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The Domestic Sources of European Anti‐Americanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Sergio Fabbrini
Sergio Fabbrini*
Affiliation:
University of Trento, Italy
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Extract

The Terrorist Attacks In New York And Washington Dc On 11 September 2001, and the killing of thousands of people were not sufficient to dispel a mood of suspicion in European public opinion towards America. Of course, during the very first days after the attack, there was widespread grief and sorrow about the event among Europeans. But, as soon as discussion on the right strategy to pursu to combat terrorism began, the initial mood of identification with America started to change. And when America, although backed by a large international coalition and legitimated by two UN resolutions, moved towards an armed intervention in Afghanistan, European anti-Americanism emerged again. Thus, during the armed intervention in Afghanistan, especially when the bombing led to the death of innocent victims, a social mobilization against the American war grew day after day, with its critics apparently losing sight of the fact that a dramatic terrorist attack on America had recently taken place.

The interesting question is why does anti-Americanism re-emerge regularly in large sections of European public opinion? This intermittent Anti-Americanism appears more in southern and continental Europe, than in the northern British Isles and Scandinavia, where it is outdone by a more vociferous anti-Europeanism. In the latter countries, anti-Americanism takes the form of uneasiness with the United States. In fact, in spite of Britain's traditional special relationship with the United States, the fact cannot be denied that post-war British elites grudgingly accept their inferior status in that special relationship. But, of course, frustration with America is not the same as anger towards America. In any case, in (continental) Europe, anti- Americanism seems to be one of the few public philosophies that can unite large sections of the left, the right and the Catholic Church. It is a public philosophy which emerges especially in periods of war (and of international crisis in general).

Type
Original Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , January 2002 , pp. 3 - 14
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2002

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References

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2 The article, originally published in Le Monde, was extensively quoted by Frank Viviano, ‘Bitter Debate in Europe on US Role. Washington’s Dominance of Nato Creates Waves of Anti-Americanism’, San Francisco Chronicle, 15 April 1999.

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6 Consider the tragedy which occurred in the Italian ski station of Cermis (Cavalese, Trentino) in 1997 (when an American airforce plane deliberately flying off course sliced through the cables of a cabin-car carrying skiers, causing dozens of deaths and injuries). The Italian press, besides rightly criticizing the unjust sentence handed down by an American court martial in 1999, which cleared the pilots of serious offences, repeatedly attacked President Clinton for not keeping his promise of compensation to the families of the victims (the relative item of expenditure had been cut by the Congress budget committee). The press was entirely ignorant of the fact that the American budget is decided by the House of Representatives (and not by the president, nor by the other branch of the legislature, the Senate), and also that the House was controlled (when the decision was taken) by the rival party to the president’s. In short, the outcry was justified, but not the ignorance of the basic notions of the separation of powers that accompanied it.

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