¹ Note that prosecutors do not form a part of the Czech judiciary but are independent from it.Google Scholar

² See Kosař, David, Politics of Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice, 13 European Constitutional Law Review 13, 97 (2017).Google Scholar

³ Bobek, Michal, The Administration of Courts in the Czech Republic – In Search of a Constitutional Balance, 16 Eur. Pub. L. 251 (2010); and, generally, Bobek, Michal & Kosař, David, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 German L.J. 1257 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴ We define a JSG body as a body with at least one judge whose primary function, entrenched in a legal norm, is to decide about issues regarding court administration and/or the career of a judge, and/or advise those who decide about such issues.Google Scholar

⁵ Kosař, David, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies 176 (2016).Google Scholar

⁶ For further information regarding the Czech judicial environment and its actors see especially Michal Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 14 Eur. Pub. L. 99 (2008); Bobek, supra note 3; Kosař, , supra note 5; Kühn, Zdeněk, The Democratization and Modernization of Post-Communist Judiciaries, in Central and Eastern Europe After Transition 177 (Alberto Febbrajo & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 2010); Kühn, Zdeněk, The Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanical Jurisprudence in Transformation? (2011); Kühn, Zdeněk, Judicial Administration Reforms in Central-Eastern Europe: Lessons to be Learned, in Judicial Independence in Transition 613 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012); and Hledání optimálního modelu správy soudnictví pro Českou republiku (Jan Kysela ed., 2008).Google Scholar

⁷ Kühn, 2012, supra note 6, at 609.Google Scholar

⁸ Art. 73 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

⁹ Art. 8(c) to (g) of the Law No. 7/2002 Coll., the Code of Disciplinary Procedure with Judges and Prosecutors.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This goes for the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, see art. 70 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges, and art. 124 of the No. 150/2002 Coll., the Code of Administrative Justice.Google Scholar

¹¹ This goes for the presidents for high and regional courts; see art. 73 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges. Assignment to the district courts needs to be in consultation with the presidents of the respective regional courts, who are thus “masters” of district courts as well.Google Scholar

¹² An attempt by the former president of the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, to circumvent this rule was thwarted by the Czech Constitutional Court; for a concise description of the circumstances, see Kosař, , supra note 5, at 174-175, and Bobek, supra note 3, at 263-265.Google Scholar

¹³ For further details on the selection of judges, see Kosař, , supra note 5, at 188-191 and 215-216. The rules for the selection of judges for the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court are set out in publicly available court presidents’ memoranda; at the regional court level, the situation is rather chaotic, see Léko, Kristián, Výběr českých soudců ovládá chaos, Lidové noviny, June 5, 2017.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Kühn, 2012, supra note 6, at 612; and Kosař, , supra note 2, at 97 and 100.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Arts. 124 to 127 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges; Art. 29 of the Law No.150/2002 Coll., the Code of Administrative Justice.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Kosař, , supra note 2, at 100.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The minutes from the meetings of the college are sent to the MoJ and discussed there, see Kosař, , supra note 5, at 179-181, and Kosař, supra note 2, at 100-101.Google Scholar

¹⁸ This term for the group has not been coined officially.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The most vocal one is Josef Baxa, President of the SAC, who is also an ardent supporter of introducing a judicial council model of JSG.Google Scholar

²⁰ This is also due to the common ground found between the three presidents, Josef Baxa (SAC), Pavel Śámal (SC), and Pavel Rychetský (CC); see Kosař, , supra note 2, at 101.Google Scholar

²¹ Where there is fewer than 11 judges, the plenary session consisting of all the judges fulfils the tasks of a judicial board; see Arts. 46 and 47 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

²² Arts. 50-53 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

²³ Kosař, , supra note 5, at 178-179.Google Scholar

²⁴ Art. 129 to 133 of the Law No.6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

²⁵ Art 130(3) of the Law No.6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

²⁶ Art 130(2) of the Law No.6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges. As of 2017, judges alone do not have a majority on the board, although the rules permit it: there are 7 judges, 2 public prosecutors, 3 academics, 1 advocate, 1 lawyer from the MoJ, and a former constitutional justice/ombudsman.Google Scholar

