Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
During Recent Years, The Notion of The Democratic deficit has become, together with subsidiarity, or transparency, one of the most popdar subjects for conferences on European Union. While almost everyone seems to agree that a democratic deficit exists, it is far from certain that there is a general understanding of what is meant by it.
The most radical meaning would be that the European Union (EU) as such is undemocratic and that its decision-making does not correspond to democratic norms. Quite often when national governments have to explain unpopular decisions of the EU, responsibility for these uncomfortable situations is attributed to a faceless monster, the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. The assumption is that a very strong central authority exists which embodies the power of decision-making and that democratic accountability of this central authority either does not exist or at least is not sufficiently guaranteed. In other words, the EU institutional system does not comply with democratic norms. This is by far the most extreme definition of a democratic deficit.
1 See in more detail my contribution, ‘The Syndrome of Democratic Deficit in the European Community’ in Parry, Geraint (ed.), Politics in an Interdependent World, Hants, Edward Elgar, 1994 Google Scholar.
2 See Schmuck, Otto and Wessels, Wolfgang (eds), Das Eunpdischt Parlamtnt im djmamischtn Inttgratumsprousi–Aufdtr Sueht nach arum ztilgtmassm Ltitbild, Bonn, 1989 Google Scholar.
3 I follow in this the excellent presentation by Ge’rard Laprat, ‘Lei Parlaments nationaux et l’ilaboration de la nonse communautaire’, Rout du Mareht Common, Oct. 1991.
4 Brittan, Leon, Europe–The Europe Wt Need, London, 1994.Google Scholar
5 ibid., p. 227.
6 Doc. PE 150.961/BUR/fin.
7 See Weiler, Joseph H. H., ‘Parlement européen, intégration européene et légitimité’, in Louis, Jean-Victor and Waelbroeck, Denis (eds), Le Parlement européen dans ľévolution institutionelle, Bruges, 1988 Google Scholar.