1 See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions xv–xvi (2007); Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire 370 (1986) [hereinafter Law's Empire].Google Scholar

2 Ronald Dworkin, , Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 1–38 (1997) [hereinafter Freedom's Law].Google Scholar

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8 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo.J.L. & Pub.Pol'y 599, 611 (2004) (“[O]riginalists should explicitly admit: interpretation requires judgment. It is not a mechanical process, and interpretive results cannot be rigidly determined.”).Google Scholar

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14 Id. at 10.Google Scholar

15 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism 54–58 (1993).Google Scholar

16 This distinction is similar to the one made by Jeremy Waldron between first-order and second-order values; but, because this terminology could be confused with the first-best/second-best distinction that is central to section B. III., I use different terminology to avoid confusion. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 196 (1999).Google Scholar

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26 Dworkin, Ronald, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 (1981).Google Scholar

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29 See Sunstein, Cass R. & Vermeule, Adrian, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (2003).Google Scholar

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31 Sunstein, & Vermeule, , supra note 29, at 914–15.Google Scholar

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36 Id. at 237.Google Scholar

37 Id. at 3.Google Scholar

38 Vermeule, Adrian, Law and the Limits of Reason 8 (2009); Waldron, Jeremy, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L. J. 1346, 1373–74 (2006).Google Scholar

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42 See Ackerman, Bruce, We the People: Foundations (1993).Google Scholar

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44 Id. at 12.Google Scholar

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49 Id. Google Scholar

50 I remain agnostic on the question of whether the text should impose an absolute limit on interpretation. One could argue that the very concept of constitutional interpretation makes sense only if the text draws the outer limits of possible interpretations. Others hold the opinion that while the text is important, it does not impose absolute limits on interpretation. For a conventionalist explanation of the importance of the text, see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 906–25 (1996).Google Scholar

51 For a sophisticated defense of procedural democracy, see Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (2007).Google Scholar

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53 Bork, , supra note 6, at 146.Google Scholar

54 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 8, at 609 (“Others are clear that a commitment to originalism is distinct from a commitment to judicial deference and that originalism may often require the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order to keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding. The new originalism does not require judges to get out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.”).Google Scholar

55 Primus, , supra note 27, at 188.Google Scholar

56 I will set aside the possibility that originalism is conceptually incoherent. For a general overview of the debate, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L. J. 1085 (1989).Google Scholar

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58 Id. at 195–99.Google Scholar

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62 Id. at 82.Google Scholar

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