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Ordination and Appointment in the Period of the Temple*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

Hugo Mantel
Affiliation:
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Extract

A well-known statement of R. Abba in the Yerushalmi (Jerusalem Talmud) attributes the historical origins of ordination — or, to be more precise, of “appointment” — to R. Johanan b. Zakkai. In contrast, however, the Babli (Babylonian Talmud) bases ordination on the biblical verse: “And (Moses) laid his hands on him (Joshua)” (Num. 27:23), thus recognising Moses as the founder of the institution. Borenstein rejects the Babylonian tradition completely, as does Newman, although the latter suggests somewhat vaguely that some kind of ordination may have existed prior to R. Johanan b. Zakkai. Gulak also maintains that ordination did not go further back than R. Johanan b. Zakkai on the grounds that during the period of the Temple the appointment of urban judges was in the hands of the High Court.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1964

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References

1 R. Abba said, “At first everyone appointed his own disciples, as when R. Johanan b. Zakkai appointed R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, and R. Joshua appointed R. Akiba, and R. Akiba appointed R. Meir and R. Simeon… Then they wanted to honour this house and said that any appointment made by the Bet Din without the consent of the Nasi is void, while any appointment made by the Nasi without the consent of the Bet Din is valid. Then they passed a decree that the Bet Din should make no appointments without the consent of the Nasi nor the Nasi make appointments without the consent of the Bet Din” (Yer. Sanh. 1, 19a). The Babli was of the opinion that the chain of Semikah had never been interrupted from the time of Moses, as is clear from the saying: “Were it not for him (R. Judah b. Babba) the laws of fines would have been forgotten in Israel” (Sanh. 17b), implying that there never had been a period in which Semikah did not exist.

2 The Babli does not deny that the passage is speaking of Semikah, as Borenstein maintains in his Mishpat ha-Semikah we-Koroteha,” ha-Tekufah 4 (5679–1919), 394–95Google Scholar, but merely argues that it cannot be deduced from the passage that Semikah required three officiants.

3 Borenstein, op. cit., 395, argues that the theory of an unbroken chain of Semikah stretching back to Moses (Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanh. IV, i) was invented during the Karaite controversy.

4 J. Newman, Semikah, p. 8; H. Gulak, Yesode Ha-Mishpat ha-Ibri IV, 39. Lauterbach thinks that the tradition of Semikah was established during the Second Temple, particularly in the period of Simeon ben Shetaḥ, when there was a desire to drive the Sadducees out of the Sanhedrin (Jewish Encyclopedia, IX, 428), but he brings no evidence. Sidon suggests that Semikah was established to act as a barrier against Hellenistic influence, but did not receive official recognition until the time of Hillel. Sidon, A., “Die Controverse der Synedrialhäupter,” in Gedenkbuch zur Erinnerung an David Kaufmann (Breslau, 1900), pp. 361–62Google Scholar. Warhaftig, Shalom in his comprehensive article, “Ha-Semikah bi-Zeman ha-Talmud,” Sinai 25 (5719–1959/60, 140–76, suggests that the custom of ordination is ancient but the manner of ordination has undergone changes.Google Scholar

5 M. Sanh. IV, 4. It cannot be argued that the Sanhedrin in Yabneh is being discussed here (Lohse, Ordination, pp. 36–37), since the Mishnah describes legal processes not current at Yabneh. The main function of the Yabneh sages was legislation (Tos. Eduyot 1, 1) and answering queries sent to them from the Diaspora (See I. S. Horowitz, Erez Yisrael u-Shekenoteha, I, 311, n. 47; G. Allon, Toledot ha-Yehudim, I, 128ff.; J. Neusner, A Life of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, pp. 147ff.). Lohse simply follows Kuenen, Wellhausen and Schuerer in rejecting completely the Tannaitic tradition of the historicity of the Sanhedrin (op. cit., p. 32, note).

6 L. Ginzberg, Perushim we-ḥiddushim bi-yerushalmi, III, 178; H. Albeck, in his Hebrew commentary on the Mishnah, Seder Neziḳin, p. 445.

