¹ Convention on Rights and Duties of States Adapted by the Seventh International Conference of American States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.Google Scholar

² For a thorough discussion, see David Raič, Statehood and the Law of Sell-determination 49–88 (2002). For an attempt to rethink the idea of “effective control” in light of recent developments in Africa and Latin America, see Brad R. Roth, Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine, 11 Melb. J. Int'l L. 393 (2010). See also Brad R. Roth, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement: Premises of a Pluralist International Legal Order 169–220 (2011).Google Scholar

³ The Declaration states:Google Scholar

** Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [about the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.Google Scholar

** Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, principle 5, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). Note that this “safeguard clause” was reaffirmed in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. See UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (June 25, 1993). This is arguably the most famous such clause, but it is by no means exceptional. On the contrary, as James Summers has noted, “[t]he normal response in international instruments has been for an article on self-determination to be accompanied with provisions on the territorial integrity of states.” James Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations 332 (2007).Google Scholar

⁴ The Supreme Court of Canada's observations in its influential Quebec Secession Reference advisory opinion provide a tidy illustration:Google Scholar

** The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.Google Scholar

** See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 282, para. 126 (Can.). This claim is sometimes framed as one relating to the current (but not necessarily future) state of the relevant law. See, e.g., Simone F. van den Driest, Remedial Secession: A Right to External Self-Determination As a Remedy to Serious Injustices? 310-11 (2013) (“At present, the right to self-determination does not allow for unilateral secession, but rather focuses on its internal dimension and is limited by the traditional core principles of international law, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State.”) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁵ The International Court of Justice has made this point on a number of occasions, most recently in its advisory opinions on Israel's construction of the West Bank security wall and Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 171–72, para. 88 (July 9); Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 436, para. 79 (July 22).Google Scholar

⁶ See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960); see also G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960). For recent reconsideration of the context, see Pahuja, Sundhya, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth, and the Politics of Universality 80–86 (2011). See also Craven, Matthew, The Decolonization of International Law: State Succession and the Law of Treaties (2007).Google Scholar

⁷ Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State 162 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945).Google Scholar

⁸ Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law 89–90 (2d ed. 1994).Google Scholar

⁹ Crawford, James R., The Creation of States in International Law 388-89 (2d ed. 2006).Google Scholar

¹⁰ It bears noting that Crawford maintains this positivist stance despite his otherwise highly nuanced treatment of self-determination. See Crawford, James, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future, in Peoples’ Rights 7, 38 (Philip Alston ed., 2001) (“The problem with self-determination, outside the colonial context, is this: while authoritative sources speak to its existence, it is an intensely contested concept in relation to virtually every case where it is invoked”).Google Scholar

¹¹ Hence, I do not mean to suggest that all international lawyers with an interest in issues of self-determination warrant characterization as legal positivists, and that such characterization would explain their generally tepid engagement with the concept. My claim is simply that such positivism tends to inform the way in which international lawyers typically frame the concept's content and scope of application. For notable examples of non-positivistic international legal scholars who grapple with self-determination's complex articulations, see Knop, Karen, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (2002); Koskenniemi, Martti, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 241 (1994); Berman, Nathaniel, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 Wisc. Int'l L. J. 51 (1988); Simpson, Gerry, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 255 (1996). I differ from these and other scholars in my explicit concern for questions of political economy.Google Scholar

¹² Classic studies of this development (and of its various ramifications) include Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Amer. J. Int'l L. 46 (1992); Roth, Brad R., Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999); Democratic Governance and International Law (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). For recent reconsideration, see, e.g., Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (2010); d'Aspremont, Jean, 1989-2010: The Rise and Fail of Democratic Governance in International Law, in Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law: Volume 3, at 61 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012); Marks, Susan, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?, 22 Eur. J. Int'l L. 507 (2011); Buchan, Russell, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (2013). Nico Krisch has raised this point explicitly in the context of recent developments in Ukraine. See Krisch, Nico, Crimea and the Limits of International Law, EJIL Talk! (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-the-limits-of-international-law/(arguing that:Google Scholar

