² Jeidels (1882–1947) was also a member with Abs of the German delegation to the London ‘standstill’ negotiations until 1938. He had also distinguished himself academically in 1905 with a study of banks' influence upon industry. In July 1939 he became a partner in Lazard Frères & Co., New York, and, in 1943, joined the Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, San Francisco.

³ Deutsche Bank Historical Archive [hereafter DBHA]: 4851, Jeidels to Abs, 4 Mar. 1947.

⁴ OMGUS, Report on the Investigation of the Deutsche Bank (1946–1947), p. 1Google Scholar [Published in German – Ermittlungen gegen die Deutsche Bank (Nördlingen, 1985), p. 11].Google Scholar The connection with Abs arises from the frequent mention of his name, the foreign activities for which he had responsibility and his then (in 1945) pending prosecution by the US authorities.

⁵ E.g. Czichon derived straight accusations against Abs by taking various quotations from the OMGUS Report but embellishing them with unacknowledged ‘additions’ of his own to fabricate fresh quotations. See Czichon, E., Der Bankier und die Macht. Hermann Josef Abs in der deutschen Politik (Cologne, 1970), p. 146 and the partial judgement of the Stuttgart District Court, 24 Feb. 1972.Google Scholar

⁶ Czichon, , Die Bank und die Macht (Cologne, 2nd ed., 1995).Google Scholar

⁷ When the 1970 and 1995 editions are compared, it can be seen that the references have changed slightly. E.g. in the 1970 edition Czichon drew on an ‘Abs Archive Collection’, which was not to be found in any public record office, and in the 1995 edition this was no longer listed. However, in the later edition, Czichon makes frequent references in his notes to a private collection of documents (copies) with its own indexing system. We can assume with the Bundesarchiv [German Federal Record Office and hereafter BA], that some of the material employed had once found its way to the Stasi, the East German security police.

⁸ James, H., ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, in Gall, L. et al. , The Deutsche Bank 1870–1995 (London, 1995).Google Scholar

⁹ It is the author's intention to investigate the extent and limits of that power in a monograph to which this essay, both chronologically and biographically, constitutes, as it were, a prelude.

¹⁰ Officially, Abs took up his position at the beginning of 1938 but he had spent the previous two months primarily occupied with questions relating to Deutsche Bank and the Standstill Agreement.

¹¹ The surviving records of Deutsche Bank's head office comprise some 14,000 files. However, the state of some suggests that they have been interfered with in various ways during the period of confiscation by the USSR and storage in the Potsdam National Record Office. E.g. individual documents may have been removed in connection with the preparation of copies for the 1970 ‘Czichon trial’. Instances of repagination and the obvious absence of documents and manuscripts, present in 1970, certainly suggest that this is what happened. However, there is no current proof of any interference aimed at altering the expressive force of the material in a particular direction.

¹² James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, p. 350.Google Scholar

¹³ Information kindly supplied by Ernest-Moritz Arndt Gymnasium, Bonn.

¹⁴ Abs in conversation with G. Gaus during 1964. See Gaus, G., ‘Hermann Josef Abs. Organist an den Registern wirtshafliche Macht’, Zur Person, 2 (Munich, 1967), p. 42.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The David Bank spectacularly collapsed in 1926. See Generalanzeiger [Bonn] (17 09 1926).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Bonn University Archive: Belegbögen Hermann Josef Abs.

¹⁷ The source is Abs himself – at a later date (DBHA: Abs-Sammelband I).

¹⁸ DBHA: 4872.

¹⁹ See Lenz, R., Karstadt. Ein deutscher Warenhauskonzern 1920–1950 (Stuttgart, 1955), pp. 112f.Google Scholar and Abraham, E. W., Konzernkrach. Hintergründe, Entwicklung und Folgen der deutschen Konzernkrisen (Berlin, 1933), pp. 61f.Google Scholar

²⁰ Lenz, , Karstadt, pp. 182f.Google Scholar The extent of the policy change undertaken by officialdom is clearly marked by the cabinet's decision to have the Acceptance Bank make similar but larger loans available to the Jewish-owned Hermann Tietz (Hertie) department store company.

²¹ ibid., p. 176. The decision to exempt Karstadt from the boycott undoubtedly also owed something to the US committee formed to protect owners of Karstadt $ bonds. The Ministry of Finance, referring to the committee, strongly advised the Foreign Office to use the New York consulate-general to inform the public that Karstadt's business had continued virtually undisturbed (BA: 3101/18541).

²² See most recently Czichon, , Die Bank (1995 ed.).Google Scholar He alleges that Fellinger, chairman of the supervisory board, asked for the immediate dismissal of all Jewish employees without notice. This is not confirmed by the minutes of the supervisory board given as the source. Fellinger advocated ‘gradual reduction of the proportion of Jewish members of staff to a normal percentage’ (an opportunistic alternative that was bad enough), which presumably meant that the company intended to part with the majority of its Jewish employees. Dismissals without notice that had already been handed out, where they jeopardised the normal course of business, were to be withdrawn where possible in conjunction with the (doubtless Nazi-dominated) works committee (DBHA: P 5224).

