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I. Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution, 1772–73
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 March 2010
Extract
On the morning of 19 August 1772 Gustavus III seized supreme power in Sweden, overthrew the authority of the Estates, and amid the applause of almost all Swedes outside the circle of professional politicians brought the Age of Liberty to an end. On the morrow of the revolution he explicitly abjured sovereignty for himself; he promised his.subjects the constitution of Gustav Adolf; and he did in fact confer on them a liberal and tempered despotism, which may be described as being by Mercier de la Rivière out of The Patriot King. It was a revolution bloodless, popular, and uniquely clement; but it was profoundly disturbing to international relations. Twice in the next nine months it produced crises from which, for a moment, there seemed no issue save a general European war involving all the great powers. It might have been supposed, indeed, that England could stand aside from such a struggle: the countrymen of Wilkes and Junius cared little for Swedish liberty, and had but a dim and confused notion of a parliamentary system in some respects more advanced than their own. But by an odd combination of circumstances, the Constitution of 1720—which Gustavus had overthrown on 19 August—had for some years acquired the status of a major British interest; its maintenance had become one of the linch pins of British foreign policy; and its overthrow was a challenge to a whole system of ideas which had prevailed and grown stronger in the years since the Peace of Paris.
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References
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9 Correspondence of George III, II, 222. Compare his similar complaint in May 1787 about secret service expenditure in Corsica nearly twenty years before, which had been borne by the Civil List upon a ministerial assurance that the king should be repaid. The repayment was never made, ‘which made me consequently appear afterwards in an extravagant light to Parliament’ ( Cobban, Alfred, Ambassadors and Secret Agents (1954), 134)Google Scholar.
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20 For Suffolk's views on relations with Russia, see S.P. 91/89, fos. 138-9: Suffolk to Cath- cart, 7 April 1772; ibid. 90, foe. 5-8: instructions for Gunning, [28] May 1772; ibid. fos. 117, 186-9: Suffolk to Gunning, 4 August, 8 September, 1772; Riksarkivet, Stockholm, [R.A.] Diplomatics, Anglica, Nolcken to Kanslipresidenten, Apostille, 6 September 1771, where he notes that ‘the English Court's partiality and inclination towards Russia seems to be notablyweakened’. Goodricke denied this in Stockholm, and his language was ‘much approved’, but Nolcken was correctly informed: S.P. 95/119, fos. 108-9, 116-17: Goodricke to Suffolk, 27 September 1771; Suffolk to Goodricke, 26 October 1771.
21 For the Hanover intercepts, see Steigung, Helle, Den engelska underrättelseverksamheten rörande Sverige under 1700-talet (Stockholm, 1961)Google Scholar, and Petersson, Bengt, ‘“The Correspon dent in Paris”—en engelsk informationskälla under 1700-talet’, Scandia, XXVIII (1961)Google Scholar; and S.P. 95/120, fos. 179-84, 190-4: Rochford to Goodricke, 3, 7, 14 July 1772; ibid. 121, fos. 47-9: Suffolk to Goodricke, 4 August 1772; Corr of George III, II, 363-6.
22 S.P. 95/121, fos. 122-3: Suffolk to Goodricke, I September 1772; Corr. of George III, II, 363-6, 384.
23 Goodricke had foreseen this possibility nearly a year before: S.P. 95/119, fos. 138-9: Goodricke to Suffolk. 25 October 1771. For his comments to Osterman, see Hjäme, H., ‘Sverige inför Europa 1772’, in Ur det jörgdngna (Stockholm, 1912), 159–60Google Scholar. Suffolk's view was that the Caps had brought it on themselves by their inexcusable neglect to act on his warnings: S.P. 95/121, fo. 172: Suffolk to Goodricke, 8 September 1772.
24 Marsangy, L. Bonneville de, Le Comte de Vergemet. Son Ambassade en Suéde (Paris, 1898), 266–8Google Scholar.
25 Letters of Horace Walpole (ed. Toynbee, ), VIII, 203, 208Google Scholar; The Annual Register, 1772, pp. 7, 53-70; Public Record Office, Bliss Transcripts, 31/13/3, fo. 51. The Prince remarked: ‘I say…his subjects have been in the wrong to permit him’ (Journals of Lady Mary Coke (Edinburgh, 1806), IV, 109)Google Scholar.
26 Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangères, Paris [A.E.], Correspondance Politique [C.P.], Angleterre, 500, fos. 107-8: Guines to d/Aiguillon, no. 96, 4 September 1772.