²⁷ The panel is composed of one judge from the SAC, one judge from the SC, one judge from regional or district court, one attorney, one state prosecutor, and one academic; see Art. 4(1) of the Law No.7/2002 Coll., the Code of Disciplinary Procedure with Judges and Prosecutors, as amended by the Law No. 314/2008 Coll. (hereinafter “2008 Disciplinary Code”). For more info on disciplinary panels, see Kosař, David & Papoušková, Tereza, Kárná odpovědnost soudce v přerodu: Ponaučení z České republiky (2017).Google Scholar

²⁸ Art. 8(2) and (3) of the 2008 Disciplinary Code. Note that the Public Defender of Rights can initiate disciplinary proceedings as well, but only in the case of court officials.Google Scholar

²⁹ In fact they existed even before, in Czechoslovakia. See Michal Princ. Soudnictví v českých zemích v letech 1848-1938 (soudy, soudní osoby, dobové problémy) 143–149 (2015).Google Scholar

³⁰ See the Law No. 412/1991 Coll., on Disciplinary Liability of Judges, the Law No. 7/2002 Coll., the Code of Disciplinary Procedure with Judges and Prosecutors (hereinafter “2002 Disciplinary Code”) and the 2008 Disciplinary Code.Google Scholar

³¹ Note that from 2002 to 2008 a judge accused of an offense could request that the offense be dealt with in disciplinary proceedings. Previously, the law enforcement authorities could refer the matter to the disciplinary panels.Google Scholar

³² Nevertheless, she can initiate the disciplinary proceedings only against court officials.Google Scholar

³³ Kosař, David & Papoušková, Tereza, Přinesla “Pospíšilova” reforma kárného řízení skutečně zpřísnění kárného postihu českých soudců? 25 Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi 219 (2017).Google Scholar

³⁴ From 1993 to 2002, the proceedings were only one-tiered for judges of the Supreme Court.Google Scholar

³⁵ Art. 5 of the Law No. 412/1991 Coll., on Disciplinary Liability of Judges and art. 3 of the 2002 Disciplinary Code.Google Scholar

³⁶ For information on composition of the panels see supra note 27.Google Scholar

³⁷ See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Law No. 314/2008 Coll., amending, among else, the Law No. 7/2002 Coll., the Code of Disciplinary Procedure with Judges and Prosecutors.Google Scholar

³⁸ Kosař & Papoušková, supra note 27.Google Scholar

³⁹ Law No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ In the end, judges can fulfil their obligation to educate themselves also by attending education events organized by other courts and universities.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 18 June 2002, case no. PI. ÚS 7/02.Google Scholar

⁴² See the next Section on the issue of selection of judicial personnel.Google Scholar

⁴³ Note that presidents of top three courts (the Supreme, the Supreme Administrative and the Constitutional) are appointed and recalled by the President of the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, analogical argumentation applies.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ In the 1990s some Ministers dared to take the risk. For instance, when Otakar Motejl became the Minister of Justice in 1998, he soon dismissed five of the eight regional court presidents. However, Motejl's gravitas was rather unique.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ There were 16 ministers of justice between 1993 and 2015 and the average length of their terms was less than two years. In contrast, most CPs held office for more than a decade.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Explanatory Memorandum to the Law No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 100, who claims that according to one of the “founding fathers” of the body, the idea of creating an informal association of regional court presidents was suggested to them by Mr Jean-Michel, Peltier, a French liaison magistrate in Prague.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Id. In 2007, presidents of regional courts attempted to formalize the college, but both the Minister of Justice and the presidents of the top courts rejected that idea.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Law No. 314/2008 Coll., amending, among other things, the Law on Courts and Judges. Note that this very amendment also transferred the power to discipline judges from exclusively judicial panels at high courts (and the Supreme Court acting as the appellate body) to mixed panels (composed of three judges and three non-judges) at the Supreme Administrative Court.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Note, again, that the President of the Czech Republic could have dismissed the presidents of the top three courts.Google Scholar

⁵² Compare supra note 46. For details see Motejl, Otakar, Pohled ministrů spravedlnosti, in Hledání optimálního modelu správy soudnictví pro Českou republiku 13 (Jan Kysela ed., 2008).Google Scholar