** [t]he more formal classical rules [on the use of force and self-determination] have come under pressure by arguments from democracy (recognizing the continued relevance of a democratic government in exile), from rights (of individuals threatened by a crisis, calling for protection and intervention) and from liberal conceptions of political choice (the right to secede as an exercise of self-determination)).Google Scholar

¹³ For what arguably remains the sharpest Marxist historical examination of self-determination claims, see Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality (2nd ed. 1992). For discussion of “economic self-determination” (including ideas about sovereignty over and free utilization of natural resources) in the context of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, see Saul, Ben, David Kinley & Jacqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials 12–132 (2014). For broader discussion of self-determination's relation to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, see Schrliver, Nico, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties 49–70 (1997).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Although it goes without saying that such nationalism frequently lies at the root of many self-determination claims.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For the purposes of this article, I include the city of Sevastopol in my discussion of Crimea. Officially a “city with special status,” and therefore distinct from Crimea under Ukrainian constitutional and administrative law, Sevastopol hosts Russia's Black Sea Fleet and has traditionally been accorded great material and symbolic importance by many Russians, not least because of its crucial role on the eastern front during the Second World War.Google Scholar

¹⁶ As is well-known, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against any state's territorial integrity and political independence, while Article 51 allows for an important exception to this prohibition in cases of individual or collective self-defense on the part of UN member states: If any such state is subject to armed attack, it may exercise its right of self-defense even before the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, has taken actions to maintain international peace and security. Charter of the United Nations with the Statute of the International Court of Justice Annexed Thereto arts. 2(4), 511 U.N.T.S. XVI (June 26, 1945).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Putin's Letter on Use of Russian Army in Ukraine Goes to Upper House, Tass Russian News Agency (Mar. 1, 2014), http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/721586; Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment in Ukraine, BBC News (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See, e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ukraine: Misinformation, Propaganda and Incitement to Hatred Need to be Urgently Countered —UN Human Rights Report (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14511&LangID=E (stating that “while there were some attacks against the ethnic Russian community, these were neither systematic nor widespread”). But see Stephen F. Cohen, The Silence of American Hawks About Kiev's Atrocities, The Nation (June 30, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/180466/silence-american-hawks-about-kievs-atrocities. As Boris Mamlyuk notes in his contribution to this issue, Russian officials and legal advisors currently appear to be attempting to develop new doctrinal tools to protect nationals and “compatriots” abroad. See Boris N. Mamlyuk, The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War II, and International Law, 16 German L.J. 479 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Significantly, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's permanent representative to the UN, appeared to make both claims before the Security Council in early March 2014. See S.C. 7124th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7124 (Mar. 1, 2014); S.C. 7125th mtg.; U.N. Doc. S/PV.7125 (Mar. 3, 2014).Google Scholar

²⁰ See the Independent International Commission on Kosovo's influential ex post facto assessment of the intervention: Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 163-98 (2000).Google Scholar

²¹ The notion of a “responsibility to protect” was first articulated in the final report of an international commission sponsored by the Canadian federal government. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). The notion has received only limited support thus far, and even then only through non-binding resolutions and related statements. See G.A. Res. 60/1, paras. 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005); S.C. Res. 1674, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Address at Event on “Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World” (July 15, 2008), http://www.un.org/sg/selected-speeches/statement_full.asp?statID=1631.Google Scholar

²² The legal status of the agreement has been questioned widely, with some going so far as to regard it as void ab initio on the grounds that it violates a jus cogens norm of territorial integrity. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Russia-Crimea Treaty, Opinio Juris (Mar. 20, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/20/guest-post-russia-crimea-treaty/.Google Scholar

²³ See, e.g., Roth, supra note 12, at 185-88; Wippman, David, Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation, in Fox & Roth, supra note 12, at 293, 297-99; Nolte, Georg, Secession and External intervention, in Secession: International Law Perspectives 65, 79–80 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006); Corten, Olivier, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law 277-87 (2010). Cf. Crawford, supra note 10, at 40–47; Gray, Christine, International Law and the Use of Force 99 (3d ed. 2008). For exaggerated criticisms that elide the continued centrality of the UN Charter's prioritization of territorial sovereignty, see Christopher J. Le Mon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 741, 743, 745 (2003) (arguing, inter alia, that “effective control” is a “dated principle” that “does not permit extensive flexibility”); Fox, Gregory H., Intervention by Invitation, in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law 816, 835 (Marc Weller ed., 2015) (insisting, rather exaggeratedly, that the UN is “Increasingly unlikely to prefer effective control to democratic legitimacy”).Google Scholar

