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² Constitutional Court Decision U-I-69/92 of 10 December 1992, para. 8 noting that Slovenia in Yugoslavia was a state “whose authorities had after the end of the war carried out mass executions of former military and current political opponents, legally unacceptable trials followed by death penalties, illegal seizure of property, obstruction and liquidation of political parties in violation of its own legal system etc., thus making the injured parties afraid, with good reason, for their lives in case of residing in such a country.”Google Scholar

³ Constitutional Court Decision U-I-109/10 of 3 October 2011, para. 18.Google Scholar

⁴ For a good analysis that this normative objective continues to remain only partly realized, see Zobec, Jan & Černič, Jernej Letnar, The Remains of the Authoritarian Mentality within the Slovene Judiciary, in Central European Judges under the European Influence: The Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Michal Bobek ed., Hart, 2015); see also Avbelj, Matej, Crises and Perspectives in Building a European Nation – The Case of Slovenia, in Nation's transitions: social and legal issues of Slovenia's transitions: 1945-2015 (Slovenia 1945-2015) (Peter Jambrek ed., 2014).Google Scholar

⁵ Constitution, Art. 3.Google Scholar

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⁸ Kosar, David, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies (2016).Google Scholar

⁹ Courts Act, Art. 61, 61b.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Courts Act, Art. 65.Google Scholar

¹¹ Fišer, Zvonko, Sodni ali pravosodni svet, v Normativne spremembe na področju sodstva v Republiki Sloveniji (2001).Google Scholar

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¹³ OJ RS 94/07.Google Scholar

¹⁴ OJ RS 94/07.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Krivic, Matevž, Drugačno mnenje o volitvah sodnikov, 37-38 Pravna praksa 12–13 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Constitutional Court of Slovenia Case U-I-224/96, par. 11: “The Council of the Judiciary is thus an organ which performs a specific role in constituting judicial power and according to the valid statutory arrangement, generally decides on questions which affect the legal position of judges. From the point of view of the organisation of state power, the Council of the Judiciary is a special organ (state organ sui generis) which cannot be classified into any of the three branches of power.” Such is also a self-description by the Judicial Council…Google Scholar

¹⁷ Constitution, Art. 130, 132.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Černič, Jernej Letnar, Kako izvoliti sodnike, Ius Kolumna (Aug. 19, 2016); Jerovšek, Tone, Ustavna ureditev sodstva, VII. Dnevi javnega prava, No. 1/2001, p. 47-59.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Novak, Marko, Nevarno razmerje: politika nad Sodnim svetom, Ius kolumna (Oct. 24, 2016); also Novak, Marko, Volitve sodnikov – mora Slovenija ostati evropska izjema?, Ius kolumna (Aug. 29, 2016).Google Scholar

²⁰ Avbelj, Matej, Sistem demokratične neodgovornosti, Ius kolumna (Apr. 22, 2016).Google Scholar

²¹ OJ RS 23/17.Google Scholar

²² Judicial Council Act, Art. 23/1.Google Scholar

²³ Id., Art. 23/2.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id., Art. 23/4.Google Scholar

²⁵ The president of the Supreme Court is appointed by the National Assembly upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice.Google Scholar

²⁶ Art. 23.Google Scholar

²⁷ Art. 23/3.Google Scholar

²⁸ The Supreme Court 2016 Annual Report, figure 56, at 103, http://www.sodisce.si/mma_bin.php?static_id=2017051514342635.Google Scholar

²⁹ Art. 23/4.Google Scholar

³⁰ Art. 24.Google Scholar

³¹ Novak, Marko, Institucionalna podhranjenost slovenskega sodnega sveta, 23 Pravna praksa 17 (2013).Google Scholar

³² Novak, Marko, ZSSve, Ius kolumna (May 15, 2017); for a critique, see Avbelj, Matej, Legalistična naivnost, Ius kolumna (July 17, 2017).Google Scholar

³³ Courts Act, Art. 30.Google Scholar

³⁴ District Court Personnel Council.Google Scholar

³⁵ Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court Personnel Council.Google Scholar

³⁶ Courts Act, Art. 32, 33.Google Scholar

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³⁸ Śorli, Nevenka, Odstopna izjava članice Sodnega Sveta, 20 Odvetnik 31 (2003).Google Scholar