⁵³ Note that officials of the Constitutional Court are selected from among the constitutional justices, who are appointed for a period of ten years (that is, as the tradition has it, once renewable), therefore their office has always been limited in this sense.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For further details including more doctrinal analysis of these cases see Bobek, supra note 3, at 263-265.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 11 July 2006, case no. PI. ÚS 18/06. For further details see Kosař, , supra note 5, at 173-175.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 6 October 2010, case no. PI. ÚS 39/08.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The former President of the Supreme Court, Iva Brožová, resigned voluntarily in January 2015.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Iva Brožová was often out of sync with Pavel Rychetský and Josef Baxa.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Pavel Rychetský and Josef Baxa have known each other well since the late 1990s, as Josef Baxa was a Vice-Minister of Justice in the Government of Miloš Zeman (1998-2002) at the same time Pavel Rychetský was Vice-PM.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See the document entitled Návrh koncepce reformy soudnictví [The Conception of the Reform of the Judiciary] of 16 June 1999 (no. 1097/99-L), approved by the Czech Government by the decision no. 686 of 7 July 1999. An outline of the reform proposal was published as a special supplement in 5 Právní rozhledy 1, 1–8 (1999).Google Scholar

⁶¹ See the Constitutional Bill No. 541/0.Google Scholar

⁶² These two statutes were Law on Courts (Bill No. 539/0) and Law on Judges and Lay Judges (Bill No. 540/0).Google Scholar

⁶³ The Constitutional Bill was rejected in the second reading – 114 MPs voted for the rejection of the bill, 68 MPs voted for the bill – and the other two bills soon followed the same fate – one of them was rejected by 71 MPs (69 opposed the motion to reject it) and the second one by 85 MPs (81 opposed).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Bobek, supra note 3, at 269.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The Constitutional Bill, apart from introducing the High Council of the Judiciary, also introduced a maximum age limit for ordinary judges and Constitutional Court Justices, prohibited a renewal of the term of Constitutional Court Justices, changed the status of the Czech National Bank and amended several other provisions of the Czech Constitution.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ These explanations are based on informal interviews with former and current politicians and CPs, but they cannot be corroborated by the hard data.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Motejl, supra note 52, at 14.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ The 2012 Bill also intended to introduce judicial performance evaluation and financial declarations of judges. Both of these tools would give the MoJ the necessary information to counter the existing information asymmetry and to make more informed decisions regarding the promotion of judges.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Hardoš, Jiří, Blažek odložil zavedení výběrových řízení na nové soudce, Právo, August 2, 2012, at 4.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The recent developments in Hungary and Poland prove that if the other branches of power launch a large-scale offensive on the judiciary, there is little that actors from within judiciary can do.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Kosař, , supra note 2, at 115-122.Google Scholar

⁷² Art. 126 para. 1 letter h) of the Law No.6/2002 Coll., On the Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

⁷³ Being appointed therefore equals a win in a lottery to a certain degree, see Léko, , supra note 13.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Note that there is no research or direct evidence proving that this claim holds true, which is why we present it only as a potential threat to judicial independence.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ The Supreme Administrative Court introduced the memorandum in 2012, the Supreme Court in 2017.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ This concerns the Municipal Court in Prague, which introduced the testing in 2014. Some other regional courts use the testing as well (Regional Court in Pilsen, Regional Court in Brno); see Léko, , supra note 13.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Kosař supra note 2, at 110-114.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ The exception was the early and mid-1990s; see e.g. 9 Právní praxe (1995).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Kosař, David, Rozvrh práce: Klíčový nástroj pro boj s korupcí soudců a nezbytný předpoklad nezávislosti řadových soudců, 12 Právník 1060, 1060–1066 (2014).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See id., at 1049-1076, and the newspaper articles cited there.Google Scholar

⁸¹ The term “bankruptcy mafia” was coined for a group with alleged influence in the area. See id., at 1050.Google Scholar

⁸² See especially the judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 15 June 2016, case no. I. ÚS 2769/15; as well as judgments of 27 May 2004, case no. IV. ÚS 307/03; judgment of 27 September 2005, case no. I. ÚS 93/99; judgment of 21 April 2009, case no. II. ÚS 2747/08; judgment of 28 May 2009, case no. II. ÚS 2029/08; judgment of 20 April 2011, case no. IV. ÚS 1302/10; and judgment of 1 November 2012, case no. IV. ÚS 2053/12.Google Scholar