7 Yer. Sanh. 1, 19a.

8 Tos. Sanh. 1, 1.

9 Ginzberg, ibid.

10 Borenstein, op. cit., 400–02.

11 See below, pages 15–16.

12 Borenstein, ibid.

13 See the statement of R. Joshua b. Levi, Sanh. 14a, and of his disciple R. Simon (b. Pazi), Yer. Bik. III, 3, 65d.

14 See below, p. 337.

15 Sanh. 13b.

16 See my Studies in the History of the Sanhedrin (Harvard Univ. Press, 1961), p. 214, note 274.

17 Sanh. 13b.

18 L. Loew, Gesammelte Schriften, IV, 215; Bacher, MGWJ 38 (1893–94), 122–27, 225; Zeitlin, JQR 42 (1951–52), 371. For an argument against this view, see Krauss, JQR, O. S. 17 (1904–05), 372, note 1.

19 Herzog, I., Sinai 3(5699–1939/40), 2429.Google Scholar S. Warhaftig (op. cit., 146, n. 44) cites also the articles on “Ordination” by Gaster in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics and by H. Revel in the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia.

20 Porath, I., Sinai 6(5703–1943), 4953Google Scholar. See also my Studies, p. 207.

21 G. Hoennicke, Das Judenchristentum (1908), pp. 257–76, lists the following items which the early Christians borrowed from Judaism: 1) The institution of a sermon after the Reading of the Law; 2) The prayers, the answering of Amen, and the Hallelujah; 3) The blessings over the meal and the cup of blessing; 4) The Sabbath; 5) Fasts; 6) Festivals, particularly Passover; 7) Excommunication; 8) Baptism. See also, Schlatter, Die Kirche Jerusalems, pp. 71ff.; Jeremias, J., ZNW 27 (1926), 128Google Scholar.

22 M. Yeb. XVI, 7; Ber. 63a; Meg. 18b, etc.

23 Sanh. 12a.

24 Sanh. 13b.

25 Bell. J. II, 8, 9, 145.

26 Tos. Ḥag. II, 9; Tos. Sanh. VII, 1.

27 When Josephus appointed magistrates and judges in Galilee, he did so as the emissary of the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem (Bell. J. II, 20, 5, 570, Vita 79).

28 Th. Mommsen, Roemische Geschichte, 8th ed. (Berlin, 1919), V, 541–42; Juster, Les Juifs, I, 401–02; H. Zucker, Studien z. juedischen Selbstverwaltung, p. 148; G. Allon, Toledot ha-Yehudim, I, 128ff.

29 Giṭṭin 88a.

30 Mekilta de R. Ishmael, Mishpaṭim I, ed. Lauterbach, III, 1–2; ed. Friedmann, 74b; ed. Horowitz, 246. See, also, Juster, Les Juifs, II, 95, note 3.

31 See Juster, Les Juifs, II, 94; Zucker, Studien, pp. 74–75.

32 See my Studies, pp. 135–39. My own definition of mufla accords with the philological interpretation of the word given by S. Lieberman in his Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, p. 66, note 153.

33 Sanh. 17b; Yer. Sheḳ. V, 1, 48d.

34 Tos. Ḥag. II, 9; Tos. Sanh. VII, 1; concerning Tos. Hor. I, 4, see below.

35 M. Sanh. IV, 4.

36 Yer. Sanh. I, 3, 19a.

37 I support the view that from the time of Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ onward only Pharisees were appointed to the Sanhedrin. Studies, pp. 96–101.

38 M. Hor. I, 4. The Mishnah there (Hor. I, 1) also states, “if one of them knew that they have erred”; here too it is clear that the “one” is a sage. For according to the Mishnah the alternative to this “one” is a student worthy to issue decisions, or in other words, a legal expert. In that case, the law here is dealing with a sage who is already ordained and a student worthy of ordination. The Talmud also asks, “Why do we need both?” — because the two terms seem to mean the same: “if one of them knew they had erred, or a student worthy to issue decisions.” According to the answer of the Talmud, the Amoraim agree that “being worthy to issue decisions” in reference to a student means one who is “both erudite and a thinker” (Hor. 2b). Even though the additional Mishnah rules that the same applies to one who is only “erudite” but not a “thinker,” there is sufficient similarity between such a graduate scholar and a full sage.

39 Tos. Hor. I, 1. This applies also to the Talmud's statement that “if all of them are present, the decision is valid, but if not, the decision is not valid” (Hor. 3b).

