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¹⁰³ Gerhard Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen 16, 36 (Walter Pauly ed., introd., 1996 [1882]).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Armin von Bogdandy, Common Principles for a Plurality of Orders: A Study on Public Authority in the European Legal Area, 12 Int'l J. of Constitutional Law 980, 985 et seq. (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Id. at 986. A proposal for an even broader understanding of sovereignty in the light of global interdependence is presented by Eyal Benvinisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 Am. J. of Int'l Law 295 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Klaus F. Gärditz rightly emphasizes the necessity of borders also for matters of inclusion in this issue.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 296 et seq. (1968).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ This question is already discussed by Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, Third Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: Cosmopolitan Right Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality (1795), who argued that there must be a right to hospitality according to which a state may only deny entry and temporary residence to a person “if this can be done without causing his destruction.” On this discussion and the democratic ambivalences of refugee law, see Schmalz, Dana, Der Flüchtlingsbegriff zwischen kosmopolitischer Brisanz und nationalstaatlicher Ordnung, 48 KJ 390, 398, 400–02 (2015); see also Whelan, Frederick G., Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in Liberal Democracy 13, 13–47 (J. Ronald Pennock & Chapman, John W. eds., 1983); Sarah Song, Denaturalizing Citizenship: A Symposium on Linda Bosniak's The Citizens and the Alien and Ayelet Shachar's the Birthright Lottery, 9 Issues in legal Scholarship 1, 16 et seq. (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Gärditz, in this issue, therefore rightly emphasizes the “re-politicization of the border.”Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Volkmann, supra note 102, at 27; Uwe Volkmann, Der Flüchtling vor den Toren der Gemeinschaft, 49 KJ 180, 191 (2016) [hereinafter Volkmann, Der Flüchtling].Google Scholar

¹¹¹ National self-determination seems to be the concern of Uwe Volkmann, who criticizes the factual opening of borders and argues that the capacity to effectively regulate migration should be regained. Volkmann, Der Flüchtling, supra note 111, at 191.Google Scholar

¹¹² Astrid Wallrabenstein, “Ich sehe was, was du nicht siehst”: Wahrnehmungsunterschiede in der Flüchtlingsdebatte. Replik auf Volkmann “Der Flüchtling vor den Toren der Gemeinschaft,” 49 KJ 407 (2016).Google Scholar

¹¹³ On new forms of territoriality, see Jureit, Ulrike & Tietze, Nikola, Postsouveräne Territorialität: Eine Einleitung, in Postsouveräne Territorialität: Die Europäische Union und ihr Raum 7, 23 (Ulrike Jureit & Nikola Tietze eds., 2015).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ This insight expressly marks the German Basic Law. See von Bogdandy, supra note 104, at 985. On the absence of a clear definition of borders in the Basic Law, see Wallrabenstein, supra note 113, at 413. For a seminal work on the relevance of international cooperation under the Basic Law, see Vogel, Klaus, Die Verfassungsentscheidung des Grundgesetzes für eine internationale Zusammenarbeit (1964).Google Scholar