Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-mzp66 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-03T00:20:48.206Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Constitutional Law and the Limits of Discretion in Family Property Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Patrick Parkinson
Patrick Parkinson*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The argument of this Article is that the width of discretion that trial judges have to alter property rights under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) has been overstated. The property aspects of the Act can only be valid to the extent to which the law is an appropriate application of the marriage and divorce powers in the Constitution or is within the boundaries of the States’ reference of powers about de facto relationships. These constitutional provisions place significant constraints upon judicial discretion. In relation to marriages, the need to adjust property rights must result from the circumstances of the marital relationship or be justified as a consequence of the financial impact upon a party of its breakdown. The authority of Parliament to make laws concerning the alteration of the property rights of de facto partners is limited to cases of relationship breakdown.

Furthermore, the Family Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia are both Chapter III courts. That has implications for the kind of discretion that Parliament can lawfully confer upon the trial judge, and the limits of that discretion. Some recent dicta and decisions of the Full Court of the Court suggest a view of judicial discretion which, it is argued, is inconsistent with the nature of judicial power in a Chapter III court. The discretion of trial judges is fettered by three duties: The duty to follow the interpretation of the Act as established authoritatively by appellate decisions, taking account of guidelines in appellate judgments; the duty to give reasons that explain the outcome of the case, and in particular, to justify the alteration of legal and equitable interests in specific items of property; and the duty to avoid arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

The current jurisprudence on family property law is not necessarily consistent with these constitutional limitations.

Type
Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 49 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 The Australian National University

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 (1979) 23 ALR 211, 218.

2 Collins and Collins [1990] FLC 92-149.

3 Australian Institute of Family Studies, Settling down: Pathways of parents after divorce, Monograph No 13 (1993).

4 Rolfe and Rolfe (1977) 34 FLR 518; Aroney and Aroney [1979] FLC 90-709. For discussion, see Gray, Kevin, Reallocation of Property on Divorce (Professional Books, 1977) 28–36Google Scholar; Kahn-Freund, Otto, ‘Matrimonial Property and Equality Before the Law: Some Sceptical Reflections’ (1971) 4 Human Rights Journal 493.Google Scholar

5 Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605.

6 Parkinson, Patrick, ‘Quantifying the Homemaker Contribution in Family Property Law’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Parker and Parker [1983] FLC 91-364.

8 [1989] FLC 92-010.

9 Ibid 77,292.

10 Cf Bremner and Bremner [1995] FLC 92-560 and Danford and Danford [2011] FamCAFC 54 with Cook v Langford [2008] FLC 93-374; Williams and Williams [2007] FamCA 313, Cabbell and Cabbell [2009] FamCAFC 205 and Agius and Agius [2010] FLC 93-442. For inconsistencies in the theoretical basis, compare the explanations in Lee Steere and Lee Steere [1985] FLC 91-626; Aleksovski and Aleksovski [1996] FLC 92-705, Pierce and Pierce [1999] FLC 92-844 and Williams and Williams [2007] FamCA 313.

11 Cf, eg, the guidance given by the majority in Coghlan and Coghlan [2005] FLC 93-220, 79,646 with the guidance about an approach which was deemed to be incorrect by the Full Court in M and M [2006] FLC 93-281, 80, 817-18. See also Palmer and Palmer [2012] FamCAFC 159.

12 This issue does not appear even to have been considered in the Full Court.

13 On inheritances, cf Bonnici and Bonnici [1992] FLC 92-272; Wall and Wall [2002] FLC 93-110; Bishop and Bishop [2013] FamCAFC 138 and Singerson and Joans [2014] FamCAFC 238. On lottery wins, cf Mackie and Mackie [1981] FLC 91-069; Farmer and Bramley [2000] FLC 93-060 and Eufrosin and Eufrosin [2014] FamCAFC 191.

14 Cf Ferraro and Ferraro [1993] FLC 92-335; JEL and DDF [2001] FLC 93-075 (special contribution by entrepreneurial husbands) and Singerson and Joans [2014] FamCAFC 238 (wife treated as making much greater contribution because husband made redundant) with Figgins and Figgins [2002] FLC 93-122; Kane and Kane [2013] FamCAFC 205, Hoffman and Hoffman [2014] FamCAFC 92 and Fields and Smith [2015] FamCAFC 57 (no doctrine of special contributions).

