President Clinton before the 52th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 22 September 1997; President Clinton in a speech at the National Defence University, 29 January 1998; President Clinton in the Pentagon, 17 February 1998; “Madeleine Albright defined a rogue state as one that had no part in the international system and that tried to sabotage it. The United States had used the term mainly for coun-tries it thought might be working on long-range missiles.” Wright, Washington Post, 19 June 2000, <http://www.gn.apc.org/-cndyorks/-yspace/-articles/derougue.htm.>, visited on 23 July 2000; Vice-President Gore, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 27 March 2000; U.S. Secretary of Defence, William S. Cohen: “Rogue States cannot hope to blackmail America or her Allies”, London Times from 1 March 2000, <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/-programm/news00/-e20000301rogue.htm>, visited on 23 July 2000; President Clinton, “Remarks by the President to the Duma”, Moscow, 5 June 2000.,+visited+on+23+July+2000;+Vice-President+Gore,+U.S.+Military+Academy,+West+Point,+27+March+2000;+U.S.+Secretary+of+Defence,+William+S.+Cohen:+“Rogue+States+cannot+hope+to+blackmail+America+or+her+Allies”,+London+Times+from+1+March+2000,+,+visited+on+23+July+2000;+President+Clinton,+“Remarks+by+the+President+to+the+Duma”,+Moscow,+5+June+2000.>Google Scholar

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“The excuse used by the United States for developing NMD and TMD was to guard against the missile threats from the so-called ‘rogue nations’”. As a matter of fact, any sensible people can perceive that the so-called “rogue nations” actually do not have the ability to launch missile attacks against the targets on the mainland of the United States, and their military strength can never be compared with that of the United States.”; Zhongguo She news agency, Hong Kong, in Chinese, 18 May 2001/BBC monitoring, <wysiwyg://37/http://globalarchive.ft.c>; visited on 14 August 2001.;+visited+on+14+August+2001.>Google Scholar

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12 U.S.C.A.§ 95a.Google Scholar

50 U.S.C. § 1701(a): “[…] any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or sub-stantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”Google Scholar

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50 U.S.C. § 1701.Google Scholar

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Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, Public Law 102-182.Google Scholar

22 U.S.C.A. § 2780 (d).Google Scholar

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The Foreign State Immunities Act of 1976, Public Law 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601–1611.Google Scholar

”A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case – not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support of resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such an act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph – if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such act; and even if the foreign state is or was so designated, if – the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign state against which the claim has been brought and the claimant has not afforded the foreign state a reason-able opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration;–neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States (as that term is defined in sections 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) when the act upon which the claim is based occurred.Google Scholar

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Terry Anderson et.al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, C.A. 99-0698 (TPJ).Google Scholar

Uniting and Strengthening America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct Ter-rorism, Public Law 107-56, 26 October 2001.Google Scholar

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