While opposition parties are expected to challenge the government and present alternatives, they often support government legislation. Synthesizing key theoretical explanations, this study examines how opposition parties weigh their goals of winning the next elections, joining or replacing the government and influencing policy. It is hypothesized that opposition parties are more likely to oppose bills when they see chances for boosting their electoral prospects or an early government alternation. Conversely, they support bills when they see chances for future coalition cooperation or policy influence. The analyses of parliamentary votes across four established democracies – Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – over 75 years, show that opposition parties strategically prioritize these goals based on bill-specific factors and the institutional context. Most innovatively, office-seeking opposition parties’ strategic behaviour depends on the patterns of government alternation. These findings offer crucial insights into the complex trade-offs opposition parties navigate in parliament.

Political parties in EU member states are situated in a complex multilevel polity, having to engage with their domestic political reality together with EU politics and international linkages with fellow European parties. But how do these parties organize? This research intends to understand how competing, though not mutually exclusive logics of political behaviour can help explain the variations in how parties apprehend this multilevel context. Relying on a rich empirical strategy with 68 semi-structured interviews with European and national party elites in 19 national political parties from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, supplemented by a party statutes investigation and data gathering in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we conduct a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). It starts from the broad assumption that parties’ multilevel organization needs to be contextually understood, relying on both past and current party dynamics, as well as the actions of the (senior) individuals populating party organizations. Our analysis shows that parties’ different multilevel organization is the result of an interaction between various factors, crucially party genetics and individual agency.

Recent crises have raised concerns about intergenerational fairness and conflict and claims that older generations imperil the future of young people. These arguments may reflect the political intolerance towards older adults: political ageism. Why and which kinds of young people are more likely to adhere to such views is still uncertain. Prior studies refer to the importance of perceived threats and authoritarian values. We introduce an interaction effect, suggesting that perceived threats temper the impact of authoritarian values on intergenerational blame attribution and discriminatory views against older individuals’ political rights. The analysis of survey data from nine European countries, focusing on respondents aged 18–34, reveals that perceived economic threat rarely relates to increased ageism. Young individuals with authoritarian values are likelier to attribute intergenerational blame and hold politically ageist views. In Sweden and the UK, however, the effect of authoritarian values diminishes when young people perceive economic threats.

Do citizens prefer national policies that are designed collaboratively over those produced by national government alone? The question is relevant, especially in Latin America, where citizens are sceptical of government’s capacity to address complex problems. In this article, we hypothesize that collaboratively crafted policies will be preferred over those produced by government alone in Argentina and Chile. We design conjoint experiments that ask respondents to choose among three pairs of policies, each of which varies randomly in terms of whether and with whom the government collaborates. We find that citizens in both countries tend to prefer collaboratively produced policies. This is especially the case when citizens have higher levels of trust in the actors with whom the national government collaborates. One important insight of our study is that, despite the costs of collaborative approaches to policymaking, citizen preferences for it could incentivize national governments to invest more resources in collaborative governance.

We theorize party attention to gender issues within the responsibility-versus-responsiveness framework, deriving and testing novel hypotheses in six Western Balkan countries (2012–2021) that aspire to European Union (EU) membership. We analyse gender-related responsibility in European Commission (EC) recommendations and examine party discourse to assess whether, how and to what extent parties and the EC align under conditions of supportive/opposing public opinion (responsiveness). Generally, attention to gender issues is low, especially on controversial topics like LGBTIQ+ rights (‘thick’ gender equality), compared to broadly accepted women’s rights (‘thin’ gender equality). Governing status influences attention to ‘thin’ gender issues, while ‘thick’ issues are highlighted mainly by green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) opposition parties. Our study advances knowledge of how public opinion, governing/opposition status and party ideology shape party attention to gender issues in aspiring EU members.

Public attitude surveys provide invaluable insights into societal views on women’s rights, democracy and other critical issues. However, many research studies do not account for biases introduced by the gender of the interviewer, which can distort estimates of public opinion and key relationships among covariates of interest. This article examines gender-of-interviewer effects on public support for women’s rights to work, own and inherit land, as well as support for democracy and feelings of closeness to opposition (versus ruling) parties, using Afrobarometer data from 34 African countries. In line with prevailing conservative social norms in Africa, the analysis reveals significant gender-of-interviewer effects, with respondents reporting more gender-unequal attitudes when interviewed by male interviewers. Additionally, gender-of-interviewer effects appear in responses to questions on support for democracy and feelings of closeness to opposition (versus ruling) parties, with respondents more likely to voice pro-democratic attitudes and close affiliation with opposition parties to male interviewers, regardless of their own gender. These findings highlight the importance of accounting for such biases to ensure the validity of public opinion research and analyses based on these political variables.