15 Cf Commissioner of Taxation v Worsnop [2009] FamCAFC 4 with Johnson & Johnson [1999] FamCA 369 and Trustee of the property of Lemnos v Lemnos [2009] FamCAFC 20. See also Chemaisse and Chemaisse; Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FLC 91-915; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Rowell [1989] FLC 92-026 and Biltoft and Biltoft [1995] FLC 92-614, 82, 127.

16 For an earlier analysis, see Parkinson, above n 6.

17 [2013] FamCAFC 138.

18 [1992] FLC 92-272 (‘Bonnici’).

19 See, eg, Wall and Wall [2002] FLC 93-110; Jarrott and Jarrott (No 2) [2012] FamCAFC 72.

20 Bishop and Bishop [2013] FamCAFC 138, [28].

21 Heiner v Scott (1914) 19 CLR 381, 393 (Griffith CJ).

22 Western Australia has not given a reference of powers in relation to the property rights of parties to de facto relationships.

23 (1987) 163 CLR 278, 285–6.

24 Ibid 286.

25 (1964) 110 CLR 353 (‘Lansell’).

26 Ibid 361.

27 Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108.

28 Ibid 119; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(2).

29 Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (NSW) s 1(2) (emphasis added).

30 [1995] FLC 92-635.

31 Ibid 82, 378-9.

32 Sindel and Milton [2010] FamCAFC 232.

33 See, eg, Grist and Grist [2007] FamCA 1248, [132]; Swarb and Swarb [2013] FamCA 404, [118].

34 [2000] FLC 93–060, 87,950.

35 [1995] FLC 92-635, 82,388.

36 Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605, 638.

37 [1995] FLC 92-595.

38 Ibid 81,912.

39 Franklin and Franklin [2010] FamCAFC 131, [179] (Boland and Thackray JJ): ‘It is also to be borne in mind that s 75(2), particularly s 75(2)(b), is not to be used a means of social engineering to re-distribute property (see Clauson and Clauson [1995] FLC 92-595 and Waters and Jurek [1995] FLC 92-635 (Fogarty J)).’

40 [2010] FamCAFC 201.

41 The Full Court said in Willis and Willis [2007] FamCA 819 that the trial judge must ‘consider the effect of the findings as to contribution on the respective positions of the parties, before proceeding to determine whether any adjustment was warranted pursuant to section 75(2)’. See also Marsh and Marsh [2014] FamCAFC 24.

42 [1996] FLC 92-705, 83,437 (‘Aleksovski’).

43 [1985] FLC 91-626.

44 Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) (1981) 149 CLR 227, 258.

45 (1979) 141 CLR 504, 519.

46 (1980) 146 CLR 447, 496-470.

47 (1976) 134 CLR 495, 510.

48 (2013) 250 CLR 441.

49 (2012) 247 CLR 108, 121 [39] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), quoting Hepworth v Hepworth (1963) 110 CLR 309, 317 (Windeyer J).

50 [1996] FLC 92-705, 83, 437.

51 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 90SF(3)(a).

52 Ibid s 90SF(3)(b).

53 Ibid s 90SF(4).

54 See, eg, Bracklow v Bracklow (1999) 1 SCR 420: the Canadian Supreme Court held that the former husband was under a duty to pay ongoing support to his ex-wife as a result of illness which had no connection with the circumstances of the marriage. For discussion see Parkinson, P, Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011), 258-59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55 Lansell v Lansell (1964) 110 CLR 353, 361.

56 [2005] FLC 93-241, 79,978 [42] (‘Zalewski’).

57 [2008] FamCAFC 107.

58 See, eg, Zalewski [2005] FLC 93-241, 79,978 [42]; Polonius and York [2010] FamCAFC 228, [93].

59 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978), 31–32.Google Scholar

60 Ibid 31.

61 (1986) 161 CLR 513, 519-520 (‘Norbis’).

62 Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584.

63 Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, at 537; see also Wilson and Dawson JJ at 533. Brennan J's dictum was cited with approval in Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, 86 [35] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ).

64 Bishop and Bishop [2013] FamCAFC 138, [28]. See above, text accompanying n.20.

65 (2011) 243 CLR 181.