²³ Brandel at the working session of the supervisory board, 7 Apr. 1933 (DBHA: P 5224). The assertion that Czichon attributed to Plassmann in 1970, to the effect that they were hoping for a government ruling that would retrospectively justify the dismissal of Jewish directors, appears to be an invention. At any rate, it cannot be substantiated from the source referred to – DBHA: P 5224.

²⁴ Czichon, , Die Bank (1995 ed.), pp. 129f.Google Scholar

²⁵ K. Gerstenberg spoke to this effect at the meeting of the working committee of the Karstadt Group held on 28 Mar. 1933 (DBHA: 4920). At the same meeting, Warburg announced his intention of retiring from the supervisory board.

²⁶ Lenz, , Karstadt, p. 178.Google Scholar

²⁷ Plum, G., ‘Wirtschaft und Erwerbsleben’, in Benz, W. (ed.), Die Juden in Deutschland 1933–1945, Leben unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft (Munich, 3rd ed., 1993), p. 281.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Lenz, , Karstadt, pp. 178f.Google Scholar In what is more than an interesting aside in relation to the Nazi period, Lenz states that at least those directors, who had been dismissed in violation of their terms of contract, were able over the next two years to sue for their claims and win.

²⁹ ibid., pp. 212f. As regards Abs's involvement, Lenz bases his account on the memoirs (written in 1954 but never published) of F. Schmitz, a Karstadt director 1920–53.

³⁰ ibid., p. 224.

³¹ DBHA: 2421, letter from Plassmann, , 8 01 1938.Google Scholar

³² Pohl, M. (ed.), Hermann J. Abs, Eine Bildbiographie (Mainz, 2nd ed., 1992), p. 30.Google Scholar

³³ Wolf, H., ‘Die Reprivatisierung der Commerzbank 1936/37. Ein Meisterstück des jungen Hermann Josef Abs’, Bankhistorisches Archiv (1996), p. 28.Google Scholar

³⁴ See Kopper, C., Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Dirigismus. Bankenpolitik im ‘Dritten Reich’ 1933–1939 (Bonn, 1995), p. 201.Google Scholar

³⁵ ibid., p. 202.

³⁶ Wolf (‘Reprivatisierung’) clearly took no account of the publications of Pohl and especially his pictorial biography of Abs: Pohl, M., Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen (Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 400f.Google Scholar; and idem, see Bildbiographie, pp. 38f.Google Scholar The records of the banks concerned must be considered lost.

³⁷ Reinhart was chairman of the bank's supervisory board, but his activities, as Under-Secretary Koehler noted in early 1937, were in fact ‘those of a general director’ (BA: 3101/18612). See also Pohl, , Konzentration, p. 401.Google Scholar According to Pohl, Commerzbank share price on 1 Sep. 1936 was 99% (NB: until 1965, prices were quoted as a percentage of nominal value).

³⁸ Insiders had known about the improvement in Commerzbank's situation since at least Mar. 1936. Certainly, the government representative on the supervisory board, Secretary of State Bruno Claussen, then confidentially informed the Ministry of Economic Affairs that the bank's profits would show a marked increase in the current financial year and that the business outcome was improving (BA: 3101/18612).

³⁹ Three other private banks – Dreyfus (Berlin), J. H. Stein (Cologne), and Alwin Steffan (Frankfurt) – constituted the consortium, together with Vereinsbank, Hamburg. At 53, 125 shares, Delbrücks had an unusually large holding, although the 25% Reemtsma sub-holding, together with that of Delbrück v.d. Heydt, Cologne, should be deducted. This leaves Delbrück Schickler & Co. with approximately the same sized holding as Dreyfus. Another indication that their holdings were similar is that Dreyfus Bank was able to claim half the management commission. However, newspaper reports mention only Delbrück Schickler & Co., since Dreyfus as a Jewish bank would surely have taken a back seat due to sensitivities with respect to the public and the authorities.

Interests in the consortium are taken from a list, 26 Jun. 1958 (DBHA: 2656). The sources upon which it was based were probably Delbrück Schickler & Co. files that have since disappeared. The figures that Abs subsequently gave Wolf are slightly different; see Archiv der Commerzbank, Frankfurt [hereafter CA], Reprivatisation File. Reichs-Kredit-Anstalt was involved in the reprivatisation without being a member of the consortium. At least as far as the first tranche was concerned, Reemtsma took the shares into his private deposit.

⁴⁰ Kopper, , Marktwirtschaft, p. 136.Google Scholar

⁴¹ ibid., p. 202. It is clear from the handwriting that the calculation of the share take-over was made by Abs (see BA: 3101/18612).

