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⁴ Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵ The case studies include Finnish gender equality plans under the Finnish Gender Equality Act, see 609/1986 Laki naisten ja miesten välisestä tasa-arvosta [Law on Equality Between Men and Women, Gender Equality Act] (Fin.), nudging, and two different banking regulation schemes.Google Scholar

⁶ See infra Section D.III.1.Google Scholar

⁷ For recent accounts, see Schauer, Frederick, The force of law (2015); Shapiro, Scott J., Legality (2011); Mc, Richard H.Adams, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits (2015).Google Scholar

⁸ On the constant and failing boundary work required to sustain the distinction between nature and culture, see Latour, Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern (1993).Google Scholar

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¹⁰ See also Schauer, supra note 7, at 93–109 (arguing that the threat of sanction and coercion of obedience are the characteristic signifiers of all modern law).Google Scholar

¹¹ Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Oxford: Clarendon Press 1907 at I.1 (1789).Google Scholar

¹² See generally Becker, Gary S., Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. Polit. Econ. 385 (1993). The beauty of the theory is that it can be applied even if demonstrably faulty as an empirical description, see Becker, Gary S., Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. Polit. Econ. 1 (1962).Google Scholar

¹³ Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 44–45 (1985).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Thaler, Richard H., From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 133 (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Stiglitz, Joseph E., Information and the Change in the Paradgm Economics, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 460 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See, e.g., Steffen Andersen et al., Lost in State Space: Are References Stable?, 49 Int'l Econ. Rev. 1091 (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁷ For a general overview, see P. H. Robinson & Darley, John M., Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 173 (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁸ The imaginary seems to have received relatively little attention in Anglophone countries, see, e.g., generally Kenworthey Bilz et al., law, Psychology, and Morality, 101–31 (2009); Eyal Zamir et al., Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, Oxford Handbook of Behav. Econ. & L. (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). It has, however, received more attention, for example in the Nordic countries, in regards to criminal law, see Tapani, Jussi & Tolvanen, Matti, Rikosoikeuden yleinen osa: vastuuoppi 43–45 (2nd rev. ed. 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Habitual obedience, where people's submission gains a “unreflective, effortless, engrained character of a habit,” H. L. A. Hart, The concept of law 51–54 (2nd ed. 1994), is one version of the moral-creating effect of law.Google Scholar

²⁰ McAdams provides the most sophisticated account of law's causal pathways. In his account, law serves an expressive, coordinating function, allowing humans to coordinate and homogenize their expectations, but it ultimately converges back on self-interested individual's calculations. See McAdams, supra note 7 passim.Google Scholar

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²² In particular, feminist, black studies, and postcolonial studies scholars have argued that this may be an illusion and that legal normative power is, in fact, complicit in producing its subjects. The critics have pointed out that law frames issues, creates social institutions, sustains categorical boundaries and structures, and, most importantly, like other powerful discourses, offers subjectifiers that people can use to subjectify themselves. See, e.g., Lacey, Nicola, The Constitution of Identity: Gender, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Law and Society Movement, Blackwell Companion to L. & Soc'y 471 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1988); Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of Identity: The Judicial and Social Legacy of American Colonialism in Puerto Rico (2001). The accounts have typically been inspired by the work of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, see, e.g., Foucault, Michel, Technologies of the self, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth 223–52 (1997); Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection Theories in Subjection (1997).Google Scholar

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³⁰ For an early musical exploration of the theme, listen to Kraftwerk, Die Mensch-Maschine (Capital records, 1974).Google Scholar

³¹ N. Katherine Hayles, Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments, 10 Configurations 297 (2002); Rosi Braidotti, The posthuman (2013); Andy Clark, Natural-born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (2003). Compare with Jannice Käll's chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

³² Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (1974). See also generally Pickering, Andrew, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future (2010) (discussing the early British cybernetics thinkers).Google Scholar

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³⁴ See, e.g., Sandberg, A., Feasibility of Whole Brain Emulation, 5 Philos. Theory Artif. Intell. 251, 262 (2013) (arguing that the whole brain emulation has no “fundamental obstacles” but only requires “a large amount of engineering and research”); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies 35–43 (2014).Google Scholar

³⁵ For an early jurisprudential deployment of the idea, see Taylor, Serge, Making Bureaucracies Think (1984) (arguing that the environmental statements were introduced to forge a particular bureaucratic way of thinking).Google Scholar

³⁶ On micro- and macrocognitions, see Klein, Gary & Wright, Corinne, Macrocognition: From Theory to Toolbox, 7 Front. Psychol. 54 (2016).Google ScholarPubMed

³⁷ A key template for the argument can be found in Philip Mirowski's history of post-World War II US economic thought, see Mirowski, Philip, Machine dreams: economics becomes a cyborg science (2002).Google Scholar

³⁸ See infra at Section D.II.Google Scholar

³⁹ See infra at Section D.III.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework – Comprehensive Version Part III, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm (2006).Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, at Part III.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 41, at 9–27.Google Scholar

