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Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Matthias Goldmann

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In Karlsruhe's recent request for a preliminary ruling, an unconventional monetary policy measure of the European Central Bank (ECB) finds an unconventional judicial response. Based on its mandate to enforce the fundamental right to vote, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) leaves no doubt about its view that the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT Programme) violates the law of the European Union and hence the German Basic Law, unless one reads them in a rather restrictive way. But as unconventional monetary policy steps up the need for the ECB to justify the legality of its measures, so does the FCC's unconventional expansion of the scope of judicial review raise questions which the recent decision in its—generally laudable—brevity leaves underexplored. In particular, the decision does not dwell much on the issue whether it is appropriate for a court to review issues of monetary policy, and which standard of review should apply. Only Judge Gerhardt calls the majority's standard of review into question when he doubts whether the requirement for transgressions of the European Union's competences to be “manifest” is a workable criterion for defining the scope of the FCC's ultra vires control.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 2: Special issue - The OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court , 01 March 2014 , pp. 265 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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