⁴² Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft (23 08 1937).Google Scholar

⁴³ ibid. (5 & 30 Oct. 1936).

⁴⁴ Heilbrunn, R. M., Das Bankhaus J. Dreyfus & Co. Frankfurt a. M. - Berlin, 1868–1939 (n.p., 1962).Google Scholar In 1962, prompted by the claim in the book that the idea to privatise the Commerzbank shares came from Dreyfus, Abs conducted an extended, trenchant but not unfriendly correspondence with W. Dreyfus. In it, Dreyfus conceded that age had left gaps in his memory. The importance Abs attached to any assessment of his role is shown by him copying the letters to various important people - to F. Seidenzahl, editor-in-chief of the stock-exchange journal, Börsen-Zeitung, and to V. Muthesius of the Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen (DBHA: 2656)

⁴⁵ DBHA: 2656, list, 26 Jun. 1958.

⁴⁶ In 1946, Reemtsma told the American investigators that he had first met Abs in 1935 or 1936: ‘Abs acquired his high standing in the leading concerns of Germany as a result of his position within the Deutsche Bank. I was consulted about the appointment of Mr. Abs as a head of the Foreign Department of the Deutsche Bank. I recommended Mr. Abs as a capable professional man, however, I pointed out some of my personal dislikes concerning Abs as an individual. Abs was a very ambitious individual and a man who always wanted to be on top of everything.’ Abs, he said, had been in constant contact with all state agencies having an interest in questions of foreign trade (OMGUS, Report on Deutsche Bank, exhibit 93).

⁴⁷ James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, p. 297.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ ibid., p. 339.

⁴⁹ Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 32 (1936).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Barkai, A., Das Wirtsdiaftssystem des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt, 1988), p. 240.Google Scholar The average price obtained by the Reich was probably in the region of 108%.

⁵¹ The sum can be established in the following way. Out of a total of RM 22. 16m. shares placed, initially half were taken over at par, the rest at approximately 106% while, within a short period of time, prices rose to first 106% and then 109%. A further indication of an exceptional if not precisely quantifiable profit comes from a remark that Abs made to Mosler (CA: Reprivatisation File, Abs in conversation with H. Wolf, 1988).

⁵² Gaus, , Zur Person, p. 51.Google Scholar

⁵³ DBHA: P 24123, and Interviews 1982, interview with Frau v. Gustke, 25 Aug. 1982.

⁵⁴ See Die Bank, 30 (8 09 1937), p. 1288.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ That at any rate is what Abs told the Allies in 1947 during his examination at Nuremberg (DBHA: 4872).

⁵⁶ OMGUS, Deutsche Bank report, exhibit 38.

⁵⁷ Die Bank (8 12 1937), p. 1677.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ DBHA: B 51.

⁵⁹ Ein Jahrhundert Creditanstalt-Bankverein (Vienna, 1955), p. 58.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ DBHA: B 55, Treaty of Friendship.

⁶¹ DBHA: B 51, memo, 31 Mar. 1938.

⁶² ibid., memo by Abs re a telephone conversation with Heller, a Creditanstalt director.

⁶³ ibid., note by Abs re a conversation with Steinbrink, 1 Apr. 1938.

⁶⁴ ibid., record of telephone conversation with Joham, 14 May 1938.

⁶⁵ ibid., report from Osterwind to Abs.

⁶⁶ After Keppler's departure, Under-Secretary Lange made clear to Abs the reservations that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had had about the former ‘Reichsbeauftragte’ (ibid., Abs memo, 29 Jun. 1938).

⁶⁷ DBHA: B 55, Consortium agreement, 30 Dec. 1938.

⁶⁸ DBHA: B 57.

⁶⁹ Described in detail in James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, pp. 333f.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ DBHA: P 6502, p. 202.

⁷¹ For the background, see also Pohl, M. with Schneider, A. H., Viag Aktiengesellschaft 1923–1998, Vom Staatsunternehmen zum internationalen Konzern (Munich/Zurich, 1998), pp. 182f.Google Scholar

⁷² Treue, W., ‘Das Bankhaus Mendelssohn als Beispiel einer Privatbank im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, Mendelssohn-Studien, 1 (Berlin, 1972).Google Scholar

⁷³ Kopper, , Marktwirtschaft, p. 274.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ A Sep. 1944 memo from the foreign-exchange department, Brandenburg Oberfinanzpräsidium, certainly suggests that at least the papers relating to the take-over are burnt (Brandenburg State Record Office, 36 A [Foreign-Exchange Department], no. 2265).

⁷⁵ Treue, , ‘Das Bankhaus Mendelssohn’, pp. 65f.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ F. Mannheimer lived in Amsterdam and took no part in the bank's affairs.

