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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE French political scene since the Left's historic victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1981 has been the spectacular emergence of former Prime Minister Raymond Barre as both a powerful contender for the ‘leadership’ of the Right and for the French presidency. His emergence raises a number of interrelated issues which are likely to have a profound impact in France over the next few years.
First, it has brought to the fore questions about the nature and perhaps even the very future of the Fifth Republic. The insistent refusal by Barre and his supporters to countenance cohabitation has elevated to the top of the political agenda the perennial issue of constitutional interpretation. What happens when the President of the Republic and the majority in the National Assembly are of opposed political persuasions? This has ceased to be a question of interest only to constitutional scholars but has become a reality after the March 1986 legislative elections resulted in a narrow victory for the RPR-UDF alliance. How Barre and his supporters behave in such a delicate situation is of crucial importance.
1 See Rémond, R., Les Droites en France, 2 Vols, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1982. Google Scholar And for a discussion on the difficulty of classifying Barre see by the same author L'Express, 1 November 1985.
2 For a very informative profile of Barre see ‘Aux origines de Raymond Barre’, Le Monde, 30 May 1985. Also useful is Le Débat, September—October 1983 and L’Expansion, September 1976. Two contrasting, though not very satisfactory, biographies that nonetheless contain some useful insights into his background and personality are Grendel, Frédéric, Raymond Barre ou les plumes du paon, Paris, Regines-Deforges, 1978 Google Scholar; Pellissier, Pierre, Un certain Raymond Barre, Paris, Hachette, 1977. Google Scholar
3 See Machin, H. and Wright, V., ‘Why Mitterrand Won: The French Presidential Elections of April-May 1981, West European Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1982 Google Scholar.
4 For details of the gradual development of the Barrist network see; Le Monde, 22–23 May 1983; Le Nouvel Observateur, 2 November 1984 and 12–18 July 1985; Le Point, 17 September 1984.
5 For details of the scale of support for Barre among UDF parliamentarians prior to the March 1986 legislative elections see L’Express, 29 June 1984; Le Monie, 13, 20, 23, 26 April 1985.
6 See Ysmal, C., ‘Situations de l’opposition’, Projet, 05 1982 Google Scholar; Marcus, J., ‘The Giscardian opposition between fusion and fragmentation’, The World Today, 11 1982 Google Scholar.
7 For the views of Charles Millon, the leader of the Barrist faction in the PR, and Pierre Mehaignerie, leader of the CDS, see Le Monde, 11 August 1984.
8 For example CDS leaders consulted Barre and heeded his advice that they should accept only ‘technical’ and not politically sensitive ministerial posts in the Chirac Government. For details see Le Monde, 18, 19, 20, 25 March and 9 April 1986.
9 For details see Le Monde, 6 September 1984.
10 See Le Nouvel Observateur, 20–26 December 1985. For a stimulating analysis of the poor image of parties in France see Chariot, J., ‘La transformation de l’image des partis poliriques français’, Revue Franchise de Science Politique, No. 1, Vol. 36, 1986 Google Scholar.
11 See L’Express, 9 August 1985; Le Point, 25 February 1985, and 2 December 1985.
12 See L’Express, 5 October 1984.
13 See Le Nouvel Economiste 23 August 1985 also L’Express, 5 October 1984 and 31 January 1986.
14 See Le Point, 17 September 1984, and 17 February, 1986.
15 See Le Point, 2 September, 28 October, 25 November, 9 December 1985 and 20 January, 10 February, 3 March 1986. See also he Nouvel Observateur, 12–18 July 1985.
16 See Le Point, 25 February 1985.
17 For his views on the constitution see R. Barre, Réflexions pour demain, Hachette, 1984 and Faits et Arguments, February 1986.
18 See France Soir, 30 January 1985.
19 See Fails et Arguments, February 1986.
20 See R. Barre ‘La France en Difficulté’, La Revue des Deux Mondes, February 1985.
21 See he Monde, 6 November 1984.
22 See ‘R. Barre au Déjeuner de “La Revue’”, La Revue des Deux Mondes, November 1985.
23 Barre defines his liberalism in the following manner; ‘Mon libéralisme est d’abord intellectuel, social et politique. Si vous entendez par libéralisme economique la gestion decentralisee d’une economie moderne… , alors vous pouvez dire que je suis liberal’. However, he qualifies his liberal convictions by adding that while ‘ma philosophic est liberale, ma gestion est réaliste’. See Lebacqz, A., ‘Raymond Barre, un nouveau Poincaré?’, in La Revue des Deux Mondes, 05 1985 Google Scholar.
24 Ibid., p. 419.
25 See he Monde, 5 June and 30 October 1985.
26 See Le Monde, 17 December 1985.
27 See Paris Match, 28 February 1986 and Le Monde, 17 December 1985.
28 For example, in the Yvelines, Ain, Marne départements and Paris. Such poor results were surprising for during 1985 there were indications that had Barre decided to go it alone by fielding his own electoral lists in each département they would have obtained very good results. Although the results were disappointing for Barre and his supporters, his influence on proceedings in the National Assembly and on government policies is likely to be far from negligible for he can count on the support of 40—50 deputies. For details of legislative and regional election results see Le Monde, 18 March 1986.
29 Barre’s rejection of cohabitation was clearly not shared by the electorate. A Sofres opinion poll for Le Monde found that only 21% of those polled agreed with Barre that under no circumstances should the UDF-RPR. form a government while Mitterrand remained President. For details see Le Monde, 8 March 1986. His refusal to accept Giscard's invitation to attend a rally of opposition leaders in Clermont-Ferrand also lost him support. See Le Nouvel Observateur, 7–13 March 1986.
30 See La Vie Française, 25 January 1987 and Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 January 1987.
* For comments on the various drafts of this article, my thanks go to Professor J. E. S. Hayward, T. P. McNeill and Dr P. Norton of the University of Hull.