Phenomena such as cloud computing, but also ambient technology, chain informatization, and social networking sites put into question the continuing applicability and relevance of existing legal frameworks, in particular the European Data Protection Directive (henceforth the DPD or the Directive), which dates back to 1995. Its framework of assigning roles of controller and processor appears to stand up no longer. It can be argued that it does not help any more in assigning responsibility for the processing of personal data. By a strict application of the DPD, the data subject can even be construed as playing the role of controller. Not only does the functioning of the principles of the roles need a reconsideration, but other essential principles, such as that of purpose-binding, require it, as well. For example, because data, which in a social networking context are disclosed to friends, are also used for targeted advertising and tailoring services, etc., the purpose-binding called for by the DPD becomes, at the very least, opaque. Furthermore, assigning responsibility to the actual processor in charge is just as unclear. Therefore, these current phenomena make clear that the conceptual foundations of the legislative frameworks, which purport to facilitate and protect privacy, require reflection.

There are many factors that influence political elections, among them, money may be the most important one. The starting point of this Article is the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. After this decision is described, the approaches of the United States and Germany in regulating political speech by campaign finance laws will be discussed, focusing on the role of companies. This Article will outline the status quo of federal American campaign finance laws (Part B). Regarding the German approach, this Article will outline the Parteiengesetz (Political Parties Act, hereinafter: Part G) and decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court, hereinafter: BVerfG) (Part C). European regulations are not the subject of this Article. Both approaches will be compared and future prospects will be given as a conclusion (Part D).

One of the prominent questions surrounding Weimar Theory of the State was that of the significance and influence of the political parties within the state. From the perspective of constitutional law, parties were as undesirable as they were an “inescapable” fact of modern statehood. They appeared to be an absolutely necessary consequence of the emancipation of all classes and social strata: Legitimation of state rule was no longer conceivable merely as a natural rule from above; on the other hand, there was no longer a unified bourgeoisie, and it thus seemed impossible for the political whole to be represented by people who felt beholden exclusively to the common weal. The homogeneous “people” had become a heterogeneous “mass.” The parties seemed to be a necessity, on the one hand, for active citizens to articulate themselves in the political system and, on the other hand, for state unity not to be torn apart by the power of a plurality of interests leaning in many different directions. Parties could therefore be conceived of as a prerequisite for state organisation: The idea of the “party state” was born. One important protagonist in the discussion on the status of parties within the state structure was the constitutional legal scholar Gerhard Leibholz (1901–1982). In Weimar times, he was the most prominent representative of party state theory (Parteienstaatslehre), and as someone who “had somehow fallen between the eras,” he also actively shaped the party state of the Bonn Republic for over twenty years (1951–1971), as a judge at the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), by significantly influencing legislation on parliamentary, party, and electoral law. His persona was therefore a particularly important bridging link between the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and even today, his theses are highly topical: “Beyond all eras, Gerhard Leibholz stands for the great tradition of German constitutional theory.”

This article examines the standard of decision-making that applies to voters. Are they free to follow their personal interests or are they bound to make decisions most beneficial to the common good? This question is answered not only for elections, i.e., for people choosing their representatives and for parliament itself appointing officials. Furthermore, the treatise extends to other votes as well, as it covers not only referenda as the paradigmatic means of lawmaking by the people, but also parliamentarian legislation.

With his “highly suggestive,” “thought-provoking” paper, The Juridical Coup d'État and the Problem of Authority, Stone Sweet initiated an ongoing debate. The paper was the object of immediate comments by three eminent legal scholars and of a response to them by Stone Sweet. Most recently, Corrias has developed on its basis a theory of constituent power now. The present article will mostly deal with those aspects of Stone Sweet's paper on which Corrias has relied.

The emergence of an independent judiciary and the associated consistent implementation of the separation of powers principle are major achievements of modern times and important characteristics of the transition to the rule of law. Against this background, any attempt at reforming the independence, control structure or liability of the judiciary must be viewed critically, because reform efforts in this area often constitute modifications to the deep layers of a legal and political system. These changes are ultimately not easy to survey and the results are difficult to control. Consequently, those who seek to touch upon the liability of judges enter a rough and sometimes even downright hostile terrain. Does such liability not inevitably lead to an impairment of judicial independence, therefore damaging the “last bulwark against the erosion of law?” Does it even perforate the traditional system of the separation of powers? Will not a circulus vitiosus in the sense of a never-ending flood of cases be created if after any legal proceedings the question of judicial liability remains to be asked (or even, from the lawyer's perspective, has to be asked to avoid recourse)? These questions can take on an even more dramatic tone and show that the area is to be treaded on lightly. Therefore, important clarifications have to be made in advance in order to put the following observations into perspective: The German judicial system is not at all a bad judicial system-the opposite is true. In a global comparison, the German system is easily able to compete with any other system in terms of speed of proceedings, judicial facilities and reputation of the courts. So then why even be concerned at all with state liability for judicial wrongs?

The goal of the European Union is not only to harmonize the different national legislations but also to create new company models. These new company models are not intended to replace the national models, but instead to offer a new and free choice to business operators in addition to the national models. It is predictable that among these models will be the European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea or SPE) regulated by the Proposal for a Council Regulation (presented by the Commission) of 25 June 2008. The other preceding European legal forms have been the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) of 1985, the European Company (SE) of 2001 and the European Cooperative Society (SCE) of 2003.

Driving licences, understood as an official authorisation issued by a State permitting a person to drive power-driven vehicles, belongs to those kinds of legal documents that can potentially significantly facilitate and enhance the free movement of persons (EU citizens) between Member States. Provided that a driving licence is duly recognized by Member States other than the State issuing the licence, the holder of the licence can move to those other Member States using his/her individual means of transport, and is entitled to use power-driven vehicles there while pursuing a large number of occupations as an employed or self-employed person. Thus, a driving licence duly recognized by the host Member State enables its holder to move, work, or conduct an economic activity there more effectively and gives the holder some additional options in that regard. Moreover, the driving licence recognized by the host Member State may be used by its holder while there to prove his/her identity and nationality as a Union citizen, and, consequently, it may serve as an equivalent of a passport or identity card. This is important insofar as the requirement to hold those latter documents (or their equivalents) is a formal prerequisite under the relevant EU legislation for Union citizens exercising their rights to enter and to reside in other Member States. The practical importance of driving licences and of the legislation concerning those issues in the EU, especially in the context of free movement of persons, is additionally reinforced by the fact that a valid driving licence is held by an estimated 60% of the Union's population, which means 300 million citizens. The EU and national legislation on driving licences has an undisputed direct impact on their lives.

This short essay seeks to introduce the phenomenological approach to law and legal decision-making, and to show the role of emotion in guiding the person applying the law. The peculiarity of the phenomenological approach-which substantially refers to the principles of Kantian epistemology-is found in the philosophical analysis of perception: Perception itself contains a specific emotional competence for evaluation, which will be disclosed to the legal context. In this context, phenomena, i.e., the contents that we perceive through our acts of perception, will be exposed as a basis for ethical decisions. Typically, when questions of legal interpretation call forth conflicts between core ethical values, it appears that the competence of a primary, intuitive judgment strongly forms our decision-making process. The phenomenological approach will thus point out the openness of a legal system towards criteria of extra-legal value judgment. Furthermore, this approach will reveal legal practitioners’ emotional competences for judgment as a source of normativity. An emotional ability to judge will finally be-in a series of examples-referred to as the last instance on our quest for justice.