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Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Nicholas Bardsley
Nicholas Bardsley*
Affiliation:
National Centre for Research Methods, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
*
e-mail: nb6@soton.ac.uk
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Abstract

Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take a partner's money. Dictator game giving therefore does not reveal concern for consequences to others existing independently of the environment, as posited in rational choice theory. It may instead be an artefact of experimentation. Alternatively, evaluations of options depend on the composition of the choice set. Implications of these possibilities are explored for experimental methodology and charitable donations respectively. The data favour the artefact interpretation, suggesting that demand characteristics of experimental protocols merit investigation, and that economic analysis should not exclude context-specific social norms.

Keywords

AltruismArtificialityExperimentsMethodology

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C70: General
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 122 - 133
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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