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⁴⁷ On the theoretical underpinnings, see, e.g., Joao A. C. Santos, Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature, 10 Fin. Mark. Institutions Instruments 41 (2001); David Miles, Jing Yang & Gilberto Marcheggiano, Optimal Bank Capital, 123 Econ. J. 1 (2013).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, § 720.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Id. § 732–42.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The process in which the systems are built is also an agencement process. I will discuss agencement in more detail below in Section D.III, but in relation to the ICAAP risk measurement systems.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, at § 452–53.Google Scholar

⁵² Id. § 462.Google Scholar

⁵³ Id. § 416.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id. § 447.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ On methodologies available at the time Basel II was designed, see, e.g., Crouhy, Michel, Dan Galai & Robert Mark, A Comparative Analysis of Current Credit Risk Models, 24 J. Bank. & Fin. 59 (2000).Google Scholar

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⁶⁰ Iain Hardie & Donald MacKenzie, Assembling an Economic Actor: The Agencement of a Hedge Fund, 55 Soc. Rev. 57 (2007). For other deployments, see Swanton, Dan, The Steel Plant as Assemblage, 44 Geoforum 282 (2013); Cédric Calvignac & Franck Cochoy, From “Market Agencement” to “Vehicular Agencies”: Insights from the Quantitative Observation of Consumer Logistics, 19 Consum. Mark. Cult. 133–147 (2016); Luis Araujo & Hans Kjellberg, Enacting Novel Agencements: The Case of Frequent Flyer Schemes in the US Airline Industry (1981–1991), 19 Consum. Mark. Cult. 92 (2015); Thomas Lemke, New Materialisms: Foucault and the “Government of Things,” 32 Theory, Cult. & Soc. 3 (2015); Philip Roscoe, Economic Embeddedness and Materiality in a Financial Market Setting, 61 Soc. Rev. 41 (2013).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Callon himself also pointed out that “[a]gency … can be attributed to heterogeneous and unexpected entities which are not necessarily human beings ('”the French economy“’ that creates unemployment; ‘”biotechnology“’ which generates ethical problems; ‘”genes“’ which are said to cause severe diseases and/or impairments).” Callon, supra note 56, at 4.Google Scholar

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⁶⁴ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, § 728–30.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 41, at 12–15.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, § 728.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id. § 730.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 41, at 14.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, § 397.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See e.g., id. at § 688.Google Scholar

⁷¹ On the state-of-play in Europe, see, e.g., Joana Sousa Lourenco et al., Behavioural Insights Applied to Policy: European Report 2016 (2016).Google Scholar

⁷² For a sample of countless articles, see, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, Nudging and Choice Architecture: Ethical Considerations, Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2014); Andreas Kapsner & Barbara Sandfuchs, Nudging as a Threat to Privacy, 6 Rev. Phil. Psychol. 455 (2015); Jeff King & Christopher McCrudden, The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, Choice Architecture in Democracies: Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging 75 (Alexandra Kemmerer et al. eds., 2016); T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 Pol. Stud. 341 (2013); Pelle Guldborg Hansen & Andreas Maal&;e Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice, 1 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 3 (2013).Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ A legal framework for understanding and evaluating nudging is still largely missing. See, e.g., Alberto Alemanno & Alessandro Spina, Nudging Legally: On the Checks and Balances of Behavioral Regulation, 12 Int. J. Const. Law 429 (2014).Google Scholar

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⁷⁸ The results of appropriate default choice architecture are sometimes striking. Studies have, for example, shown that people enroll in organ donor programs in great numbers if the enrolment is an opt-out choice on a driver's license application form, while the enrolment rate is much lower if people are required to tick a box to opt in on the very same form. On default choice nudges, see, e.g., Sunstein, Cass R., Deciding by Default, 162 Univ. PA. L. Rev. 1 (2013).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Healthy snacks, for example, can be placed close to typical routes and easily visible in stores or in academic conferences, while the unhealthy ones are stacked in hard-to-find places. See, e.g., Ida Kongsbak et al., Increasing Fruit and Vegetable Intake Among Male University Students in an Ad Libitum Buffet Setting: A Choice Architectural Nudge Intervention, 49 Food Qualty & Preference 183 (2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Gharad Bryan, Dean Karlan & Scott Nelson, Commitment Devices, 2 Annu. Rev. Econ. 671–98 (2010).Google Scholar

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⁸³ Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 204–06 (2005).Google Scholar

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⁸⁵ Id. Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Id.B Google Scholar

⁸⁷ The relationship between nudging and psycho-morphing is fraught as there seems good reason to think that the rational Econs, in particular, are cultural constructs. The Econs' rationality can only be imprinted on the Humans with the help of countless years of education and training, that is, psycho-morphing and material agencement.Google Scholar

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⁹⁰ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 40, § 729.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁴ The continuing human hegemony is clearly visible in, for example, Christopher Stone's argument; things can be subject to law in the sense of having a standing, rights, and a guardian to sue in their name. See Stone, Christopher D., Should Trees have standing? (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Schlag, Pierre, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 Harv. L. R. 1047, 1107–09 (2002). Compare also with Selkälä & Rajavuori chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁷ For a similar argument, see Hildebrandt, Mireille, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements of Law and Technology 217–19 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Luhmann's account of law's binary nature is probably best known. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System 90–91 (2005).Google Scholar