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Prospects for Democracy in Zambia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Keith Panter-Brick
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Extract

The Success of The Movement For Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) is too recent an event to permit any firm assessment of changes taking place in the Zambian political system. These are, however, probably weighted in favour of a more democratic regime. A situation has arisen in which the powers of the President and those of a parliamentary opposition hang in the balance. In Africa presidents have tended to gain the upper hand but this may prove not to be the case in Zambia.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , 01 April 1994 , pp. 231 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1994

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References

1 Notably, General Temba, arrested in 1988 on charges or treason, and Lt Luchemba, instigator of the June 1990 scare.

2 It was reduced in size by half and several of its leading members were dropped.

3 The state of emergency dated from July 1964. It had been extended by the National Assembly for successive periods of six months until 1969 when a constitutional amendment – the Constitution (Amendment) No. 5 Act, No. 33 of 1969 – authorized its continuation for an indefinite period.

4 Notably the paramount chiefs of the Bemba and the Lozi.

5 The Supreme Court quashed this injunction two days before the election.

6 Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act 1990, Act No. 20 of 1990. This repealed 1.4 of the 1973 Constitution and increased the number of elected MPs from 125 to 150.

7 Report of the Constitutional Commission, Government White Paper No. 2 of 1991. The chairman was Professor P. Mvunga.

8 Most politically sensitive appointments, eg. senior judges, the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Auditor-General, the Secretary to the Cabinet, are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The National Assembly may refuse to ratify the President’s first choice; likewise a second choice. Any third choice is ipso facto valid. See Constitution of Zambia 1991, s.44 (4).

9 The Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 and the Electoral Act 1991 (Acts 1 and 2 of 1991).

10 The deputy Chief Justice was appointed chairman. Of the other two members, one resigned and was not replaced.

11 See the specimen ballot paper reproduced in Presidential and national assembly elections in Zambia, 31 October 1991: the report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 1992.

12 See Bjomlund, E., Bratton, M. and Gibson, C., ‘Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa; Lessons from Zambia, African Affairs, 1992.Google Scholar

13 Kaunda may have been encouraged by the fact that there had been a change of chairman at ZIMT. The original chairman, Richard Chongwe, had resigned on being elected to a senior position in the MMD. He had been replaced by David Phiri, an administrator known to enjoy good relations with Kaunda.

14 ZEMCC’s sponsors were the Zambia Episcopal Conference, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, the Christian Council of Zambia, the Law Association, the National Women’s Lobby Group, the Press Association of Zambia, and die University of Zambia Students’ Union.

15 See The October 31st, 1991 Motional Elections in Zambia., The Caner Center of Emory University and The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1992.

16 Compare the comment ‘President Kaunda recognized that a UNIP victory would be met in all likelihood, with popular incredulity and civil unrest. He therefore came reluctantly to regard the imprimatur of election observers as the essential ingredient to his own peaceful reinstallation’, Eric Bjornlund et ah, pp. 424, footnote 41.

17 See the extensive comment in Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, Vol. 5, No. 11, August 1992. In March 1992, a Caucus for National Unity had been formed by some members of MMD, to bring pressure on the government. It called for a reduction in the powers of the president, the dismissal of ministers ‘of questionable integrity’ and a more equitable ethnic representation in government. See Africa South, June 1992 and also Africa Economist, Vol. 5, No. 3, June/July 1992.

18 I am grateful to Professor Tordoff and Dr Young of Manchester University. Their readiness to provide information and comments was much appreciated.