27 S.P. 91/90, fos. 168-9: Suffolk to Gunning, I September 1772.
28 S.P. 95/121, fos. 164-5: Goodricke to Suffolk, 22 August 1772.
29 For the circumstances of his appointment, Corr. of George III, II, 205-7, 251-2. In at least two critical interviews Suffolk was forced to ask his interlocutor to permit him to speak English: Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen [D.R.A.] Dept. f.u.A., England II, Depescher, Diede to Osten, 17, 28 April 1772.
30 Sir Joseph Yorke wrote: ‘Our two Secretaries are of crazy constitutions, the one from his own fault, the other by inheritance. I am very sorry for it because I esteem them both, and they are both attentive and spirited, and want nothing but health to make any figure they please in their departments’ (British Museum, Add. MS. 35370. fo. 97 to Lord Hardwicke, 16 February 1773).
31 See his letters to W. Eden, in Add. MS. 34412. fos. 174, 182, 214; and to Keith, , in Memoirs and Correspondence of Sir Robert Murray Keith (1849), I, 301Google Scholar.
32 D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II, Diede to Osten, 3 April 1772: ‘II se fait beaucoup estimer. II n/aigrira point les choses…mais je m/attends qu/il me rendra toujours avec franchise et énergie ce qui aura été résolu dans le conseil, ou ce qu/il sera chargé de me dire. Politesse générate, et douceur de caractère, réserve sur lea détails, franchise et brièveté dans les propos ministériaux, encore un peu d/embarras, me paroissent etre les traits principaux qui le caractérisent. II conviendra de le ménager.’
33 Temperely, H. W., Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph (1915). 263Google Scholar. Isabel de Madariaga quotes this judgement, apparently with approval: Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (1962), 448; but it is noteworthy that Temperley also considered Suffolk ‘a fairly able man…with a singularly unbiased mind’.
34 ‘Das Ereignis des 19 August 1772’, wrote Amburger, ‘war Oberhaupt die schwente Niederlage, die die Politik Katharinas II biaher erlitten hattc’ (Amburger, , op. cit. 266)Google Scholar.
35 In the event, Kaunitz took care to give no encouragement to the idea that Austria would support her ally on this issue: see A. E. C. P. Suède 262, fos. 201, 281, 298: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 30 September, 9,14 November 1773; ibid. fo. 234: copy of Rohan's memorandum of interview with Kaunitz; British Museum, Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 308: Stormont to Gunning, 14 November 1772; R. A. Anglica. Svenska beskickningar till Nolcken. Upplösta chifferbrev (vol. 438): Bark to Nolcken, 6 November 1772.
36 See especially Add. MS. 35502, fo. 14: Suffolk to Gunning, 30 October, 1772; S.P. 91/91, fos. 105-7: same to same, 30 October 1772; Hist. MSS. Comm. Dartmouth (1896), III, 196-7: Suffolk to Dartmouth, 6 September 1772.
37 The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich (Navy Records Soc. 1932), I, 20-3: North to Sandwich, 5 September 1772. Sandwich's pointed reply, alluding to the Swedish revolution, in ibid. 23-4.
38 S.P. 75/127, fo. 204: Suffolk to Woodford, 8 December 1772; ibid. fos. 231-4: Woodford to Suffolk, 12 December 1772.
39 S.P. 91/91, foe. 13-16: Gunning to Suffolk. 28 August, 4 September 1772.
40 D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II, Diede to Osten, I, II, 15 September 1772.
41 S.P. 91/91, fo. 34: Suffolk to Gunning, 2 October 1772.
42 For this farcical affair, see S.P. 91/91, fos- 22-3. 25-7. 46-7, etc.
43 S.P. 91/91, foe. 46-7: Suffolk to Gunning, 6 October 1772.
44 Compare George III: ‘as we are not bound by any treaty of alliance, I cannot see any reason for joining with Russia in s declaration against the changes of die Swedish Constitution; though if Russia is attacked by France, views of general policy [will] not permit our remaining idle spectators’ (Corr. of George III, II, 404).
45 S.P. 95/131, foe. 169-72; S.P. 91/90, fos. 180-3, 186-9; and see his private letter to Gunning, 8 September, in Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 170.
46 S.P. 95/121, fos. 169-70: 8 September 1772.
47 S.P. 91/91, fo. 72: Gunning to Suffolk, 14/25 September 1772; cf. Add. MS. 35502, fo. 20: same to same, 14 December 1772, for a similar report.
