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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2017
This paper offers a limited defence of two seemingly disparate interpretive approaches to free thought in Hegel’s Jena Phenomenology of Spirit. On the one hand, I defend the view of so-called post-Kantian Hegelians, that Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception is central to Hegel’s account of free thinking in the Phenomenology. On the other hand, I argue that the notions of das Offene in Heidegger’s Vom Wesen der Wahrheit and Ab-Lösung in his 1930/31 lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology are no less crucial to an understanding of free thought in Hegel’s work. I show that absolution is a condition for the possibility of das Offene, which is a condition for the possibility of apperception in its reflexive capacity.
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