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A Hegelian Logic of ‘Us’: Implicit Forms and Explicit Representations of Actions and Practices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2019

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer*
Affiliation:
Universität Leipzig, Germanystekeler@uni-leipzig.de
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Abstract

In order to understand Hegel's gnomic oracle according to which the ‘I’ is a ‘We’, the notion of a personal subject is explained by its competence to perform personal roles in a pre-given partition of roles. Explicit divisions of labour by contractual promises are special cases that presuppose the general case of an already established social practice. On the other hand, methodological individualism is right to stress that we actualize joint intentions only via corresponding instantiations. In performing our parts, we form a plural subject, a we-group. The result of what each of us does is what we do, and the generic ‘We’ turns into the generic ‘I’.

Type
Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 40 , Special Issue 3: Hegel and the Philosophy of Action , December 2019 , pp. 374 - 397
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2019 

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