40 In fact, there is no difference between “if one of them was absent” (Tos. Hor. I, 2) and “if one of them knew that they have erred,” since in both cases the condition “until all of them are present” is lacking (Hor. 3b).

41 M. Hor. I, 5.

42 See M. Sanh. I, 6; Sanh. 17b.

43 M. Hor. I, 5.

44 Sifre, Numbers, Shelaḥ III, ed. Friedmann, p. 32a.

45 M. Hor. I, 5.

46 Yer. Hor. I, 8, 46b.

47 P. R. Weis, Mishnah Horayoth (Manchester, 1952), p. xxiii.

48 See Z. Frankel, Darke ha-Mishnah, pp. 154–55; I. H. Weiss, Dor II (Wilno, 1904), 114.

49 See Ḥullin 49a.

50 Generally, R. Ishmael was closer to the conservatism of R. Eliezer than to the liberalism of R. Akiba. See Frankel, Darke, pp. 113–14.

51 See Weis, ibid.

52 Yoma 49a, 59a and b. See, also, Frankel, op. cit., p. 169, and Weiss, op. cit., II, 137–38.

53 Succah 27b. See, also Frankel, op. cit., pp. 78–87; Weiss, op. cit., II, 74–75.

54 There is nothing surprising in the fact that R. Judah the Patriarch held, on the one hand, that the matter of the sacrifice for the erroneous decision (bullock) was the exclusive prerogative of the Bet Din Ha-Gadol, while, on the other hand, he held that only in the absence of the mufla would the verdict be annulled. For R. Judah ha-Nasi was wont to choose eclectically laws from both sides, according to his own judgment (see, e.g., Ḥullin 109b). In addition, the entire problem was theoretical at his time, and it is obvious that the whole question of the sacrifice for an erroneous decision dates from the days of the Temple, as Weis has shown.

55 See M. Yoma I, 5; M. Parah III, 7. See, also, my Studies, pp. 116–17, 187–88.

56 Sanh. 87a. S. Safrai (in his review of my Studies, Kiryat Sefer 39 [5724–1964], 69–75), argues that Paul must have been tried before the Great Sanhedrin for preaching the abrogation of the Law. He overlooks two points. (1) Paul was not a Mufla, that is, a judge appointed by the Great Sanhedrin, and so could not be tried as a Rebellious Elder. (2) A Rebellious Elder is defined as one who accepts the Scriptural Law but rejects the Soferim's interpretation of it (M. Sanh. XI, 3). But Paul rejected Scriptural Law, too.

57 M. Sanh. XI, 2, 4.

58 M. Hor. I, 4.

59 M. Sanh. XI, 2; Sanh.

60 Hor. 4b.

61 The rule of a rebellious elder applies only to one who sets his personal opinion against the tradition of his colleagues. Sanh. 88a.

62 See Büchler, Synedrion, p. 70, note 64; Krauss, Die Mischna SanhedrinMakkot (Giessen, 1933), pp. 291ff. The Talmud defines Yoʻeẓ as “one who knows how to intercalate years and fix months” (Ḥag. 14a; Sanh. 87a) , but the lower courts were not authorized to do these things.

The term Yoʻeẓ occurs in Sanh. 86b–87a. But in Sifre Deut. 152 (ed. Friedmann, p. 104; ed. Finkelstein, p. 205) and in the Yer. Sanh. XI, 3, 30a, the reading is: “From thee — this is ‘Eẓah”. But ‘Eẓah here probably means council, as with the Dead Sea Sect. See A. Dupont-Somer, The Essene Writings from Qumran, p. 43. On this version, too, the members of the ‘Eẓah had the title of Yoʻeẓ. (‘Eẓah in the sense of “counsel” or “advice” is out of context in the rule of the Rebellious Elder. Perhaps the Sifre and the Yerushalmi substituted ‘Eẓah for the Yoʻeẓ in order to exclude the Yoʻeẓ from becoming a Rebellious Elder, in harmony with the ruling of the Mishnah. The Baraita, in turn, in retaining the Early Halakah, makes the Yoʻeẓ, too, culpable for contradicting the Great Bet Din's ruling.)