⁷⁷ Kopper, , Marktwirtschaft, pp. 229f.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Treue, , ‘Das Bankhaus Mendelssohn’, p. 69.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Detailed statement by Loeb, R. on 20 12 1947Google Scholar exonerating Abs in his ‘denazification proceedings’ (DBHA: 4851).

⁸⁰ DBHA: P 24130, letter, Pohle, W. to Abs, 26 07 1938.Google Scholar

⁸¹ BA: R. 3101/15515, pp. 260f.

⁸² ibid., p. 276.

⁸³ BA: R 2501/9441.

⁸⁴ Reproduced in Treue, , ‘Das Bankhaus Mendelssohn’, p. 78, n. 75.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ DBHA: PA Kurzmeyer.

⁸⁶ E.g. Kurzmeyer's close relationship with SS-Obergruppenfüher Pohl, which even Sippell stressed in a memo, 14 Apr. 1944 (ibid.).

⁸⁷ BA: R 2501/9567.

⁸⁸ ibid.

⁸⁹ G. v. Mendelssohn of Florence was also a partner, being the widow of the late senior partner, R. v. Mendelssohn.

⁹⁰ de Vries, J., ‘The Netherlands financial empire’, in Pohl, M. with Freitag, S. (eds), Handbook on the History of European Banks (Aldershot, 1994), p. 728.Google Scholar

⁹¹ A case in point in the banking field was Bohemian Union Bank, an episode in which, as James has shown, Abs clearly sought, as he did in other similar cases, to keep a certain distance. See James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, pp. 329f.Google Scholar

⁹² Here a case in point was R. Pferdmenges, who steered Oppenheim Bank through the Third Reich. See Stürmer, M., Teichmann, G. and Treue, W., Wägen und Wagen. Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. Geschichte einer Bank und einer Familie (Munich/Zurich, 1989), pp. 348f.Google Scholar

⁹³ Czichon, , Die Bank (1995 ed.), p. 180.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ In 1950 he asked Abs for help in settling the matter of the former Mendelssohn employees' pensions (DBHA: RWB 43).

⁹⁵ DBHA: 4728.

⁹⁶ Holtfrerich, C.-L., ‘The Deutsche Bank 1945–1957: war, military rule and reconstruction’, in Gall et al., Deutsche Bank, pp. 447f.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1924–1925 ed.), p. 909.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ The heading Wohlthat gave to his report (BA: R7/1005–1012).

⁹⁹ ibid.

¹⁰⁰ As J. Abs wrote to his son Josef, H. on 11 07 1938 (DBHA: P 961).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Abs visited Wohlthat on several occasions between Jan. and Apr. 1939 and discussed with him (in addition to the Romania business) how things were going with Hubertus. On 30 Mar. Wohlthat suggested to Abs that he apply to the Ministry of Economic Affairs for ‘repurchase of shares’ (DBHA: KK Wohlthat). For the recommendation of Wohlthat to Adenauer, see DBHA: 2321.

¹⁰² DBHA: P 964, letter, Abs to Leisring, 22 May 1939.

¹⁰³ DBHA: KK Petschek, and 4976.

¹⁰⁴ ibid.

¹⁰⁵ For the polemical ‘East German’ position, see Radant, H., ‘Hermann J. Abs – Bankier im Geheimauftrag Görings’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 4 (1974).Google Scholar Unfortunately, the sources cited by Radant (who essentially based his account on ministerial tradition) can no longer be verified.

¹⁰⁶ But remember that the relevant documents, particularly regarding the Reich side of the story and the wider background, have probably almost all disappeared. Even documents from the Office of the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, currently located in Moscow, throw no additional light on the issue (information kindly supplied by Dr S. Wendehorst).

¹⁰⁷ There are numerous letters to that effect in DBHA: P 7250.

¹⁰⁸ BA: R 2/3383, p. 67.

¹⁰⁹ Source material reproduced in Radant, ‘Abs’, p. 34.

¹¹⁰ DBHA: KK K. Blessing.

¹¹¹ DBHA: KK J. Wallenberg. It is not clear from the documents where the talks were held.

¹¹² DBHA: 4977.

¹¹³ Skandinaviska Banken Aktienbolag, 77th report for financial year 1940, p. 3; and Pohl, with Freitag, , European Banks, p. 1007.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Radant, , ‘Abs’, p. 48.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ DBHA: 4977, letter to Puhl, , 7 10 1940.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ ibid., letter, O. Wolff to Abs, 11 Oct. 1940.

¹¹⁷ BA: R 2/3383, p. 81. The sum arises from the nominal value of the loan certificates at an exchange rate of RM 2.50:$1.

¹¹⁸ BA: R 2/3847, p. 264.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in Radant, , ‘Abs’, p. 36.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ DBHA: 4977, letter, Bayrhoffer, to Abs, 3 12 1940.Google Scholar

¹²¹ DBHA: KK Roth.

¹²² DBHA: KK M. Wallenberg jr. and J. Wallenberg.