48 S.P. 91/91. fos. 105-7: Suffolk to Gunning, 30 October 1772.
49 Ibid. fo. 109: Suffolk to Gunning, 30 October 1772, and especially his private letter to Gunning of same date: Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 170.
50 S.P. 91/91, fo. 124: Suffolk to Gunning, 10 November 1772; Add. MS. 35502, fo. 16: same to same, 17 November 1772. Gunning seems to have broken it only gradually to Panin: Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 310: Gunning to Goodricke, 7/18 December 1772.
51 S.P. 95/122, fos. 131-6, 138-40: Goodricke to Suffolk, 27, 30 October 1772; cf. Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 235: Goodricke to Gunning, 30 October 1772.
52 Sir Joseph Yorke wrote that Sweden and Denmark ‘seem like Arlequin and Scapin on the Italian stage, to have big words in their mouths, but at the same time to be horribly afraid of each other’: Add. MS. 35370, fo. 70 (to Hardwicke, 17 November 1772).
53 For Gustavus's designs on Norway, see Gustav III:s och Lovita Ulrikat brevväxling (Stockholm, 1919). II. IIIGoogle Scholar; Komuig Gustaf III:s efterlämade och femtio dr efter hans död öppnade papper, ed. Geijer, E. G. (Stockholm, 1843)Google Scholar; D.R.A. Ges.-Arkiver, England I, Osten to Dicde, 2 November, 28 November (Apostule), 1772; Nielsen, Y., ‘Gustav den III:s norake Politik’ [Dansk] Historish Tidsskrijt, II R., I Bd. (1877). Panin ia said to have been genuinely apprehensive that the Norwegians might voluntarily transfer their allegiance to Gustavus III (R.A. Muscovitica, Ribbing to K.P., 16/27 November 1772)Google Scholar.
54 S.P. 75/127 fos. 74-7 100-9, 113-15: Woodford to Suffolk, 31 October, 3 November 1772; ibid. fos. 98-9: Osten to Woodford, 2 November 1772; cf. Egerton MS. 2701, fos. 199-200: Woodford to Gunning, 29 September 1772. Osten resisted Russian pressure to make a joint declaration in Stockholm, on the ground that he must first find out what England would do: Suffolk was strongly opposed to a declaration, and the project dropped: D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II, Diede to Osten, 20 November 1772; D.R.A. Ges.-Arkiver, England I, Osten to Diede, 19 September, 17 October, 20 October 1772.
55 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Kanslipresidenten, 29 September 1772; Hjärne, p. 169 n. a.
56 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Kanslipresidenten [K.P.], 29 September, 6 November 1772. Gustavus asked d/Aiguillon to use his good offices to have Goodricke recalled (A.E. C.P. Suéde 262, fo. 204: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 30 September 1772; fo. 233: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 20 October 1772); R.A. Kabinettet för utrikes brevväxlingen (Presidentskon-toret) Koncept. Ulrik Scheffer to Nolcken, 23 October 1772; to Creutz, 16 October 1772. It was not the first time: see Corr. of George III, II, 249-50. Goodricke believed that a general war could be avoided if Russia attacked Sweden immediately (Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 313: Goodricke to Gunning, I January 1773).
57 R. A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 8 December 1772; Hjelt, A. J., Sveriges ställning till utlandet närmaist efter 1772 drs statshvälfning (Helsingfors, 1887), 152Google Scholar.
58 See, for example, S.P. 75/127, foe. 11-12, 125-6: Suffolk to Woodford, 13 October, 17 November 1772; S.P. 91/91, fos. 132-3: Suffolk to Gunning, 17 November 1772; and Nolcken's report of a ojmilar statement by Rochford: R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., Apostille, 18 December 1772. Scheffer's elaborate pamphlet refuting the allegation of aggressive designs is in R.A. Kabinettet for utrikes brewixlingen. Cirkullrer 1772.
59 A.E. C.P. Suède, 262, fos. 57, 200: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 21 August, 30 September 1772. D/Aiguillon was as sceptical about Denmark's aggressiveness as Suffolk was about Sweden's: A.E. C.P. Suéde, 262, fos. 271, 304-5, 325-6: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 5, 15, 26 November 1772.
60 [Manderström, L.], Brefvexling rörande Sveriges historia under dren 1772-1780 (Stockholm, 1854), 1-2, 8-10, 21-2, 23-4, 42–3, etcGoogle Scholar.