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⁴⁰ Vavken, Luka, Delovanje in upravljanje sistema rednega sodstva (Master Thesis, University of Ljubljana Faculty of Law, 2016).Google Scholar

⁴¹ This was the case of Mr Masleša prior to and some time after his appointment as a President of the Supreme Court.Google Scholar

⁴² Id., at 67.Google Scholar

⁴³ Court Service Act, Art. 16.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Court Service Act, Art. 28.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Courts Act, Art. 60 stipulates that Judicial Administration, that the courts’ presidents are responsible for, consists of: decision-making, knowledge-managament, planning, organization, staff-managament, leading, coordination, communication, monitoring the effects, reporting, managing the court's budget as well as all other tasks prescribed by the law. Moreover, according to Art. 60a it is also part of judicial administration to monitor, determine and analyze the efficiency of judges’ work at the individual courts.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Some Supreme Court justices themselves have been critical of the present system, see Peternel, Mateja Končina, Kakšne pristojnosti (naj) ima Sodni svet?, 7-8 Pravna praksa 6–7 (2015).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Vavken, supra note 40, at 67; Śorli, Marko, Dialog za zaupanje in spoštovanje, 24-25 Pravna Praksa 6–7 (2008).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Avbelj, Matej, Zakaj ne sodimo skupaj?, Finance (Nov 25, 2017), https://www.finance.si/8862512.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Vavken, supra note 40, at 67; Śorli, Marko, Dialog za zaupanje in spoštovanje, 24-25 Pravna Praksa 6–7 (2008).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Vavken, supra note 40, at 101.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Jerovšek, Tone, Ustavna ureditev sodstva, VII. Dnevi javnega prava, št. 1/2001, p. 53, who reports that in the first ten years of the Slovenian independence the National Assembly refused to appoint three candidates, which were eventually nevertheless appointed upon the repeated proposal by the Judicial Council.Google Scholar

⁵² http://www.sodni-svet.si/2016/tiskovno-sporocilo-izjava-za-javnost-sodnega-sveta-z-dne-25-11-2016/.Google Scholar

⁵³ Murgel, Jasna, Nedopusten poseg v sodstvo? Strah je odveč!, 16 Pravna praksa 12–13 (2015).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See, for example, Krivic, Matevž, Se poslanci res imajo sposobne sodniškega odločanja?, 7-8 Pravna praksa 20–21 (2015).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ http://www.mp.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/sluzba_za_nadzor_organizacije_poslovanja_sodisc/.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ This position is currently held by a designated judge Miran Jazbinšek.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Courts Act, Art. 65a.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Vavken, supra note 40, at 81.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Constitutional Court U-I-60/06; U-I-159/08. For a comment, see, Gregor Virant, Sodstvo – močna veja oblasti in hkrati učinkovit servis, 3 Pravna praksa 6–7 (2007).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Dallara, Cristina, Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe (2014) 39.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See further Zobec and Letnar, supra note 4, who point out that the entire body of lawyers was implicated in the previous regime and quote the following fitting paragraph by France Bučar: “with their often unnecessary or at least excessive meekness […] they themselves have strengthened the totalitarian system, as by their conduct and laxness they were giving it justification of at least acceptability, if not legitimacy, and thus inadvertently confirming that it is right and simultaneously giving it an absolution for its violations of fundamental human rights.” France Bučar, 'Pravnik v današnjem času’ (uvodno predavanje na 30. Dnevih slovenskih pravnikov) [Lawyer in the Current Times, The Introductory Lecture at 30th Days of Slovene Lawyers], 36 Pravna praksa 6 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶² Leskovic, Alenka, Deset let pozneje, 18 Pravna praksa 33 (1999).Google Scholar

⁶³ Adam, Frane & Tomšič, Matevž, Transition Elites: Catalysts of Social Innovation or Rent Seekers?, (2000); Bugarič, Bojan, Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: “Lands In-between” Democracy and Authoritarianism, 13 Int'l. J. OF Cst. L. 229 (2015).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Mežnar, Śpelca, Zasebno življenje sodnice, 20 Pravna praksa (2014).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See the discussion infra; for a broader overview, however, see Avbelj, Matej, Failed Democracy: The Slovenian Patria Case – (Non)Law in Context. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462613 (July 4, 2014). Originally published in Slovenian as Matej Avbelj, Zadeva Patria – (ne)pravo v kontekstu, 26 Pravna praksa (2014).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Mr. Masleša has, however, repeatedly refuted these allegations as false and malicious.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Pavliha, Marko, Primer Masleša: (ne)uspeh Sodnega sveta?, 7 Pravna praksa 4–6 (2000).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ However, the charges have been publicly known for more than 10 years.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ svet, Sodni, Zavarovanje dostojanstva in sodnikov in sodstva, 49-50 Pravna Praksa 36 (2010).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ For an in-depth analysis of the case Matej Avbelj, Nepravna država (2015).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Avbelj, Matej, How to Reform the Rule of Law in Slovenia, in Slovenia: Social, Economic and Environmental Issues (Frane Adam ed., 2017).Google Scholar