Populist radical right parties across Europe have consistently capitalized on refugee crises to advance anti-immigrant agendas. By employing extensive content analysis of social media posts from February 2022, the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war, to March 2023, this article examines how Bulgarian, Czech, German and Polish populist radical right actors discursively contest and reinvent the legitimacy of Ukrainian war refugees. Two dominant narratives emerge. First, radical right politicians assessed the legitimacy of seeking refuge based on ethnicity, reasons for flight and gender, initially welcoming Ukrainians as vulnerable Europeans who needed immediate protection. Second, radical right rhetoric quickly endorses nativist connotations. Despite their cultural proximity, war refugees are now portrayed as an imminent threat to security, welfare and national identity. This study sheds light on the consistency of the discursive tactics populist radical right parties employ when shaping public opinion on solidarity, national identity, immigration and foreign policy.

A two-dimensional ‘basic structure’ of economic and cultural dimensions has often been used as a master frame to interpret party system change in Europe. This article questions whether such a common model of political dimensionality exists on the demand side as well. Using data from eight European democracies, this article shows that the dimensionality of voter attitudes is similar across Europe – that is, composed of comparable cultural and economic issue dimensions. However, the findings also reveal that the positioning of voters and socio-structural groups within this shared dimensional structure remains dependent on the national political context and the structure of the corresponding party system. Substantively, the study thus concludes that European political spaces are largely similar in their ‘dimensionality’ but more different in their ‘structuring’. By highlighting this distinction, the article expands extant knowledge of political structuration across Europe.

The recent rise of authoritarian populist and far-right parties in Western democracies has raised concerns about democratic stability in these countries. While existing research often focuses on electoral outcomes, we argue this approach inadequately captures citizens’ regime preferences due to the complexities of electoral processes and national politics. To address this limitation, we examine the relationship between immigration and regime preferences through a democratization framework using structural equation modelling across 17 established Western democracies between 2008 and 2020. Our findings reveal a positive association between immigrant population rates, individuals’ authoritarian predisposition and anti-immigrant sentiments, with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes correlating with increased support for authoritarian governance models such as dictatorship and army rule. This relationship appears particularly pronounced among individuals with low authoritarian predispositions, underscoring the mobilizing effect of immigration. This research offers insights into the recent political landscape in Western democracies, contributing to debates on democratic resilience and challenges posed by changing demographics.

The ‘inclusion–moderation thesis’ suggests that populist parties will be tamed by government inclusion. However, empirical evidence is mixed. We argue that this may be explained by different strategic contexts. We hypothesize that populist parties that rely on coalition partners will reduce their populist communication when they have credible government prospects. We analyse multiple years of political communication by two radical-right populist parties, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Although the two parties are rather similar ideologically, this is a most different systems design (MDSD). While the SVP is a typical governing party that was only in opposition once (2007/2008), the FPÖ is typically in opposition, with recent government experience (2017–2019). This empirical analysis focuses on these crucial periods. We find evidence of moderation before joining government for both parties in our pooled analysis. However, individual analyses suggest that this was much clearer for the SVP.

This article analyses the political speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán between 2014 and 2023 by applying the ‘ideational approach’. Questioning the description of Orbán as a politician whose career represents nothing but opportunism and kleptocracy, the article argues that his politics are driven and underpinned by an illiberal political ideology. Examining how Orbán conceptualizes illiberalism in the realms of (1) Hungarian domestic politics; (2) foreign and global politics; and (3) cultural politics (understood in the Gramscian sense as a battle for fundamental values), this article offers a systematic analysis of Hungarian illiberalism and of the interrelations of its main ideological components. The article also examines how and why Orbán portrays himself not only as the authentic voice of the Hungarian people, but also simultaneously as the genuine representative of original Europeanness.

Democracy requires responsiveness. While empirical responsiveness research tends to focus on opinion polls, there are other ways elites listen to public opinion. Therefore, we need to examine those forms of public opinion that elites see and hear. This is explored through a dataset of letters to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, coded consistent with the Comparative Agendas Project. I find evidence of deliberate, systemic non-responsiveness in the political agenda (measured by the topics of Mr Howard’s speeches) to the volume of letters. Mr Howard knowingly, deliberately ignored this public opinion. There are, however, indications that the topics of the letters are responding to government announcements. The findings highlight the selective nature of elite engagement with public opinion. The study contributes to understanding political agenda-setting, representation and the institutional conditions under which public input is ignored. These results have implications for theories of representation and responsiveness in policymaking.

If elections are fair and free, citizens should accept their results regardless of the party or candidate they voted for. The evaluation of democracy should not be tainted by ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ an election. However, research on ‘losers’ consent’ has demonstrated that winners evaluate the functioning of democracy more positively than losers. We argue that the effect of losing is even more pronounced for populist voters. For them, winning and losing is indicative of the functioning of the democratic system itself. To demonstrate this, we use cross-sectional data from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems as well as panel data from Germany and the Netherlands for longitudinal analysis. We show that the more populist a citizen is, the stronger the effect losing is on the level of satisfaction with democracy.

This article contributes to the ongoing debate on populist radical-right parties in power and illiberalism, focusing on the Italian League and its welfare chauvinist agenda. It consists of ethnographic research conducted in a medium-sized city located in one of the party’s electoral strongholds. During its term in municipal office, the party changed the regulation on school services (buses and canteens), requiring non-EU families to present additional documentation in order to access reduced charges. The ‘canteens affair’ provoked the exclusion of immigrant children from the services, a strong mobilization of local civil society, an echo in the international media and a legal dispute between a civic committee and the League’s administration. Starting from this specific case, the article sheds new empirical light on the illiberal turn of Western democratic systems, understood as the progressive erosion of liberal-democratic principles of universalism and equality.