¹²³ DBHA: 4852. Questioned by the Allies after the war, Abs gave his yearly income for 1940 as RM 0.37m. before tax. This amount was around the level of what he gave for the years before and after. Possibly he ‘forgot’ the separate income from the Kreuger transaction. He is also hardly likely to have been open with the tax authorities about this ‘secret government matter’.

¹²⁴ Bundesbank Archive [hereafter BbA]: Strongroom Ledger. The entries of the various deposits allow no firm conclusions.

¹²⁵ For a highly objective account, see Smith, A. L., Hitler's Gold, The Story of the Nazi War Loot (Oxford, 1996)Google Scholar. For a more journalistic approach, see Rings, W., Raubgold aus Deutschland. Die Golddrehscheibe Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Zurich, 1996).Google Scholar Regarding repatriation from Sweden after 1945, see U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II, Preliminary Study coordinated by Eizenstat, S. E., Under-Secretary of Commerce for International Trade (05 1997) [First Eizenstat Report], pp. 123f.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ BbA: HA 11.094. According to postwar testimony, in Vienna alone the Austrian National Bank had more than 65 tonnes of gold on 17 May 1938, though when war broke out most of it had been used.

¹²⁷ BbA: Strongroom Ledger. The reconstruction of the path of the gold was traced from the crediting and debiting of the individual deposits.

¹²⁸ Independent Commission of Experts, ‘Schweiz-Zweiter Weltkrieg. Die Schweiz und die Goldtransaktionen im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, interim report, 25 05 1998 [Bergier Report], p. 35, appendix 2, esp. p. 5.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ ibid., p. 35, p. 51. The report does not in fact prove any corresponding delivery to the Riksbank's deposit via the Swiss National Bank but, at the same time, it does stress that, during the first two years of the war, the Reichsbank's gold transactions were mainly conducted through the commercial banks. It was not until an order of Oct. 1941 that transactions of this kind had to be conducted through the Swiss National Bank. So a delivery from the Reichsbank to a Swedish account may very well have been made to a private bank at the beginning of 1941. Indeed, Swiss commercial banks handled transactions involving 50 tonnes of gold.

¹³⁰ Aalders, G. and Wiebes, C., Affärer till varje pris. Wallenbergs hemliga stöd till Nazistema (1989), translated into German as Die Kunst der Tarnung. Die geheime Kollaboration neutraler Staaten mir der deutschen Kriegsindustrie. Der Fall Schweden (Frankfurt-a-M., 1994), pp. 150f.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Abs, H. J., ‘Die finanziellen Rückwirkungen des Krieges auf die west- und mitteleuropäischen Länder’, lecture to annual meeting of German Institut für Bankwissenschaft und Bankwesen e.V., 9 05 1940Google Scholar, and published in Schriftenreihe der Finanzwochenschrift ‘Die Bank’, 12 [copy in DBHA: 4946].Google Scholar

¹³² On the Istanbul branch's gold trading, see OMGUS, Report on Deutsche Bank, pp. 180f.Google Scholar, Annex, , pp. 18–21.Google Scholar

¹³³ See Steinberg, J. (in cooperation with other members – A. Barkai, G. D. Feldman, L. Gall and H. James – of the Historical Commission appointed to examine the history of Deutsche Bank in the period of National Socialism), The Deutsche Bank and its Gold Transactions during the Second World War (Munich, 1999).Google Scholar

¹³⁴ See Wicht, W. E., Glanzstoff. Zur Geschichte der Chemiefaser, eines Unternehmens und seiner Belegschaft (Neustadt/Aisch, 1992), pp. 74f.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Kettenacker, L., ‘Die britische Historiographie und der deutsche Widerstand’, in Müller, J. and Dilks, D. N. (eds), Grossbritannien und der deutsche Widerstand 1933 bis 1944 (Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich, 1994), p. 18Google Scholar; and Gaus, , Zur Person, p. 46.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Schiller, K. in a television interview, SWF 1, broadcast 14 10 1991.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ DBHA: 4046, letter, Abs to Roon, G. v., 29 02 1964Google Scholar; and see Roon, G. v., Widerstand im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1981), pp. 146f.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Yorck's activities with respect to his responsibility for trusteeship questions and statistical papers at Wirtschaftsstab Ost during the war were presented in an unfavourable light in connection with a recent army exhibition but a proper study has yet to be made. See Gerlach, C., ‘Die Männer des 20. Juli und der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion’, in Heer, H. and Naumann, K. (eds), Vemichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941–1944 (Hamburg, 1995), pp. 438f.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ This is based upon Abs's detailed written reply to questions from the Dutch historian Roon, G. v., 29 02 1964 (DBHA: 4046).Google Scholar Moltke's wife, Freya, was a second cousin of Abs's wife.

