THE ELECTION OF SALVADOR ALLENDE AS PRESIDENT OF CHILE IN 1970 awoke world-wide interest. He obtained executive power at the head of an electoral coalition whose chief members were the Chilean Socialist and Communist Parties and he entered upon his term of oflice dedicated to finding a ‘Chilean Way to Socialism’ that would entail a continuing observance of Chile's well established constitutional traditions.

The peaceful election of a government led by a self-styled ‘Marxist-Leninist’ and containing two strong avowedly Marxist parties was in itself the cause of comment. Still more interest was aroused by the government's declared intention of conducting a revolution within the framework of a ‘liberal-constitutional’ system of government.

THE CHILEAN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE HAS MORE THAN enough characteristics to arouse admiration amongst those who support it and astonishment or scepticism among everyone else. A rapid glance backwards is enough to establish that their non-institutional legitimation is a factor common to practically all revolutions, ancient or modern. To such a point that political theory has devised the category of revolutionuy legitimation in order to compare it with other (religious, dynastic, historical, democratic etc.) categories. Revolutionary movements have always sought justification of their raison d'être in the causes or goals which have motivated them. Usually these goals have been in conflict with those forming the bases of the pre-existing system of political institutions. Hence revolution seems to be associated with conflict against institutionalism, and the triumph of the revolution seems to have involved the institutional collapse of the former regime.

WE PROPOSE TO ANALYSE HERE SOME OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS POSED by the attempt to pursue ‘the Chilean road to socialism’, and in particular to assess the possibilities of successfully following this path within the political and constitutional framework in being when Allende became president, always bearing in mind that he came to power with the support of 36·3% (or little more than one third) of the popular vote. It is necessary first to discuss the constitutional system, the background to the 1970 election and the election campaign. This will serve to place Allende and his coalition in proper perspective. Subsequently we will attempt to analyse the legal and political resources at Allende's disposal after his election in order to see if the powers these gave him were sufficient for the Unidad Popular to honour its commitments and the alternative strategies he could have pursued when and if these resources proved insufficient. Finally, there will be some discussion of the present state of the Unidad Popular, and its future prospects.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT CHILEAN POLITICAL PROCESS MAY serve to underline some features of the Marxist theory of the state and of the relationship between social classes and institutional structures. Few countries offer such a clear example as Chile of the impact of the elements forming the ideological superstructure on the social and economic mechanisms which operate at the level of the infrastructure. Its long, bourgeois democratic tradition has led to the accumulation of many juridical and institutional elements, to which formal respect has been given, and which have built up a system of domination thanks to the acquiescence of other social sectors. The achievement of a high degree of consensus had been the other side of the face of a weak bourgeoisie, and in the blind logic of weak dominant classes, they have transformed their superstructure into their Achilles's heel. For the Chilean political process has shown how political power can transform itself into an instrument which will destroy the unity of the institutionalized power structure of the bourgeois state, when it is controlled by an alliance of social forces which escape the influence of the dominant class and its allies.

A SURVEY OF THE HEADLINES IN THE CHILEAN PRESS DURING THE first year of the Unidad Popular (UP) government might give the unwary observer the impression that the period has been characterized by a succession of subversive plots. Conspiracy theories have abounded and dramatic public announcements (like modern ceremonies of exorcism), have marked the official recognition of each theory while presaging its prompt disappearance from the front pages of the newspapers and from the view of an increasingly sceptical populace.

Events over the past year more than justify the alarm of the UP. The ‘peaceful road to socialism’ has been obstructed by the activities of groups of the extreme left and the extreme right which have each committed one major political assasination.

IS MITTERAND ANOTHER ALLENDE? WOULD BERLINGUER, ONCE IN power, observe the constitutional rules of the game as carefully as the Chilean communists? Is the Chilean road to power likely to provide a model for the accession to power of Communist Parties in other countries, notably France and Italy, where these parties command a sizeable electoral following, and where they could, as in France, since 27 June 1972, form part of an electoral, and subsequently of a governmental, coalition with the socialist parties and other left-wing parties or wings of parties? Such questions are bound to occur.

It will have been noticed from the present collection of essays by Chilean political scientists and politicians, that the Chileans themselves do not indulge in such prognostications. On the contrary, President Allende's maxim that ‘Our revolution is not for export’ seems to represent the majority opinion in Chile. It is in Latin Europe, rather than in Latin America that the evolution of the Chilean experiment is watched with mixed hopes and fears.