²⁴ This was precisely one of the points that Ukraine made before the Security Council. See Letter Dated 4 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/152 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/152.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. U.S.A.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126, para. 246 (June 27) (“[I]t is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition.”).Google Scholar

²⁶ The question of whether Ukraine is a “crisis” is a very real one, as there is much to be said for the view that international responses to developments in Ukraine have confirmed— not undermined—the conventional prohibitions against unilateral military intervention and non-defensive use of force. Nevertheless, the fact that Crimea has effectively been integrated into Russia and that much of Ukraine has been transformed into the site of a Cold War-style proxy war testifies to the scale of its geopolitical repercussions and the scope of its precedential implications.Google Scholar

²⁷ For the rise of the right in post-Yanukovych Ukraine, see “Ukraine's European Discourse Does Not Correspond to Reality”: Interview with Valadymyr Ishchenka, Eurasianet (Apr. 26, 2015), http://eurasianet.es/2015/04/ukraines-european-identity-does-not-correspond-to-reality/ (last visited May 1, 2015); The Far Right Are Still the Most Visible Political Forces, Ctr. Soc. & labor Research (Dec. 9, 2014), http://cslr.org.ua/en/the-far-right-are-still-the-most-visible-political-forces/. The chief exponent of Russian “Eurasianism” is the Moscow-based neo-fascist Alexander Dugin. For a taste of his work, see Dugin, Alexander, Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism (2014). For one account of the role of “Eurasianism” in the crisis, see Snyder, Timothy, Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine, N.Y. Rev. Books (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/mar/20/fascismrussia-and-ukraine/.Google Scholar

²⁸ For the emergence and consolidation of regional “business clans,” see Sakwa, Richard, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands 60–67 (2015); cf. Sławomir Matuszak, The Oligarchic Democracy: The Influence of Business Groups on Ukrainian Politics, 42 Osrodek Studiów Wschodnich Stud. (Sept. 2012), http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2012-10-16/oligarchic-democracy-influence-business-groups-ukrainian-politics.Google Scholar

²⁹ Yatsenyuk himself is given to stressing Ukraine's “European future,” and to speaking of “the European project of Ukraine.” See, e.g., US Department of State, Press Conference of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Secretary of State John Kerry, Kiev, Ukraine (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/02/237212.htm; Arseniy Yatsenyuk in interview with Matthias Schepp & Christoph Schult, Ukrainian Prime Minister: Putin “Needs New Annexations,” Der Spiegel Online (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-ukrainian-prime-minister-arseniy-yatsenyuk-a-1009711.html.Google Scholar

³⁰ Note, though, that the latter point receives consideration in the language of the second Minsk Protocol, drafted and signed in early February 2015. For an English translation of the text, see Minsk Agreement on Ukraine Crisis: Text in Full, The Telegraph (London) (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk-agreement-on-Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html. The first Minsk Protocol, signed in September 2014, had failed to put an end to hostilities.Google Scholar

³¹ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. For commentary, see Cassese, Antonio, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 47–62, 65–66 (1995).Google Scholar

³² On the political economy of post-Soviet Russia, see Kagarlitsky, Boris, Empire of the Periphery: Russia and the World System 304-22 (Renfrey Clarke trans., 2008); The Political Economy of Russia (Neil Robinson ed., 2013); Sutela, Pekka, The Political Economy of Putin's Russia (2012). See also Pavlovsky, Gleb, Putin's World Outlook—Interview by Tom Parfitt, 88 New Left Rev. 55 (2014).Google Scholar

