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Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

Extract

On two previous occasions I tried to show how neither Plato nor Aristotle held that God was unknowable, ineffable, and unnameable, how the tentative objections against the unknowability of the ideas raised in the Parmenides and Sophist are answered by Aristotle, how in the extant literature of Greek philosophy prior to Philo there is no conception of a God who is unknowable and unnameable and ineffable, how Philo arrived at the conception of an unknowable, ineffable, and unnameable God, how he may have meant it to be either an interpretation of Plato or something in opposition to him, and how the description of God as ineffable found in Albinus and Plotinus may have been due to the influence of Philo. We may add here that, though Plotinus attributes his conception of a hierarchy of three hypostases to Parmenides as reported by Plato and though it is also to that Parmenides that he may refer by the pronoun “he” in his statement, “he says that it (the One) cannot be spoken (ῥητòν) or described (γραπτóν),” neither the views which he attributes to Plato nor the language which he quotes from him are those of Plato. They are rather those of older interpreters of Plato, and among them Philo is to be included.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1952

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References

1 “The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 5657 (1947), 233249CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Ibid., pp. 239–249.

3 Cf. Philo, II, pp. 113–117.

4 Ibid., II, pp. 118–126.

5 Ibid., II, pp. 117–118; 112–113.

6 Ibid., II, pp. 158–160.

7 Enn., V, I, 8 (23–27). The numbers within parentheses in the references to the Enneads are to the numbered lines in E. Bréhier's edition (Plotin: Ennéades, 1924–1938).

8 Ibid., VI, 9, 4 (11–12); cf. Parmenides 142A. (In Philo, II, p. 160, n. 78, and p. 484, this reference to the Enneads is misprinted “V, 9, 4”).

9 Cf. É. Bréhier, Plotin: Ennéades, V, p. 13; VI, 2, p. 176, n. 1; A. E. Taylor, The Parmenides of Plato, pp. 145 ff.; E. R. Dodds, “The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic ‘One,’” The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), pp. 129–142; A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, pp. 14–28.

10 It is only fair to warn the reader that there are scholars who believe with E. R. Dodds that “that Plotinus himself could take … Philo … as an authority I find it hard to believe” (art. cit., p. 140, n. I) and “that any attempt to extract a coherent system from Philo seems to me foredoomed to failure; his ecclecticism is that of the jackdaw rather than the philosopher” (ibid., p. 132, n. I). But there are others, such as E. Vacherot (Histoire critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie, I, 1846, pp. 166–167); H. Guyot (L'infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin, 1906, pp. 99–100; Les Reminiscences de Philon le Juif chez Plotin, 1906); and long before them the Church Father Eusebius of Caesarea (Historia Ecclesiastica II, 4, 2; cf. Philo, II, p. 158), who believe that Plotinus could have been influenced by Philo, or that he was actually influenced by him either directly or indirectly. As for the jackdawish ecclecticism of Philo, see discussion in Philo, I, pp. 97–115.

11 Philo, II, p. 111.

12 Ibid., II, p. 73.

13 Ibid., II, p. 127.

14 Ibid., II, pp. 130–131; 109–110.

15 Enn., V, 3, 13 (I).

16 Ibid., (4).

17 Ibid., (37).

18 Ibid., V, 3, 14 (I).

19 Ibid., VI, 8, 11 (5–13).

20 Ibid., V, 5, 13 (21–23).

21 Didaskalikos, X, 3 and 4. The section numbers are those of the edition of the Didaskalikos in Fr. Dübner, Platonis Opera, vol. III, 1873, pp. 228–258; Pierre Louis, Albinos: Epitomé, 1945.

22 Ibid., X, 4.

23 Ibid., X, 5–6.

24 Num. 23:19; cf. Philo, II, p. 97.

25 Philo, II, pp. 126–127.

26 Didask., X, 5–6.

27 Enn., VI, 7, 36.

28 Ibid, V, 3, 14.

29 Didask., X, 5. See comments on this passage in E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, p. 312; R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, p. 132.

30 Euclid, Elements, I, Def. 1.

31 Cf. Anaratii in decem libros priores Elementorum Euclidis commentarii ex interpretatione Gherardi Cremonensis, ed. M. Curtze, 1899, p. 2, II. 19–23: Dixit propterea Sambelichius: Punctum ideo negando Euclides diffinivit, diminutione superfidei a corpore, et diminutione linee a superficie, et diminutione puncti a linea. Cum ergo corpus sit tres habens dimensiones, punctus necessario nullum earum habet, nee habet partem.” Quoted in T. L. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements, p. 157. This passage is missing in the edition of the Arabic text by R. O. Besthorn et J. L. Heiberg under the title of Codex Leidensis 399, Euclidis, I.Elementa … cum commentariis al-Narizii, 1893, p. 8Google Scholar. I take it that the term diminutio in the Latin, which Heath has translated by “detaching” but which I have changed to “abstraction,” reflects the Greek ἀϕαίρεσις (cf. below n. 93), probably through the Arabic nαqṣ, for the Greek verb ἀϕαιρέω has also the meaning of “to diminish.” The Arabic verb nαqαṣ as a translation of the Greek ἀϕαιρεîν occurs in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics (See M. Bouyges, “Index alphabétiques,” p. 269, Nos. 1413–1414, in his edition of Averroes: Tafsir ma ba'ad at-tabi'at, Vol. 111, 1948).