This article examines populist challenges to democracy and liberalism in contemporary Europe through the eyes of populist opponents. It does not assume that populist parties necessarily threaten liberal democracy but shows that, for many, fear of this threat is a mobilizing force. Content analysis of data on justifications of initiatives opposing populist parties in Hungary, Poland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Denmark examines the prevalence of opposition frames defining populism as ‘democratic illiberalism’ or as a ‘threat to liberal democracy’, and demonizing, delegitimizing ‘anti-populist’ frames. Analysis shows the Populism as Democratic Illiberalism and Anti-Populist opposition frames were more prevalent than the Populism as Threat to Liberal Democracy frame. It further shows that populist success in hybrid democracies could be an explanation for the higher prevalence of the Democratic Illiberalism frame in some cases, and that ideological illiberalism and the polarizing practice of cooperation with populist parties in government could explain the higher prevalence of the Anti-Populist frame.

Current scholarship conceives of courts as victims or targets of populist authoritarians. But can empowered courts facilitate democratic backsliding? This article develops a new framework for understanding the approaches judiciaries take when tackling political corruption and argues that when judges attempt to replace ‘corrupted’ elected branches as the primary representative institution, their actions and rhetoric can enable populist authoritarians to seize power, raising the risk of democratic backsliding. I combine jurisprudence, newspaper archives and interviews to trace the process through which Pakistan’s Supreme Court, committed to playing a representation-replacement role, enabled the military-backed populist Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf to come to power in 2018, and use its powers to reverse Pakistan’s democratic transition. I also probe the political impact of anti-corruption jurisprudence in more established democracies. In doing so, I introduce a typology for understanding approaches courts take when combating corruption, and highlight the threat to democracy that can emerge from judiciaries.

Why do business allies (not) defect from authoritarian regimes? An emerging scholarship shows that connected businesses face high political risk, and the autocrat can financially pressure business allies during economic crises. And yet, despite their disruptive power, the business elite rarely switch to opposition. I argue that this unexpected loyalty does not always stem from credible power-sharing. The more material quid pro quo the business elite engage in with the dictator, the less they can credibly threaten the dictator with defection. I present a bargaining game between the dictatorship and its business allies and test it using a country-year-level dataset of 76 countries for 1992–2019. The results indicate that higher degrees of patrimonial co-optation lower the risk of business opposition. This effect is partly mediated through the government’s control over the media landscape. These findings suggest that even informal, non-institutional tools of co-optation can effectively deter defection.

Moments of heightened violence and war in Palestine have often elicited extraordinary regime and opposition reactions in Arab states, including large-scale popular protests that are otherwise rare in such authoritarian contexts. This article examines how foreign policy influences domestic political opposition under authoritarianism. We approach this relationship combining classical insights from foreign policy analysis (FPA) with our own theorization of opposition as a tri-dimensional political space – as the dynamic product of intersecting institutional, practical and discursive spaces. Empirically, we capture such complexity through an exploratory, in-depth case study focusing on Morocco and, specifically, on the expressions and reconfigurations of its opposition movements in response to Israel’s wars on Gaza (2008–2009 and 2023–2025). Drawing on interviews conducted between 2007 and 2024 as well as official statements and press releases, these two episodes shed light on the consequences of both time-bound foreign policy shocks and more gradual, structural foreign policy transformations.

How did populist governments handle the COVID-19 pandemic? Did they act as erratic, irrational and unsound – in short: ‘populist’ – as observers expected them to do? Through which social policies did they respond to the hardships caused by the pandemic? And, what does populist governance explain about these governments’ social policies? This article explores these questions through a comparative analysis of a diverse set of six populist governments. We first conceptualize, operationalize and measure populist governance by constructing a novel Populist Governance Index. Second, we describe and measure governments’ welfare policies through a novel Social Policy Response Index. Third, we relate social policy responses to variations in populist governance across countries. Our mixed-method study suggests that populism explains the politics rather than the policies of populist governments. We conclude that this is the case because populism fundamentally defines a mode of governance rather than policy content

Do populist politicians use simpler language to get closer to ‘ordinary’ citizens? Current studies – both qualitative and quantitative – are divided on whether populist actors actually use simpler language. Analysing a large corpus of text of German parliamentary debates from January 1991 to September 2021, this article aims to resolve this controversy by measuring language complexity in parliamentary discourse. The article hypothesizes that populist actors use simpler language, following their ideal of a simplified world between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. The analysis, however, positively refutes that, and instead shows that right-wing populist actors use the most complex language. Left-wing populists seem to use somewhat average language complexity. At the same time, the study finds that language complexity decreased significantly in the German parliament over time. Additionally, this article shows that language complexity is context-specific and people-dependent. As such, this article also discusses simple language as a tool for substantive and surrogate representation.