Green parties promote decentralization as a functional organizing principle but also a normative goal. This has been most vividly realized through the creation of comparatively devolved party structures. In federations, this can assume a territorial dimension and may lead to the adoption of confederal or federal models of party organization. Surprisingly little work has been undertaken on these arrangements when they have been implemented by green parties. This article explores whether the normative commitment by green parties to decentralized party arrangements is sufficient to preserve the integrity of dispersed party structures. This is done by examining the Australian Greens. We find that there has been gradual growth of the party’s national stratum, even in spite of formal provisions which guarantee the autonomy of the state organizations. It is argued that one of the main agents driving this outcome has been the Greens’ expanding federal parliamentary wing.

In the last few decades, ethno-regionalist parties have become leading players in many regional political systems across Europe. This increased representation has opened up new strategic opportunities for these parties, and in particular it has offered them the chance to participate in regional government. Based on a newly compiled data set of 282 governmental formations in Italian and Spanish regions during the period 1945–2011, this study develops and tests several hypotheses regarding the governmental participation of ethno-regionalist parties at regional level. These have been partly drawn from similar studies of ‘outsider’ party families, such as the Green parties or the radical right. A specific focus is then placed on multilevel dynamics, based on the idea that there is a relationship between party strategies at regional and state levels, and in particular on the perception that parties are willing to adopt compatible alliance strategies at the two levels (vertical congruence), at least under certain conditions. Both types of hypothesis (single-level and multilevel) are shown to be plausible when empirically tested on the cases of Italy and Spain. Special attention is given to the conditions under which vertical congruence is used by ethno-regionalist parties as an effective way of minimizing the risks associated with inclusion in governmental coalitions at regional level.

This article examines the effect that municipality size and local office have on election candidates’ results. We argue that candidates from the larger municipalities have comparatively larger relevant networks, both in terms of constituents and party grassroots volunteers. In addition, these candidates appeal to a relatively larger share of voters within the constituency. We expect that the relative size of the candidates’ municipality will have a positive effect on the relative number of preferential votes they receive in the constituency and will interact with the effect that holding local office has on the individual election result. While the empirical analysis does not show support for the idea that municipality size will have a significant effect, the expected interaction between local office and municipality size is confirmed. The electoral advantage of being mayor, alderman or local councillor seems to increase with the relative size of the municipality in the district.

How is it that the Swedish populist nationalist party the Sweden Democrats receives its strongest support from the established working class, in spite of the high degree of class voting and left–right mobilization which is known to characterize Swedish politics? Based on surveys from the SOM (Society, Opinion, Media) Institute as well as the Swedish National Elections Studies, this article shows that this is not a result of increasing anti-immigrant attitudes in the working class or of decreasing left–right polarization among voters. Rather, we present the argument that the weakening alignment between the working class and the Social Democratic Party and the weakened left–right polarization between the main parties have created a structure which has left room for a realignment between large parts of the working class and the Sweden Democrats along the alternative underlying ideological dimension of authoritarianism/libertarianism.

Although semi-presidentialism is a popular form of governance in new democracies, we have little empirical evidence supporting its popularity. In this study, I attempt to reassess democratic performance of new semi-presidential regimes from 1974 to 2009 as a function of four broadly cited risk factors: divided minority government, cohabitation, presidential powers and president-parliamentarism. The results are more encouraging than previous research has suggested. First, divided minority government is positively associated with higher levels of democracy, even though it, along with a strong presidency and president-parliamentarism, makes executive instability more likely. Second, perils of cohabitation are not substantiated with regard to executive instability and quality of democracy. Third, none of the caveats against semi-presidential systems makes them more vulnerable to democratic breakdown. However, a failure to check presidential powers appears to be a serious risk for semi-presidentialism. As presidents enjoy more powers, the levels of democracy tend to decrease. This finding has a substantive implication for countries that already practise semi-presidential governance or contemplate a move in that direction: checking presidential powers is critical to facilitate democratic consolidation in semi-presidentialism.