⁸³ For an account of some of such incidents, see Kosař, , supra note 2, at 117-118.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Kosař, , supra note 5, at 236-333.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Kosař, , supra note 5, at 187-235.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See the case of changes to case assignment (work schedules) caused by a ruling of the Constitutional Court described above.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Compare art. 8 of the 2002 Disciplinary Code and of the 2008 Disciplinary Code. Note also, that the Public Defender of Rights could initiate the proceedings against court officials.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Compare art. 4 of the 2002 and 2008 Disciplinary Codes.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Note that from 1991 to 2002 judges of the Supreme Court had no such possibility, as in this period disciplinary panels were assembled pursuant to a hierarchical pattern – disciplinary panels at regional courts decided on motions against judges of district courts; disciplinary panels at high courts decided on motions against judges of regional courts as well as against judges of the relevant high court; and disciplinary panels at the Supreme Court decided on motions against judges of the Supreme Court. In the next period, i.e. from 2002 to 2008, all first-instance disciplinary proceedings were held at high courts. Comp. art. 5 of the Law No. 412/1991 Coll., on Disciplinary Liability of Judges (hereinafter “1991 Disciplinary Code”) and art. 3 of the 2002 Disciplinary Code.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Compare art. 21 of the 2002 and 2008 Disciplinary Codes.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See art. 87 of the Law No. 6/2002 Coll, on Courts and Judges, as amended by the Law No. 314/2008 Coll. Otherwise judges could still be disciplined for infringing upon dignity of the judicial office or threatening public confidence in independent, impartial and just decision-making of courts.Google Scholar

⁹² Kosař & Papoušková, supra note 27.Google Scholar

⁹³ In 2010, a website platform for discussing personal experience with individual judges and opinions on them was launched. See znamysoudce.cz.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ To avoid overlap with the account of impact on public opinion, we omit the social dimension of judicial legitimacy.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ This understanding connects legitimacy with legality and claims that judiciary is legitimate when it adheres to legal rules; see e.g. Carl Schmitt, Legality and legitimacy (2004); and Dyzenhaus, David, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Herman Heller in Weimar (1999); and various contributions in Legitimacy in International Law (Rudiger Wolfrum & Volker Roeben eds., 2008).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 110-112; Derka, Ladislav, Pro soudní funkcionáře právo neplatí? 4 Soudce 7 (2015); Derka, Viktor, Ústavnost opakovaného jmenování soudních funkcionářů, 23 Jurisprudence 3 (2014).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See e.g. Stillman, Peter G., The Concept of Legitimacy, 7 Polity 32 (1974).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Better rules for selection could have a sort of “trickle-down effect”, as it may improve also the quality of judges and, subsequently, of the judicial process and decisions.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See supra notes 75 and 76.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Before, many may have had the impression that “kids” with little life, to say nothing of legal, experience, sit on the bench; see Kühn 2012, supra note 6, at 614.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ For an overview, see Kosař, , supra note 5, at 167-173; and Kosař, David, The Least Accountable Branch, 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 234, 251–252 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁰² At the beginning, almost two thirds of judges were ex-communists.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ See the judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 15 November 2010, case no. I. ÚS 517/10.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ For this, Czechia was criticised many times by the European Court of Human Rights.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ The length of proceedings in Czechia is, if compared to other EU countries, average. See the European Commission's 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard, at 7-11.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See for example Léko, Kristián, Soudci by se “pod lupou” víc snažili, Lidové noviny, July 17, 2017, at 5, where one of the respondents, a professional lawyer, claimed that “If the judiciary is slow, at least make it transparent.” Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See supra note 81.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ This includes e.g. the former Prime Minister Petr Nečas and his spouse Jana Nečasová, former Minister of Health David Rath, and Marek Dalík, an influential lobbyist and an advisor to the former Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Note that we are speaking mainly about systemic changes, as “local” (i.e. court specific) changes in judicial transparency may appear any time a new court president is appointed and thus has an opportunity to adopt a new transparency policy.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See, for instance, Léko, supra note 13.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See art. 132 of the Law 6/2002 Sb., on Court and Judges.Google Scholar