63 See especially, G. M. Harper, Village Administration in the Roman Province of Syria (Yale Classical Studies, I [1928]), pp. 143–45. The prevalence of such city councils in Judea prior to 70 C.E. is implied in the Talmuds comment that Lev. 26:19 refers to “the Bulaʼot in Judah” (Giṭṭin 37a). For further talmudic references to boules in Palestine, see Jastrow's Dictionary, p. 146, s. vv. Bulbuṭes, Boulebṭes, Buli I and II.

64 This tallies with Josephus, Ant. IV, 8, 14, 114; Bell. J. II, 20, 5, 570–71 (cf. Meg. 26a). See S. Baron, The Jewish Community, I, 133–34; H. A. Wolfson, Philo, II, 348–52; A. Tscherikover, Ha-Yehudim ba-olam ha-yewani we-ha-romi, pp. 208–12.

65 Yer. Bik. III, 3, 6sd. See my Studies, pp. 203–05. It is clear from the context that those sages were outside the Holy Land when they were appointed and not, as the Pene Moshe believes, in the Holy Land; for the Yerushalmi begins by stating that “elders may not be appointed in the Diaspora” and concludes by stating that “elders may be appointed in the Diaspora on condition that they return.” It would be far-fetched to suggest that a sage lost his authority on leaving the Holy Land.

66 Sanh. 5b; Yer. Shebi. VI, 1, 36bc; Yer. Giṭṭin I, 2, 43C.

67 Yer. Sheb. VI, 1, 36d; Yer. Giṭṭin I, 2, 43c; Sifra, Shemini 3, Parshata I, 32, ed. Weiss, p. 43c; Erubin 63a; Yoma 53a; Wayyiḳra Rabbah XX, 6. R. Eleazar (a second generation Amora) limits this prohibition to a radius of twelve mils from the teacher's presence (Wayyiḳra Rabbah XX, 7).

68 Pirḳe de R. Eliezer II. See also Abot de R. Nathan, version II, chapter 17, ed. Schechter, p. 32; version I, chapter 6, p. 31. (J. Goldin's translation, The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan [New Haven, 1955], p. 44).

69 Y. D. Gilat, Tarbiẓ 32 (1963), 396, has challenged my conclusion by arguing that R. Eliezer merely wished to teach etiquette, that it is not respectful for a disciple to teach in the presence of his teacher, but that there is no prohibition involved. Gilat overlooks the Midrash which attributes the death of the two sons of Aaron to their violation of this rule and the story which relates that R. Eliezer's disciple died within a week of his transgression (Wayyiḳra Rabbah XX, 6). That R. Eliezer's reference to the death penalty was not a mere figure of speech becomes apparent also when we try to reconstruct the reasoning behind his statement. The Rabbis placed respect for one's teacher above the duty of respect for one's father (M. B. M. II, 11). Since disrespect to one's parents, in an extreme form, is subject to the death penalty (Ex. 21:15, 17), disrespect to a teacher, even if not in an extreme form, should deserve the same penalty, though the courts do not mete it out. In view of the gravity of the offence, it should not be surprising that the Rabbis provided a means of avoiding it by the teacher's granting “permission” or “ordination” to the student.

70 See above, note 1.

71 Sanh. 13b.

72 Sanh. 5a–b.

73 This point, made explicitly in my Hebrew article, was overlooked by Gilat (ibid.). Warhaftig (op. cit., 156) argues that only “disciples worthy of giving decisions” could do so, even prior to Rabbi's Taḳḳanah.

74 Nor is it impossible that despite this it was customary occasionally to honor an outstanding student by giving him permission to lecture publicly. The story is related of R. Meir that, although he was appointed by R. Judah b. Babba to judge cases involving fines, he had previously been ordained by his teacher R. Akiba; and the Talmud adds that it was necessary for him to be ordained again by R. Judah b. Babba, since “they did not accept” the ordination of R. Akiba (Sanh. 14a). Our theory will, however, reconcile the need of two authorizations if we assume that R. Akiba did not appoint R. Meir to judge cases involving fines, but ordained him to preach publicly and issue decisions in money and ritual matters. However, we shall have to argue then that the statement in the Yerushalmi about R. Akiba ordaining R. Meir and R. Simeon referred only to ordination for public preaching as a prelude to appointment to judge, as we have suggested below concerning M. Sanh. IV, 4.