¹⁴⁰ v. Oppen, B. Ruhm (ed.), Helmuth J. von Moltke. Briefe an Freya. 1939–1945 (Munich, 1995).Google Scholar Out of 1,600 surviving letters, only those written after 22 Aug. 1939 have been published in anything like their complete state.

¹⁴¹ ibid., pp. 263, 265.

¹⁴² James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, p. 351.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ All the information about Trott is based on DBHA: P 24130.

¹⁴⁴ However, in 1964, Abs had only a vague memory of these meetings with ‘persons little known to him’. See DBHA: 4046, letter to Roon, G. v., 17 08 1964.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ v. Oppen, Moltke. Briefe an Freya, passim.

¹⁴⁶ DBHA: 4046, letter to Roon, G. v., 17 08 1964.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ DBHA: 4851. Marion Yorck v. Wartenburg gives the month as 11 1941.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ DBHA: 4046, letter to Roon, G. v., 29 02 1964.Google Scholar According to Abs, he had declined ‘requests and invitations to Kreisau’ not least ‘at the urgent exhortation of my wife’: Gaus, , Zur Person, p. 46.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Mommsen, H., ‘Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die deutsche Gesellschaft’, in Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler (Munich/Zurich, 1986), p. 15.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Moltke, F. v., Balfour, M. and Frisby, J., Helmuth James von Moltke, 1907–1945. Anwalt der Zukunft (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 192Google Scholar, lists those attending the Kreisau gatherings. There is no mention of Abs in 1942 in the published correspondence of Moltke. The list was probably based on as yet unpublished material belonging to F. v. Moltke.

¹⁵¹ Oppen, v., Moltke. Briefe an Freya, p. 481.Google Scholar

¹⁵² DBHA: KK Kempner.

¹⁵³ DBHA: KK Dohnanyi.

¹⁵⁴ Bürgers wrote to Abs from Cologne, 10 Jul. 1947, that following Sperl's resignation from the board of directors (a man who had totally failed to accept customs and had tended ‘wherever possible to use all his old and new Berlin connections to break new ground’), they were looking for someone ‘who can be relied upon to become firmly immersed in the longstanding, tried and tested traditions of the institution’ (DBHA: P 5535). Like Dohnanyi, Sperl was an opponent of the NS regime and, from a position within the Ministry of Economic Affairs, had been looking out for a post in the private sector and, initially, found one at Rheinboden. Sperl was arrested after 20 Jul. 1944 and spent some time in a concentration camp. See Boelcke, W. A., Die Deutsche Wirtschaft 1930–1945. Interna des Reichswirtschaftsministeriums (Düsseldorf, 1983), pp. 181f., 352.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Rheinboden Hypothekenbank Archive: 4–3. Again, Abs expressed himself only verbally. Bürgers, on the other hand, passed on Abs's message in writing.

¹⁵⁶ DBHA: P 553, letter from Abs, 12 Jan. 1942.

¹⁵⁷ Brissaud, A., Canaris 1887–1945 (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 844.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ See Höhne, H., Canaris. Patriot im Zwielicht (Munich, 1976).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ DBHA: P 5536.

¹⁶⁰ Rheinboden Hypothekenbank AG, Die Geschiclite der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Boden-Credit-Bank AG in Köln, 1894–1994 (Cologne, 1994), p. 104.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, p. 350.Google Scholar

¹⁶² DBHA: 4046, letter, Abs to Roon, G. v., 29 02 1964.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ The attacks were aimed directly at Abs and Plassmann (DBHA: 2996). See also Holtfrerich, , ‘Military rule’, pp. 361f.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ The man in question was a brother of the widow of company-head-designate (Stefan Henkell), and listed as killed in action.

¹⁶⁵ The vast majority of the relevant documents must be considered lost.

¹⁶⁶ James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, pp. 329f.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ DBHA: B 128.

¹⁶⁸ ibid. According to a memo made by Abs and Kurzmeyer on 22 Aug. 1940, Galopin said that he was prepared to let Deutsche Bank have his bank's holdings in Banque Commerciale, Bucharest, and the Yugoslav Bank Corporation. A further talk in the presence of bankers from Belgium and Luxembourg served to facilitate participation in Luxembourg's Banque Générale.

¹⁶⁹ ibid., memo by Kurzmeyer about his stay in Brussels in mid-Sep. 1940.

¹⁷⁰ ibid., correspondence.

¹⁷¹ DBHA: KK Schacht.

¹⁷² James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, pp. 331f.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Lenz was unable to give any further details of the events surrounding the Grands Magasins à l'Innovation episode in his account of the history of the Karstadt company since no documents on the subject have been preserved in either Karstadt's own archives or the relevant sections of the Federal Record Office (Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs and Reich Ministry of Finance) and the Military Record Office, Freiburg. He was not even aware that the deal had been brokered by Deutsche Bank. The account handed down in the files of Deutsche Bank appears to be the only trace of these transactions still available. See Lenz, , Karstadt, pp. 254, 361.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ DBHA: Interviews, Koenemann, 1982.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ DBHA: B 128, Koenemann's, 1st report is dated 2 07 1940.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ DBHA: P 5221.

