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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
The purpose of this paper is not to argue for a particular approach to constitutional interpretation, but to map the domain thereof and clarify the requirements that an adequate theory of the subject must meet. A comprehensive constitutional theory has to address both how and by whom a given constitution should be interpreted. While everyone admits that these two issues are not entirely unrelated, many constitutional theorists presume that a theory of constitutional interpretation can usefully insulate these two questions. The argument is that once we have answered the question of who will interpret the constitution and we have made a decision on institutional design, we can then focus our efforts on the proper method of interpretation. Although I do not deny that the two questions can be analytically separated, my contention is that a theory of constitutional interpretation focusing only on the how question is wholly inadequate.
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