66 Ibid 213.

67 (1996) 189 CLR 51; see also Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson (2014) 307 ALR 174, 185 [40] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ): ‘The principle for which Kable stands is that because the Constitution establishes an integrated court system, and contemplates the exercise of federal jurisdiction by state Supreme Courts, state legislation which purports to confer upon such a court a power or function which substantially impairs the court's institutional integrity, and which is therefore incompatible with that court's role as a repository of federal jurisdiction, is constitutionally invalid’.

68 (2008) 232 CLR 438, 470.

69 Gleeson, M, ‘Judicial Accountability’ (1995) 2 The Judicial Review 117, 122.Google Scholar

70 Bosworth and Firkins [2014] FamCAFC 202, [44].

71 (1995) 184 CLR 348.

72 Ibid 394.

73 Ibid; see also Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

74 Farmer and Bramley [2000] FLC 93-060, 87, 947 [49].

75 Steinbrenner and Steinbrenner [2008] FamCAFC 193, 234 (Coleman J).

76 Law Reform Commission, Matrimonial Property, Report No 39 (1987), 138.

77 Bremner and Bremner [1995] FLC 92-560.

78 Williams and Williams [2007] FamCA 313.

79 [1997] FLC 92-757, 84,299. This passage was cited with approval by the Full Court in Sindel and Milton [2010] FamCAFC 232, [70].

80 Kennon and Kennon [1997] FLC 92-757, 84,300.

81 Ibid.

82 Aleksovski [1996] FLC 92-705, 83,437.

83 Ibid 83, 443.

84 Farmer and Bramley [2000] FLC 93-060, [49] (Finn J).

85 [2014] FamCAFC 212.

86 Fields and Smith [2015] FamCAFC 57.

87 (2014) 253 CLR 58.

88 Ibid 74.

89 Ibid.

90 (2001) 207 CLR 584.

91 Ibid 608. See also 634 (Kirby J).

92 Ibid 591.

93 [2015] HCA 39.

94 Ibid [26].

95 Ibid [27].

96 Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46.

97 Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118, 124 (referring to awards of damages).

98 (1976) 136 CLR 248, 257-258.

99 (2012) 247 CLR 108.

100 Ibid 120.

101 Ibid 122.

102 (1957) 100 CLR 312, 317.

103 (1972) 127 CLR 588.

104 Ibid 599.

105 Ibid at 604.

106 See e.g. Wall and Wall [2002] FLC 93-110; Jarrott and Jarrott (No. 2) [2012] FamCAFC 72.

107 De Angelis and De Angelis [1999] FamCA 1609; James and James [1978] FLC 90-487.

108 [2014] FamCAFC 238.

109 Singerson and Jones [2013] FCWA 36 [152].

110 Singerson and Jones [2014] FamCAFC 238 [65]-[66].

111 Ibid [2014] FamCAFC 238 [94]-[98].

112 Leave to appeal to the High Court was refused by French CJ and Nettle J in August 2015: Singerson v Joans [2015] HCATrans 195. The Full Court judgment was corrected under the slip rule in relation to a calculation error: Singerson and Joans [2015] FamCAFC 172.

113 Steinbrenner and Steinbrenner [2008] FamCAFC 193, [234] (Coleman J).

114 Kronman, Anthony, Max Weber (Stanford University Press, 1983) 77.Google Scholar

115 Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108, 120.

116 (2014) 253 CLR 560, 582.

117 Ibid, quoting Campbell v Kitchen & Sons Ltd and Brisbane Soap Co Ltd (1910) 12 CLR 515, 531.

118 Ibid, quoting National Commercial Banking Corporation of Australia Ltd v Batty (1986) 160 CLR 251, 268.

119 Ibid, citing Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 227.

120 (2014) 253 CLR 560, 596.

121 Ibid, 603.

122 Ibid, 596.

123 Ibid 581 (French CJ).

124 Schneider, Carl, ‘Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View’ in Hawkins, K. (ed), The Uses of Discretion (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) 47, 64.Google Scholar

125 (2007) 233 CLR 307, 351.

126 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1997), 19.

127 [2014] FCWA 77.

128 Ibid [27]-[28].

129 Bishop and Bishop [2013] FamCAFC 138, [28].