¹⁷⁷ DBHA: P 5234.

¹⁷⁸ DBHA: P 5221. The connection is inferred purely from a telephone memo for the absent Plassmann.

¹⁷⁹ ibid. Regarding some small amounts, formalities had not yet been completed or purchase was merely promised.

¹⁸⁰ DBHA: P 5234.

¹⁸¹ As Deutsche Bank informed Ministry of Economic Affairs, 25 Jun. 1942.

¹⁸² DBHA: P 5221, memo by Koenemann, , 16 12 1941.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ DBHA: P 5234.

¹⁸⁴ See Radant, H. (ed.), Fall 6. Ausgewählte Dekumente und Urteil des I.G.-Farbenprozesses ([East] Berlin, 1970), p. 19.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ The portion of total Cyclon B production that went to Auschwitz was small (2–3%). See Hayes, P., Industry and Ideology (Cambridge, 1989), p. 362.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ Plumpe, G., Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. Wirtschaft, Technik und Politik 1904–1945 (Berlin, 1990), pp. 693f.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ Numerical comparison based on: Deutsche Bank's 1939 Company Report (Berlin, 1940) and Farbenindustrie, I. G. AG, Report of the Board of Directors and Supervisory Board and Annual Accounts for the 1939 Financial Year (Frankfurt-a-M., 1940).Google Scholar By 1942, I. G. Farben's capital fund had risen to RM 1.4b. The 1941 balance sheet total came to RM 2.3b.

¹⁸⁸ Unter den Linden, 78.

¹⁸⁹ DBHA: P 1765, memo by Abs, 19 Jun. 1940.

¹⁹⁰ ibid., letter from Schmitz, 21 Jun. 1940.

¹⁹¹ Amongst other positions, Duisberg had been chairman of the Bayer board of directors.

¹⁹² Heine, J. U., Verstand mid Schicksal. Die Männer der I. G. Farbenindustrie AG in 161 Kurzbiographien (Weinheim/New York/Basel/Cambridge, 1990), p. 287.Google Scholar It should be noted that this contains whitewashing of a kind that makes it hard to believe that it was published in 1990. Reading it, one might think I. G. Farben had been a hotbed of resistance.

¹⁹³ On Krauch's cardinal role in arms production, see Boelcke, , Die deutsche Wirtschaft, p. 238.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ This is true at least as regards the working committee of 1941 (Bayer Archive, Leverkusen [hereafter BayA]: Farben, I. G., Supervisory Board, 11/3, minutes, 59th supervisory board meeting, 8 08 1941).Google Scholar Members included: W. F. Kalle, W. Gaus, P. Müller (Pulver-Müller), G. Pistor and E. Selck. For biographies of those concerned, see Heine, Verstand und Schicksal, passim.

¹⁹⁵ DBHA: P 1765.

¹⁹⁶ For instance, according to the plans, building the Auschwitz plant was three times as expensive as an appropriate adaptation of the Hüls factory. See Hayes, , Industry and Ideology, p. 349.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ Borkin, J., The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben (New York, 1978), p. 97.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ Hayes, , Industry and Ideology, p. 350.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ Sandkühler, T. and Schmuhl, H.-W., ‘Noch einmal: I. G. Farben und Auschwitz’, Gesellschaft und Geschichte (1993).Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ Hayes, , Industry and Ideology, p. 356.Google Scholar

²⁰¹ Plumpe, , Die I. G. Farbenindustrie, p. 631. He gives a figure (for prisoners) of 20.7% as at 12 1944.Google Scholar

²⁰² Hayes, , Industry and Ideology, p. 347.Google Scholar The costs of a PoW were between two-thirds and three-quarters of those of a German labourer; ‘labour output’ was only half.

²⁰³ ibid., p. 350.

²⁰⁴ DBHA: P 1765, p. 102, letter to Schmitz, 1 Jan. 1941.

²⁰⁵ BayA: Farben, I. G., Supervisory Board, 11/3, minutes, 57th supervisory board meeting, 7 02 1941.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ OMGUS-Ermittlungen gegen I. G. Farben (Nördlingen, 1986) [reprint of the investigative report of 09 1945]. P. 27.Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ DBHA: KK Schmitz.

²⁰⁸ The relevant documents remained in Berlin in 1945 and were among those that, initially, were in Russian hands and then kept in East Germany. Thread-bound, they show no sign of any manipulation.

²⁰⁹ DBHA: P 1785, letters Jul. & Sep. 1941.

²¹⁰ DBHA: P 1766.

²¹¹ Plumpe, , Die I. G. Farbenindustrie, pp. 675f. The issue of complimentary shares was offset in the balance sheet by a revaluation of holdings.Google Scholar

²¹² DBHA: P 1773, memo, 11 Apr. 1942, and KK Schmitz.