¹¹² Only three more of the eight regional courts organize an open selection procedure for law clerks, but they do so without assistance of the Judicial Academy.Google Scholar

¹¹³ The MoJ published a list of such judges following to the judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 15 November 2010, case no. I. ÚS 517/10.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ See Němeček, Tomáš, Tajná data z Ústavního soudu, Lidové noviny, February 28, 2011; Němeček, Tomáš, Zachraňte doktora Balíka, Lidové noviny, March 5, 2012; and Němeček, Tomáš, Doktorka Lastovecká se topí, Lidové noviny, February 23, 2013.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ The Supreme Court began publishing all its decisions online in 2000. The newly established Supreme Administrative Courts followed this path and started publishing all decisions online soon after its establishment in 2003. The Constitutional Court made this step in 2006.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ They are accessible through http://www.nsoud.cz/Judikaturans_new/judikatura_vks.nsf/uvod.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ The Office of the Public Defender of Rights, 2017. Výroční zpráva 2016, at 57: https://www.ochrance.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/zpravy_pro_poslaneckou_snemovnu/Vyrocni-zprava2016_web.pdf Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ For more details see the web http://www.reformajustice.cz/ejustice/ and other websites it references.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ See http://data.justice.cz/SitePages/DomovskaStranka.aspx.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Note that, for instance, in Slovakia such information is available through the website https://otvorenesudy.sk/.Google Scholar

¹²¹ However, see above for information on the quite transparent selection of judges for the two apex courts.Google Scholar

¹²² Dougherty, George W., Lindquist, Stefanie A. & Bradbury, Mark D., Evaluating Performance in State Judicial Institutions: Trust and Confidence in the Georgia Judiciary, 38 State and Local Government Review 176 (2006).Google Scholar

¹²³ Mishler, William & Rose, Richard, What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies, 34 Comparative Political Studies 30 (2001).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Sztompka, Piotr, Trust: A sociological theory (2000).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See, e. g. Kühn 2011, supra note 6, at 53.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Source: Czech Social Science Data Archive of the Czech Institute of Sociology. The remainder (to 100 %) are “do not know” answers. The question asked was: “Please tell us, do you trust or distrust the courts?” Possible answers: I definitely trust/I rather trust/I rather distrust/I definitely distrust them.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ The restoration of the social position of judges becomes evident also when looking at the rise of their salaries. In Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, judges’ salaries were only slightly above the national average salary, and below e.g. miners’ or bus drivers’ salaries, see Ota Ulč, Malá doznání okresního soudce 76 (1974). In 2017, a judge's salary base is calculated by multiplying the average nominal monthly salary of individuals in the non-business (public) sector by the coefficient of 3. The salary base is then in turn multiplied by a specific coefficient depending on the position of a judge etc.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Source: Czech Social Science Data Archive of the Czech Institute of Sociology. Legend: The data in the figure represent the average score of prestige on a scale from 1=the lowest prestige to 99=the highest prestige.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ See the memos published by the CPs, supra note 75.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Kühn, 2012, supra note 6, at 613-616.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Kühn, 2010, supra note 6, at 191, reports that in 2001 the numbers were quite similar.Google Scholar

¹³² See České soudnictví 2016: Výroční statistická zpráva, Ministerstvo spravedlnosti, 2017, at 12, 53, 94, 105, and 111. The causes of underrepresentation of women at the upper echelons of the Czech judiciary are not yet determined.Google Scholar

¹³³ See http://portal.justice.cz/Justice2/Soudci/soudci.html.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ This tradition dates to the times of Austro-Hungarian Empire; see Princ, supra note 29, at 209-220.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ See Art. 119 of the Law no. 6/2002 Sb., On Courts and Judges; and art. 74(2) of the Law no. 6/2002 Sb., On Courts and Judges, which explicitly admits that the function of the court president is part of the public administration.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Art. 119(2) of the Law no. 6/2002 Sb., On Courts and Judges.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Especially the rule that who appoints, dismisses as well.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 11 July 2006, case no. PI. ÚS 18/06.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 4 May 2010, case no. PI. ÚS 7/09.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See e. g. http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/tema/484360-volby-2017-spravedlnost-a-stav-justice.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ See arts. 64 and further Law No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges.Google Scholar