75 See my Studies, pp. 38–39, 248.

76 Daube, D., JTS. 39 (1938), 4559CrossRefGoogle Scholar; E. Lohse, Die Ordination im Spaetjudentum, pp. 29ff.

77 See my Studies, pp. 214–17.

78 Daube assumes that the fact that Rabbi gave “permission” to unordained students to issue decisions in ritual matters proves that previously only ordained students could issue such decisions. But this is contradicted by the statement of the Talmud which specifically states that until the time of R. Judah ha-Nasi unordained students used to issue decisions on ritual matters without obtaining permission (Sanh. 5b). Daube's view that the word έξουσία in the Gospels is the equivalent of “permission” is supported in the passage in which they asked Jesus with whose permission he was acting, and he replied that John the Baptist also worked without permission (Mark 11:28 and parallels). However, where the story is told that the men of Galilee were amazed that he taught as if he had received “permission” and not like γραμματεῖς, it is difficult to interpret the word as applying to teachers of children. For in the Gospels (Mark 14:53 and parallels, etc.) it is always used of scholars seated in the Sanhedrin. It is equally difficult to accept Daube's theory that the phrase διδαχή καινή means “A New Law” (Mark 1:27 and parallels). For can a “permitted” student invent a new law in opposition to the Law of Moses? Contrary to Daube, the Jews were not delighted to have “two Laws”. They were dismayed at the prospect of having the Torah appear as “two Laws” (Yer. Sanh. I, 7, 19c; Sanh. 88b; Tos. Ḥag. II, 9; Tos. Sanh. VII. i. See, also, my Studies, p. 11, note 62, and pp. 113, 124–25). It is more likely that the phrase διδαχή καινή means “new teaching” in the sense of a new explanation.

Daube supposes that in Temple times it was customary to ordain those who had been appointed city officials, basing his argument on Acts 6:1. But it has already been shown that the text there is discussing public lecturers, or preachers, and not communal leaders (see note 89 below). There is no need to argue as Daube does that the Christians invented ordination in order to transmit the holy spirit, for among the Christians the holy spirit was associated with the teaching and spreading of their law. Moreover, there is no support for Daube's view that among the Jews ordination was normally given only for the teaching of Aggadah, for in Judaism, law and Aggadah were inseparable, the law frequently being based on Aggadah. For instances, see H. Z. Hirschberg — B. Mermelstein, Yaḥas ha-Aggadah la-Halakah (Vienna, 1929); Y. Bari, ha-Midrash ka-Halakah (Jerusalem, 1960).

Daube's suggestion that there was some magical quality associated with ordination, since the ordinand was forgiven all his sins, is unfounded. For in all cases of appointment to a high office, the man's “sins were forgiven him” (Sanh. 14a); whether he be a sage, a bridegroom, or a Nasi, his promotion acted as purification (Yer. Bik. Ill, 3, 65c). Even “the convert's sins are forgiven him” (ibid. top. See also Rashi on Gen. 36:3 citing a Midrash) and there is no need to search for magical explanations.

79 Sanh. 5a; Yer. Ned. X, 10, 42b relates that R. Judah Nesi'ah gave a temporary appointment to R. Ḥiyya b. Abba, apparently, not in his presence. See also my Studies, pp. 217–18.

80 Sifre, Numbers, 140; ed. Horovitz, p. 86, ed. Friedmann, p. 52b; also, Yalḳuṭ Shimeʻoni 776; but Midrash ha-Gadol II, ed. Fisch (Jerusalem, 1963), p. 247, attaches this comment to the succeeding verse.

81 Sifre, Deut. 16; ed. Friedmann, p. 68b; ed. Finkelstein, p. 26.

82 For a similar instance of courtesy in ordering by means of a question, see M. Shab. II, 7 and the comment of the Talmud, Shab. 34a.

83 Sanh. 5b.

84 Sifre Zuṭṭa and Midrash ha-Gadol, ed. S. Fisch, on Numbers 27:18.

85 Deut. 34:9.

86 The Book of Acts was composed around 70 C. E. on the basis of traditions. See, Schmiedel, “Acts of the Apostles,” Encyclopaedia Biblica, I, 49–50; Ewald, “Luke”, The New Schaff-Herzog Religious Encyclopedia, VII, 63–64.

