas, Agey, Alami, An, Ananyeva and Tooby2018; Durkee et al., Reference Durkee, Lukaszewski and Buss2019; Cohen et al., Reference Cohen, Chun and Sznycer2020; Sznycer & Cohen, Reference Sznycer and Cohen2021). Others, like the invisibility hypothesis, remain to be tested.