61 The delay was due to Panin's indolence: Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 306: Gunning to Goodricke, 16/27 November 1772. Osterman was however threatening Russian intervention as early as 9 November, though without instructions to do so: R.A. Schefferaka Samlingen. Skrivelser till Ulrik Scheffer, vol. VIII: Falkenberg to Ulrik Scheffer, 9 November 1772. A copy of the declaration Osterman was ordered to make in Stockholm is in Eg. M.S. 2701, fo. 237; a copy of the Swedish reply in Add. MS. 35504, fo. 132. The Prussian minister verbally supported the Russian note: Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 282: Goodricke to Gunning, 18 December 1772; D.R.A. Ges.-Arkiver, England I, Osten to Diede, 22 December 1772; Bull, H. J., Friedrich der Grosse und Setnoeden in den Jahren 1768-1772 (Rostock, 1933), 93Google Scholar.
62 A.E. C.P. Suède 262, foe. 265-8: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 3 November 1772, with copy of Swedish note; ibid. fos. 272-3: Gustavus III to Louis XV, 8 November 1772; ibid. fo. 274, the Danish declaration, 9 November 1772; S.P. 75/127, fos. 131-4: Woodford to Suffolk, 10 November 1772. For Danish policy at this period see especially Osten's memorial of 29 August and Schack's observations upon it of 5 September, in ‘Aktstykker og Breve til Belysning af Grev Ostens politiske Stilling… 1772-3’, Danske Magaxin, vR., 4 Bd. (Copenhagen, 1900), 194–208Google Scholar.
63 Pol. Con. XXXIII, 38, 50; Bull, pp. 88-9.
64 S.P. 91/91, fos. 105-7: Suffolk to Gunning, 30 October 1772; ibid. fos. 213-15: Gunning to Suffolk, I December 1772; Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 20: Goodricke to Gunning, 29 January 1773.
65 Pol. Con. XXXIII, 18, 66. With his usual mendacity Frederick also stated that England and Denmark had offered him an alliance against Sweden (to Prince Henry, 16 October 1772): Pol. Con. xxxii, 570. The story was quite untrue.
66 Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs… de France, IX, (2): Russie (Paris, 1890), 286–300Google Scholar; A.E. C.P. Suéde 262, fos. 230,239-42: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 20 October 1772; Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 288-9: Woodford to Gunning, 25 December 1772; ibid. fo. 291: Gunning to Murray, 14/25 February 1773; Add. MS. 24158, fo. 197: Rochford to Grantham, 15 December 1772; D.R.A. Ges.-Arkiver, England I, Osten to Diede, 12 September 1772.
67 Cf. the verdict, Abbé Georgel's on d/Aiguillon: ‘il avait plus de connoiaiances [que Choiseul] et autant d/esprit; maia il ne aavoit paa comme lui être tranchant et braver lea obstacles. De petitea ruses, de petits moyens, le talent des petites intrigues, voilà ce qui le caractérisoit. II prenait I/opinietreté pour l/energie, et il a montré qu/il étoit peu propre a manier le timon dea affaires dans un grand état’: Memoires de I/Abbé Georgel (Paris, 1820), I, 150Google Scholar.
68 See, for example, S.P. 78/283, foa. 66, 139, 148, 150, 263; S.P. 78/284. fo*. 35. 331-2; S.P. 78/285, fos. 320-2; S.P. 78/286, fos. 150-3; S.P. 78/287, foa. 119-20; Fnguier, B. de, ‘Le Due d/Aiguillon et l/Angleterre’, Revue de I/Histoire diplomatique, XXVI (1912), 609–27Google Scholar. Mercy, commented: ‘je le soupconne d/idées chimériquea sur son prétendu crédit en Angleterre’ (Correspondance secrète du Comte de Mercy-Argenteau ante I/Empéreur Joseph II et le prince de Kaunitx (Paris, 1891), 11, 412Google Scholar: Mercy to Kaunitz, 16 October 1772); cf. S.P. 91/90, fo. 133: Cathcart to Gunning, 6/17 July 1772, where Cathcart reports French approaches to him. But French espionage with a view to the invasion of England continued in 1771 ( Lacour-Gayet, G., La marine militaire de la France tout le règne de Lotus XV (Paris, 1910), 456)Google Scholar.
69 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fo. 299: d/Aiguillon to Guinea, no. 55, 6 December 1772.
70 S.P. 78/285 fo. 295: Harcourt to Rochford, 16 July 1772.
70a Though he seems to have been on bad terms with Choiseul: R.A. Anglica, Nolcken to K.P., 23 October 1768.