87 Acts 6:6.

88 Perhaps the number seven was in accordance with the Jewish custom of appointing seven city officials, “tube ha-ʻir” (Meg. 26a), as suggested by Strack-Billerbeck (Kommentar, II, 641), but city officials are never said to have been ordained by hand. It is merely reported that R. Ḥaggai (fifth generation Amora) used to make the newly appointed city officials carry the Torah (Yer. Peʻah VIII, 7, 21a).

89 See J. Rawson Lumby, The Acts of the Apostles, Cambridge Bible, 1907, P. 73; Jackson-Lake, The Beginnings, Part I, vol. I, 307 ff.; Lohse, Die Ordination, pp. 74ff.

90 Acts 13:3.

91 I Timothy 4:14.

92 Ibid. 5:22.

93 2 Timothy 1:6.

94 See Acts 21:20; also, Jackson-Lake, op. cit., 304ff.; von Harnack, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums I (19244), 51–52; von Weizsaecker, Das Apostolische Zeitalter (18922), p. 38.

95 See also W. Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums, ed. H. Gressmann (Tübingen, 1926), p. 169.

96 Similarly, Flusser has shown that there was a custom in Temple times to heal by laying hands on the head. This custom is mentioned a number of times in the Gospels and has now been confirmed by the Dead Sea Scrolls, though Flusser does not believe it is ever mentioned in Talmudic literature — D. Flusser, “Healing through the Laying on of Hands in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” IEJ 7(1957), 107–08. In fact, the Palestinian Amoraim used to heal by hand but not by “laying on” of hands. It is related that when R. Ḥiyya bar Abba was ill, R. Johanan said: “Give me your hand” and lifted him up. “He gave him his hand and he lifted him.” So did other Amoraim, too, (Ber. 5b), not by placing their hand on the sick man's head, but merely giving him their hand. Perhaps they regarded it disrespectful to place their hands on the head of a great man. However, it is more likely that in Talmudic times they ceased placing hands on the head of the sick altogether, through respect for the Shekinah; for according to a Baraita: “Whoever goes to visit the sick should not sit on the bed nor on a chair, but should wrap himself around in a Talit and sit before him, since the Shekinah dwells above the head of the sick.” (Shab. 12b.)

97 Yer. Sanh. I, 3, 19a.

98 M. Sanh. IV, 4; Tos. Sanh. I, 1.

99 Ginzberg, Perushim, III, 178; J. Newman, Semikhah, p. 116. See above, nn. 18, 19, 20.

100 Sanh. 14a.

101 Sanh. 5a-b. See my Studies, pp. 218–21.

102 Borenstein, op. cit., 400–02.

103 M. Mak. I, 10. For a similar use of “Noheget” see M. Ḥullin V, 1; VII, 1, etc. Danby thinks that this Mishnah refers to the Great Sanhedrin, and hence his mistranslation.

104 Tos. Peʼah IV, 6; Tos. Ket. III, 1; Ket. 25a; See also my Studies, pp. 193, 195, 203–05.

105 Yer. Bik. III, 3, 65d. Although the Babli explains a number of incidents on the assumption that in Palestine sages living abroad were never ordained (Sanh. 14a), Schwabe has already proved that the Nesiʼim often sent ordained sages to communities abroad on a permanent basis (as in Antioch) or in order for them to travel from place to place (Tarbiẓ 1 [5690–1930], Part II, 85–110, Pt. III, 110–21). Such sages obviously set up courts of law, in accordance with the instruction of the above Mishnah in Mak. I, 10; see my Studies, pp. 193, 203–06.

106 Sanh. 13b; B. M. 85a.

107 Warhaftig, op. cit., 170.

108 Sanh. 13b.

109 M. Yoma I, 6.

110 Yeb. 121a.

111 M. Sanh. IV, 4.

112 Tos. Sanh. VII, 1, Yer. Sanh. I, 3, 19c.

113 Tos. Sanh. I, 1.

114 “He (God) said to him (Moses): ‘Appoint an interpreter for Joshua so that he may question, and preach, and issue decisions during your lifetime. When you leave this world, Israel will not say: “During his teacher's lifetime he did not teach, but now he does.”’ … R. Nathan said ‘When Joshua entered, Moses used to silence the interpreter until he had completed his entry and was seated.’” (Sifre, Numbers, 140, ed. Friedmann, p. 57b).