⁷² Bergant, Vesna Rakočevič, Zakaj meni nihče ne piše sodb v Murglah?, 23 Pravna praksa 33 (2013).Google Scholar

⁷³ Id., at 33.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See, the official report from the event, at http://www.sodisce.si/vsrs/objave/2014060616053789/.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Constitutional Court Up-879/14, Up-883-14, Up-889/14 (April 20, 2015).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See, President of the Supreme Court, Branko Masleša, addressing the Slovenian judges at the annual event “Days of Judiciary”, official report available at: <www.sodisce.si/vsrs/objave/2014060616053789/> accessed 11 November 2014.+accessed+11+November+2014.>Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ Bugarič, , supra note 63, at 13.Google Scholar

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⁸¹ Haček, Miro, (Dis)trust into the Rule of Law in Slovenia, 4 Political Preferences 9, 19 (2013).Google Scholar

⁸² Special Eurobarometer 461: Designing Europe's Future, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/78720.Google Scholar

⁸³ Zobec, Barbara, Ponižano Vrhovno sodišče, Finance (Sept. 19, 2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Avbelj, Matej, Izbiranje predsednika Vrhovnega sodišča – slovenski sodni svet je farsa, Finance (Sept. 19, 2016); Avbelj, Matej, Bo sodni svet zdaj odstopil?, Finance (Dec. 17, 2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Novak, Marko, President of the Judicial Council in Odmevi, RTVSLO.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Zobec, Barbara, supra note 83.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ To this result see also Peternel, Mateja Končina, Moč in avtoriteta sodnikov morata postati del nacionalne kulture, 33 Pravna praksa 3 (2015).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See also Pavčnik, Tomaž, Kaj Iahko sodstvo stori za ohranitev trajnega mandata?, 46 Pravna praksa 33 (2011).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ The media reported that since between 1945-1991 4384 wills were lost, and since 1991 additional 1000.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Lončar, Andreja, Sodišču ne zaupajte svoje oporoke!, SIOL, http://siol.net/novice/slovenija/sodiscu-ne-zaupajte-svoje-oporoke-427307.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Between 1945 and 1991 the Slovenian judiciary failed to declare 4384 wills that were deposited by individuals at the courts to be declared in case of death. Almost additonal 1000 wills have not been declared since 1991. The judiciary simply displaced those wills and the entitled successors were hence deprived of their hereditary rights. The »system« rather than any actual individual has been blamed for this legal scandal. See Lončar, Andreja, Sodišču ne zaupajte svoje oporoke, https://siol.net/novice/slovenija/sodiscu-ne-zaupajte-svoje-oporoke-427307.Google Scholar

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⁹³ Śorli, Marko, Neučinkovit sodni sistem – uspešno vodenje?, 3 Pravna praksa 3 (2013).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See, in particular, Alan Uzelac, Survival of the Third Legal Tradition, 49 Supr. Ct. L. Rev. 377–396 (2010); Kuhelj, Alenka & Bugarič, Bojan, A Day in the Life of a Post-Communist Europe, 8 The Hague Journal of the Rule of law 183 (2016).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Milovan Djilas, New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (1957).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Zobec, Jan, Sodniški novi razred, Finance (Aug. 22, 2016).Google Scholar