²¹³ DBHA: P 1773, circular, 10 Jul. 1943.

²¹⁴ Plumpe, , Die I. G. Farbenindustrie, p. 597.Google Scholar

²¹⁵ DBHA: P 1765, circular, Krauch to supervisory board members, 19 Jun. 1942.

²¹⁶ James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, p. 340.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ DBHA: 4852, memo from Ritter von Halt re conversation with K. H. Heuser, deputy regional economic adviser, 17 Dec. 1942.

²¹⁸ BA: R 43 11/245b. The interpretation in James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, p. 343Google Scholar, to the effect that the comment was made by Hitler personally is not supported by the sources.

²¹⁹ Fischer, A., ‘Jüdische Privatbanken im “Dritten Reich”’, Scripta Mercaturae 28 (1994), pp. 1–54, passim.Google Scholar

²²⁰ BA: R 58/1067, sheet 46. Schröder probably resigned his Rotary membership in 1933, in fact, immediately after the seizure of power, in order to ‘maintain his relations with the government of the Reich’.

²²¹ Holtfrerich, , ‘Military rule’, p. 366.Google Scholar

²²² James, , ‘The Deutsche Bank and the dictatorship’, pp. 337f.Google Scholar

²²³ DBHA: P 345, note by Abs, 10 Aug. 1944.

²²⁴ See Der Spiegel, 47 (1997), pp. 198f.Google Scholar

²²⁵ Larsmo, O., ‘Gold - aber kein gestohlenes’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (30 01 1997), p. 36.Google Scholar

²²⁶ DBHA: P 24064.

²²⁷ According to affidavits sworn by Abs himself and M. Hoseit in connection with the Czichon trial: Czichon, E., Der Techniker der ökonomischen Aggression. Hermann J. Abs als Repräsentant des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus, dissertation ([East] Berlin, 1977), pp. 590f.Google Scholar

²²⁸ DBHA: UB box 1.

²²⁹ DBHA: 4728, letter to Klugist, , 29 04 1947.Google Scholar Klugist spent the last year of the war in Switzerland and, subsequently, was interned for two years. No written evidence could be found of an invitation to Sweden.

²³⁰ Holtfrerich, , ‘Military rule’, p. 371.Google Scholar

²³¹ Pohl, M. and Raab-Rebentisch, A., Die Deutsche Bank in Hamburg 1872–1997 (Munich, 1997), p. 117.Google Scholar

²³² Holtfrerich, , ‘Military rule’, p. 372.Google Scholar

²³³ See Marsh, D., Die Bundesbank, Geschäfte mit der Macht (Munich, 1992), pp. 165f.Google Scholar He describes Gunston as an admirer of Hitler who in 1934 even spent a summer holiday in a German Labour Service camp.

²³⁴ DBHA: KK Gunston.

²³⁵ Horstmann, T., Die Alliierten und die deutschen Grossbanken, Bankenpolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Westdeutschland (Bonn, 1991), p. 70.Google Scholar

²³⁶ DBHA: 4854.

²³⁷ ibid.

²³⁸ DBHA: 2404, letter from Wenhold, , 6 09 1945.Google Scholar

²³⁹ ibid., letter, Wuppermann to Abs, 28 Aug. 1945. In it he refers to Abs's attitude as expressed verbally.

²⁴⁰ Horstmann, , Allierte und Grossbanken, p. 71.Google Scholar

²⁴¹ DBHA: 4850.

²⁴² DBHA: 25.

²⁴³ See OMGUS, Report on Deutsche Bank, Annex, p. 381.Google Scholar Documents from the Hamburg branch of Deutsche Bank could not be used until March 1947, when the OMGUS Report appendix was put together.

²⁴⁴ Horstmann, , Allierte und Grossbanken, pp. 4f.Google Scholar

²⁴⁵ DBHA: 4976.

²⁴⁶ BA: All-Proz. 1, Rep. 501/IX/ZJ/1.

²⁴⁷ DBHA: 4872. Abs reported accordingly to a French officer, Commandant Michel, on 4 Nov. 1947.

²⁴⁸ DBHA: 4728, letter, Leverkuehn, P. to Abs, 19 12 1947Google Scholar: ‘You are aware that I have accepted only for you and Kisskalt for Nuremberg and in fact hope never to have to go there.’

²⁴⁹ BA: All-Proz. 1, Rep. 501/IX/ZJ/1.

²⁵⁰ See OMGUS, I. G. Farben. Abs was not mentioned in the American report.

²⁵¹ Reproduced in (among other places) the pictorial sections of OMGUS, I. G. Farben; and Borkin, I. G. Farben.

²⁵² DBHA: 4851, letter from Meyer-Struckmann, , 19 02 1948.Google Scholar The Hamburg decision was recognised in the other zones of occupation.