115 Some scholars hold the view that the Babli attaches a dual meaning to the Mishnah, “The ordination of elders is by three” (Sanh. I, 3), the primary meaning being the laying of hands on the sacrifice, and the second being the ordination of sages (Newman, op. cit., pp. 3–4, in the wake of earlier commentators). The truth is that the Talmud discusses the ordination of sages only on the basis of the Baraita: “We have learned that ordination and the ordination of elders is by three” (Sanh. 13b). Now, if the meaning of the term “ordination” in this Baraita is as the Talmud appears to understand it — the appointment of judges — then we cannot determine the period at which this law was decided upon. When did they say that the appointment of a judge requires a Bet Din of three? If it was during the time of R. Johanan b. Zakkai, then “every one appointed his own disciples” (see above note 1), and if in the period following that, the Nasi alone had the power to appoint judges; whereas in the third period no court could appoint “without the consent of the Nasi” (ibid.). An (ordinary) Bet Din of three was insufficient. Moreover, this is different from the law that it requires three to fix the month and seven to intercalate a year; for there, in fact, the Nasi's participation was not essential — only his approval of the Bet Din's decision (M. Eduyot VII, 7; Shemot R. 15, 20); the Nasi merely made the announcement of the decision (M. R. H. II, 7). This was not true of ordination, where the primary responsibility was the Nasi's (Sanh. 7b; Yer. Bik. III, 3, 65d). As for the Temple days, judges were appointed by the Great Sanhedrin (Tos. Sanh. VII, 1). This then lends support to the theory of ordination suggested here, that it meant the right given to a student to lecture publicly, so that the ruling in this Baraita as well as in the Tosefta (Sanh. I, 1) that “Semikah is by means of three,” is an old law dating from the Temple period, when such ordination existed.

It would seem that such was R. Johanan's opinion, too; for, on the Talmud's asking “What is ordination (Semikah), and what is ordination of elders?” he replied, “The ordination of a sabi” (Sanh. 13b). On the surface it is difficult to see what answer R. Johanan gave by translating “elder” as sabi. But his answer becomes meaningful if we note that the term Zaḳen or “elder” has the special connotation of “judge” (Jastrow, A Dictionary, p. 409, s.v. “Zaṣen II”) whereas sabi never connotes “judge”; it signifies, in addition to its basic meaning of “a man advanced in years,” also, as in this case, “one who has gained wisdom” (Jastrow, op. cit., p. 948, s.v. “Saba I”). Thus R. Johanan's statement means that Semikah here refers, not to the appointment of judges, but to the licensing of a scholar to teach publicly.

116 Yer. Sanh. I, 3, 19a.

117 Borenstein, op. cit., 394.

118 Pene Moshe, by R. M. Margalit, commentary on the Yerushalmi, printed alongside the text of the Wilno edition.

119 The Yerushalmi frequently cites even a Tosefta to support a law of the Mishnah. See Higger, Ozar ha-Beraitot VII, 9–12.

120 The Tannaim were careful to teach in Hebrew. Ḳid. 70a.

121 But in the Tosefta the reading semikah remains, since the Tosefta mentions the ordination of elders too, and there is no possibility of misunderstanding both expressions to refer to the laying of hands on the sacrifice (or appointment of sages, as Maimonides maintains). Thus there is no need to correct semikah to semikut, as Krauss suggests, op. cit., p. 13a.

122 It is difficult to ignore this fact, which appears in a number of places. The Palestinian Amora, R. Joshua ben Levi, said, “There is no ordination outside Palestine.” Also, the saying of R. Judah in the name of Rab is based on a Palestinian tradition that “Once the authorities passed a decree in Palestine that anyone ordaining (ha-Somek) or being ordained (Nismak) would suffer the death penalty.” (Sanh. 13b-14a; A. z. 8a). Moreover, those stories of Tannaim and Amoraim who received ordination, even when recorded in the Babli, have their source in Palestine — it would be unlikely that they changed the wording of their source. See B. M. 85a; Sanh. 14a; 30b; Ket. 112a.

Even the Tosefta says that “Ordination is by three, and ordination of elders by three” (Tos. Sanh. I, 1), and we have already shown that this Tosefta could not have been Babylonian in source as Ginzberg suggests (Perushim, III, 178). Nor is there any reason for emending the text to fit in with the Baraita, as Krauss argues (op. cit., p. 13).