³³ International Energy Agency, Ukraine Energy Policy Review 2006, at 204 (2006), quoted in Margarita M. Balmaceda, the Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, And Lithuania Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure, 1992–2012, at 94 (2013).Google Scholar

³⁴ See, e.g., Tolstykh, Vladislav, Reunification of Crimea with Russia: A Russian Perspective, 13 Chin. J. Int'l L. 879, 885-86 (2014) (arguing that Crimea was returned to its “natural state” through incorporation into Russia, and that Ukraine “will not become a part of Europe or the Western world,” because “for this it would have to completely give up its language, religion, history and genetic memory”).Google Scholar

³⁵ For the “action plan,” see Russia Makes $15 Billion, Gas Discount Commitments to Ukraine, Deutsche Welle (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.dw.de/russia-makes-15-billion-gas-discount-commitments-to-ukraine/a-17303930. For the IMF's own account of its loans to Ukraine, see interview with Reza Moghadam: Ukraine Unveils Reform Program with IMF Support, IMF Survey (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/new043014a.htm; Interview with Poul Thomsen: Stabilizing Ukraine's Economy, IMF Survey (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car090214a.htm. The precise size of these loans has been the subject of some skepticism. See, e.g., Ukraine's New Boil-Out: The Austerity to Come, The Economist (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/02/ukraines-new-bail-out-0.Google Scholar

³⁶ The conditions under which any such right might be triggered “should be limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question.” Written Statement by the Russian Federation (Apr. 16, 2009), 31–32, para. 88, I.C.J. Advisory Proceedings: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&case=141&code=kos&p3=1.Google Scholar

³⁷ Putin, Vladimir, Address by President of the Russian Federation, President of Russia (Mar. 18, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. For the American position during the Kosovo proceedings on the question of whether international law regulates declarations of independence, see Written Statement of the United States of America (Apr. 17, 2009), 50–52, I.C.J. Advisory Proceedings: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&case=141&code=kos&p3=1. For some of the general implications of Putin's arguments, see also Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law 2–3, 180-84 (2015).Google Scholar

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³⁹ In 1954, no more than a decade after Stalin had ordered the deportation and massacre of large numbers of Tatars and other non-Russian inhabitants of Crimea, Soviet authorities transferred responsibility for administering the peninsula from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This put a nominal end to the authority that Russia had wielded over Crimea more or less continually since the late eighteenth century, when it had conquered a Muslim Tatar state affiliated with the Ottoman Empire. For details, see Bilinsky, Yaroslav, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II 18–19 (1964).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For discussion of support throughout the Donbass—the “Ukrainian Ruhr”—for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, an explicitly russophone party that has now effectively been dissolved, see Ararat L. Osipian & Alexandr L. Osipian, Why Donbass Votes for Yanukovych: Confronting the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, 14 Demokratizatsiya 495 (2006). On the Donbass’ economic decline in the early 1990s, see Kuromiya, Hiroaki, The Donbas—The Last Frontier of Europe?, in Europe's Last Frontier?: Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine Between Russia and the European Union 97, 103-05 (Oliver Schmidtke & Serhy Yekelchyk eds., 2008). For useful discussion of the history and politics of Ukraine's various regions, see also Mikhail A. Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations 239-43 (2002).Google Scholar

⁴¹ “We Want to Join a Russian Empire”: Discussion with the Leader of the Donetsk People's Republic, Center on Global Interests (July 8, 2014), http://www.globalinterests.org/2014/07/08/we-want-to-join-a-russian-empire-discussion-with-the-leader-of-the-donetsk-peoples-republic/. See also Grove, Thomas & Baczynska, Gabriela, East Ukraine Separatists Hold Vote To Gain Legitimacy, Promise Normalcy, Reuters (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/30/us-ukraine-crisis-east-idUSKBNOIJ22G20141030.Google Scholar

⁴² For a nuanced treatment of the pro-Russian tendencies of eastern Ukrainian “business clans,” see Kuromiya, supra note 40, at 105–07. See also Wilson, Andrew & Rontoyanni, Clelia, Security or Prosperity? Belarusian and Ukrainian Choices, in Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine 23, 39–40 (Robert Legvold & Celeste A. Wallander eds., 2004).Google Scholar