32 Enn., VI, 7, 36 (7).

33 Ibid., V, 3, 14(4–7).

34 Ibid., VI, 8, 11 (34–35).

35 Metaph., IV, 2, 1004a, 14–16; IV, 6, 1011b, 18ff; X, 5, 1056a, 15–18.

36 The example of “wall,” which is used by Maimonides as an illustration of the difference between “privation” and “negation” Millot ha-Higgayon, ch. 11; Moreh Nebukim I, 58) is taken, as I have shown from Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics IV, 6, 1011b, 15 ff. (ed. M. Hayduck, p. 327, 11. 18–20). Cf. “Maimonides on Negative Attributes,” Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume (1945), pp. 425, 427.

37 Eth. Nic, VII, 1, 1145a. 25–27.

38 Didask, X, 4.

39 Enn, VI, 9, 3 (42).

40 Ibid., VI, 9, 6 (48–49).

41 Ibid, V, 5, 13 (5).

42 Didask., X, 5.

43 Cf. reference to Plato in J. Freudenthal, Hellenistische Studien, Heft 3: Der Platoniker Albinos und der falsche Alkinoos, p. 285, and in Pierre Louis, op. cit., p. 60, n. 143.

44 Rep., VI, 508 E.

45 Ibid., 509 B.

46 Ibid.

47 Enn., VI, 7, 36 (7).

48 Ibid., V, 3, 14 (8–19).

49 On the proof of the existence of God from the human mind, see Philo, II, pp. 78 ff.

50 Didask., X, 6. The last sentence in this quotation reads: τοúτῳ δὲ καì θεòν συνεπινοεῖ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ τιμίῳ ὑπεροχήν. Pierre Louis (op. cit., p. 62) translates it: “à ces idées on ajoute alors celle de Dieu, qui se distingue par son excéllence.”

51 Cf. reference to Plato in J. Freudenthal, op. cit., p. 286, and in Pierre Louis, loc. cit., n. 144.

52 Sympos., 210A.

53 Ibid., 210B.

54 Ibid., 210C.

55 Ibid., 210D.

56 Ibid., 211C.

57 Ibid., 212A.

58 Enn., VI, 7, 36 (7–8).

59 Ibid., V, 3, 14 (7–8).

60 The reference here is to the Aristotelian proof for the existence of God from the interconnection of all things in the world as cause and effect. Cf. Phys. VIII, 4–5.

61 Enn., V, 5, 13 (9–20).

62 Didask., X, 3.

63 Enn., VI, 9, 5 (38–41).

64 Ibid., VI, 9, 6 (24–26).

65 Didask., X, 3.

66 Ibid.

67 Enn., VI, 9, 6 (40–42).

68 Ibid., (53–54).

69 Ibid., III, 9, 9 (17–18).

70 Ibid., VI, 9, 4 (2).

71 Ibid., (14, 17).

72 Ibid., (3).

73 Ibid., VI, 7, 36 (4).

74 Ibid., (8–10).

75 Cf. Philo, II, pp. 83–85; 92.

76 Ibid., II, pp. 47–51.

77 On the analogies and differences between Philo's and Plotinus' conceptions of vision see R. Arnou, Le Désir de Dieu dans la Philosophic de Plotin, pp. 224–227.

78 Enn., V, 6, 5 (7–8).

79 Ibid., VI, 7. 22 (6–7).

80 Leg. All., III, 33, 102.

81 Abr., 17, 80.

82 Enn., V, 1, 6 (26).

83 Ibid., V, 8, 7.

84 Ibid., VI, 7,38 (10).

85 Ibid., VI, 9, 6 (51).

86 Cf. above, n. 72.

87 Enn., VI, 9, 4 (13–14).

88 Cf. Philo, II, pp. 91–92, 149

89 Enn., VI, 9, 4 (26–27).

90 Ibid., (29–30).

91 Ibid., VI, 7, 36.

92 Cf. my papers “The Aristotelian Predicables and Maimonides' Division of Attributes” in Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller (1938), pp. 201234Google Scholar; “Maimonides on Negative Attributes” in Louis Ginzberg Memorial Volume (1945), pp. 411446Google Scholar.

93 H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. v.

94 De Divinis Nominibus II, 4 (PG 3, 641 A); De Mystica Theologia II (1000B).

95 De Fide Orthodoxa I, 4 (PG 94, 800 BC).

96 Cf. Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des Isḥāḳ ibn Ḥonain, ed. Isidor Pollak, Glossar, p. 42, s.v.

97 Cf. Maimonides, Moreh Nebukim I, 58.

98 In the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, 3, 1047a, 14, the Arabic verb naja translates the Greek ἐξαιρεîν (cf. ed. Bouyges cited above, p. 269, No. 1410), which means the same as ἀϕαιρεῖν.

99 Moreh Nebukim, I, 51, Arabic: nafy al-ṣifāt; Hebrew, harḥakat ha-to'arim (Ibn Tibbon); bitṭṭul ha-middot (Ḥarizi). Cf. also Ḥobot ha-Lebabot, I, 10, Arabic text, ed. A. S. Yahuda, p. 72, ll. 6 and 9: al-sawālib min ṣifāt; Hebrew: ha-shollot be-middot and wa-kull mā yunfa ‘anhu min al-ṣifāt; Hebrew:’ we-kal ha-meruḥakot mi-mennu min ha-middot.

100 Tahafot al-Tahafot, VI, 19, p. 320, l. 11 (ed. M. Bouyges): min nafy al-ṣifāt; Hebrew: be-silluḳ ha-to'arim (Kalonymus ben David ben Todros).

101 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, I, 14. I do not think Munk is right in taking the Latin remotio to be a translation of the Arabic nafy (cf. Le Guide des Egarés, I, 58, p. 239, n.). He has overlooked the Greek aphairesis.