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⁹⁸ Betetto, Nina, Generali in vojaki, Finance (Aug. 28, 2016).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ For an analysis, see Avbelj, Matej, Nova era ali po Masleši Masleša?, Finance (Apr. 29, 2017).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ For a description of the phenomenon “of output perversion of accountability” more generally, see Kosar, supra note 8, at 68-72.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See also Vavken, supra note 40, at 107-108.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Pavčnik, Tomaž, Ta je zoper nas, 9 Pravna praksa 33 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Vavken, supra note 40, at 118; Sodni svet RS, Merila za kakovost dela sodnikov za oceno sodniške službe (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ One such notorious example was that of a judge who was appointed as a secretary general of the Government. While his judicial status was stayed, he also acted as an advocate in a case of his wife, filing a motion requesting all judges in Slovenia to recuse themselves as they are biased against him. The affair resulted in his stepping down from the governmental office. See Toplak, Simona, Afera Cerarjev generalni sekretar Darko Krašovec: sodnik, ki ne priznava sodišč, žena, ki ne plačuje davkov, Finance (June 10, 2016) https://www.finance.si/8846026.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ The so-called affaire “Bankruptcy friends” in which the judges, lawyers and bankruptcy managers were partying together, exchanging presents etc. remained unsanctioned by the personnel councils, see https://www.rtvslo.si/crna-kronika/prijatelji-v-stecaju-brez-sankcij-za-vpletene-upravitelje-in-sodnike/314894.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ The case of the Judge of a District Court of Celje.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Vavken, supra note 40, at 77, quoting the then Vice-President of the Supreme Court.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Judicial Service Act, Arts. 79a,b,c.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., an interview with the former President of the Supreme Court, Mitja Deisinger, who in 2000 (still) explained that the data on the initiated disciplinary procedures are classified and that also in other countries such procedures are extremely rare. Bojan Kukec, Slovensko sodstvo na poti v Evropsko unijo: intervju s predsednikom Vrhovnega sodišča RS Mitjo Deisingerjem, 6 Odvetnik 3 (2000.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Betetto, Nina, Koliko neodvisnosti je dovolj?, 48 Pravna praksa 3 (2015).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See, e.g., Judicial Council, Sodstvo je velik, vendar zelo občutljiv sistem, 7-8 Pravna praksa 3–4 (2006).Google Scholar

¹¹² See, e.g., Mrva, Blaž, Za objavo imen sodnikov v objavljenih sodbah, 6-7 Pravna praksa, 21 (2012).Google Scholar

¹¹³ For a critique, see Avbelj, Matej, Slovenski pravosodni meritokratski deficit, Ius kolumna (March 13, 2017).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ See also Černič, Jernej Letnar, Med Scilo in Karibdo, Ius kolumna (Sept. 16, 2016).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Novak, Marko, Institucionalna podhranjenost slovenskega sodnega sveta, 23 Pravna praksa 17 (2013).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See Novak, Marko, Navidezna moč slovenskega Sodnega sveta, Ius kolumna (July 4, 2016).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ The members of the Judicial Council have, however, denied that, see Vovk, Irena, Zavrnili očitke o cehovski solidarnosti, 38 Pravna praksa 4–5 (2003).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ By 2016 Slovenia has been convicted by European Court of Human Rights in 341 cases, which makes it a leading country in terms of the number of violations found per capita.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ The huge number of judges is a legacy of a communist past and a result of a failed attempt to improve the efficiency of judiciary in Slovenia by increasing the number of judges. The latter was done as part of the Lukenda program in response to the eponymous ruling of the European Court of Human Rights which proclaimed the violation of the right to a speedy trial as a systemic problem in Slovenia (Lukenda v. Slovenia, no. 23032/02).Google Scholar

¹²⁰ See, recently, European Commission, Justice Scoreboard 2016.Google Scholar

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¹²² See, e.g., Vladimir Balažic, Arbitrarnih odločb vrhovnega in ustavnega sodišča enostavno ne sme biti, Delo (June 10, 2017).Google Scholar

¹²³ Occasionally, however, relicts of the old system resurface in practice. Such was a “Commitment between the Government and the Judiciary to Improve the State of Judiciary” agreed in 2013 http://www.mp.gov.si/fileadmin/mp.gov.si/pageuploads/mp.gov.si/PDF/131002_podpisana_ZAVEZA.pdf.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Pavčnik, Marijan, Sodstvo, delitev oblasti in ustava, 6-7 Podjetje in delo 1513–1522 (2006).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See the report by Vovk, Irena, Nedomišljene sodne reforme, 24-25 Pravna praksa 37 (2013).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ See, e.g., Zalar, Aleš, Minister za pravosodje, Sodni svet in sodniki, 6-7 Podjetje in delo 1280 (2002).Google Scholar