⁴³ The haste with which the Crimean referendum took place is one of the grounds upon which many have compared it unfavorably with superficially similar referendums in Scotland and Catalonia. See Simpson, Brad, Self-Determination in the Age of Putin, Foreign Policy (Mar. 21, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/21/self-determination-in-the-age-of-putin/.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Donetsk, Luhansk Leaders Hold On To Positions of Self-Determination, Tass Russian News Agency (Sept. 9, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/world/748746.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Kates, Glenn, Ukraine Separatists Plan “Summit of Unrecognized States,” Radio Free Europe (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-separatists-summit-unrecognized-states/26820366.html. Unsurprisingly, Kosovars were among the numerous groups not to be mentioned.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For a comparison of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases with that of Kosovo, partly with a view to undermining widespread claims that they are of an essentially sui generis character, see Rein Müllerson, Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 8 Chin. J. Int'l L. 2, 3–4, 24 (2009). See also Tancredi, Antonello, Neither Authorized nor Prohibited? Secession and International Law After Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 18 Ital. Y.B. Int'l l. 37 (2008); Ryngaert, Cedric & Sobrie, Sven, Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, 24 Leiden J. Int'l L. 467 (2011); Kosovo: A precedent? —The Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (James Summers ed., 2011); Self-Determination and Secession in International Law (Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg & Kavus Abushov eds., 2014). For the view that Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 is an illuminating analogue to Russia's recent actions in Crimea, see further Jure Vidmar, The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People, 16 German L.J. 365 (2015).Google Scholar

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⁴⁸ See, e.g., Dolidze, Anna, How Well Does Russia Speak the Language of international Law?, Open Democracy (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anna-dolidze/haw-well-does-russia-speak-language-of-international-law; Dolidze, Anna, The Non-Native Speakers of International Law; The Case of Russia, 15 Balt. Y.B. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2015), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523633 (last visited May 1, 2015).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ I have focused on two states (Ukraine and Russia) and one set of sub-state actors (Crimea and the self-proclaimed “people's republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk). I have done so on account of the fact that these actors have been most directly involved in the conflict in Ukraine. It goss without saying, though, that the analysis can be extended to include a variety of other actors, not least the United States and European Union.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Weitz, Eric D., Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right, 120 Amer. Hist. Rev. 462, 469 (2015). Note, though, that there is currently no genuinely persuasive genealogy of the concept of collective self-determination. Indeed, attempts to trace the concept's pedigree have tended to be rather sketchy to date. For a telling example from a doyen of international legal studies, see Brownlie, Ian, An Essay in the History of the Principle of Self-Determination, in Grotian Society Papers 1968: Studies inthe History of the Law of Nations 90 (C. H. Alexandrowicz ed., 1970).Google Scholar

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⁵² For classic discussion of this quandary, see Jennings, Ivor, The Approach to Self-Government 56 (1956) (arguing that the notion of self-determination, or “let the people decide,” is “ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people”), I do not address here any number of other criticisms that have been levelled against the concept of self-determination, particularly the notion of “peoplehood” upon which it is premised. For strong discussion of the difficulty of defining “peoples” from an especially pertinent but generally neglected perspective, see S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 100-03 (2d ed. 2004). Cf. Luis Rodriguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime (1919–1989) (2005); Coulthard, Glen Sean, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (2014). For more general discussion of the theoretical paradoxes of self-determination in constitutional and international theory, see Oklopcic, Zoran, The Idea of Early-Conflict Constitution-Making: the Conflict in Ukraine Beyond Territorial Rights and Constitutional Paradoxes, 16 German L.J. 658 (2015).Google Scholar

⁵³ Wilson began to lean upon a weak form of self-determination only after it became clear that subject nationalities were interpreting demands for representative government in stronger terms than had initially been assumed. See Cassese, supra note 31, at 14–23; cf. Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities 23–24 (1997). For a broader reconstruction of the rivalry, see Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (1964).Google Scholar

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⁵⁵ For a strong articulation of this view, see Moyn, Samuel, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 84–119 (2009).Google Scholar