71 E.g. Tchernichev: Martens, F. de, Recueil des Traités…concha par la Russie (St Petersburg, 1892), IX (X), 280Google Scholar; and , Favier wrote ‘My lord Rochefort est homme de plaisir, mais encore plus homme d/honneur’: Boutaric, E., Correspondance secrète inédite de Louis XV (Paris, 1866), II, 186 n.I; cf. Add. MS. 35370, fo. 16Google Scholar.
72 Goebel, J., The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (New Haven, 1927), 356 n. 78Google Scholar. George III wrote to Suffolk, of ‘your Brother Secretary who, though possessed of many amiable qualities, is not very prudent’ (Corr. of George III, II, 370Google Scholar). And Gamier wrote: ‘Milord Rochford est sujet en affaires ou plutôt en discours à de petites vivacités qui ne signifient rien’ (A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fo. 221: Gamier to d/Aiguillon, no. 106,30 October 1772). For a less favourable estimate see the reports of Haneken and Diede: D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II, 3 April, 17 April 1772, where he is accused of using his influence on foreign policy to assist his stock-exchange manœuvres.
73 Cf. his anxiety about d/Aiguillon's talks with Shelburne when Shelburne was in Paris (S.P. 78/283, fo. 313).
74 The Lettert of Junis (ed. Everett, C. W.) (1927), 190 n. iGoogle Scholar.
75 Suffolk found it necessary to deny this to Nolcken (Bliss transcripts 31/13/3, fos. 14-16).
76 R.A. Anglica, Nolcken to K.P., 6 November 1773.
77 S.P. 78/284, fos. 282-4; *86, fos. 67-71; d/Aiguillon had compared British and French behaviour in India, and suggested that sooner or later the British were bound to be evicted by the outraged Indians. Rochford called this ‘as extraordinary a performance as ever issued from the pen of the most insolent French Minister that ever existed’.
78 S.P. 78/286, fos. 95-6; 287, fos. 102-4; Fraguier, pp. 610-12.
79 Pol. Corr. XXXII, 611, Jeanneret to Frederick, 16 October 1772, where he reports Rochford as saying, ‘C/est done un mensonge afireux et une impertinence indigne de la France de débiter une pareille nouvelle, et, par conséquent, même de nous prêter des sentiments que nous n/avons point.’
80 D.R.A. Dept. f.uA., England II, Diede to Oaten, 27 November 1772, 19 February 1773; cf. the remarks of Mussin-Pushkin (the Russian Minister to Great Britain), ibid. 13 April 1773.
81 Sandwich Papers, I, 30-3.
82 Add. MS. 24158, fo. 197: Rochford to Grantham, 15 December 1772.
83 S.P. 78/284, fo8. 161-2; 285, fos. 263-4, 271-2.
84 S.P. 78/286, fos. 24-5: Blaquière to Rochford, 9 September 1772; fos. 80-2: Rochford to St Paul, 9 October 1772 (cf. a previous instruction to Blaquière of II September: 286, fos. 18-19); Add. MS. 24158, fos. 144, 182: Rochford to Grantham, n September, 13 November 1772; R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., Apostille, 30 June 1772.
85 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Gustavus III, 22 January 1773.
86 Add. MS. 35502, fos. 18-19: Gunning to Suffolk, I December 1772.
87 Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 325: Maltzan to Frederick, 16 February 1773, where he reports Suffolk as saying: ‘que la France étoit déterminée qu/en cas que la Russie attaquât la Suède d/envoyer une escadie dans la Baltique; qu/eux ne l/empêcheraient pas, dût-elle y faire passer toute sa marine’; D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II; Diede to Osten, 18 December 1772: ‘C/est de la Russie qu/on se mine plus que de la France, et c/est elle qu/on blâme…et si elle [sc a Russian attack on Sweden] arrive, on laissera fedre la Cour de France’: cf. Osterman's comments to Goodricke, S.P. 95/113, fos. 24-5; and Sir J. Yorke's to Gunning, 15 March 1773: Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 16. There seems no doubt that Panin believed that these were Suffolk's views; though the trend of Diede's later despatches was to the effect that it was Rochford rather than Suffolk that held such language; and in mid-April (when it was too late to matter) Mussin-Pushkin told Diede mat hitherto he had treated such remarks as of no importance: see D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II; Diede to Osten xa and 19 February, 13 April 1773.
88 Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 308; cf. ibid, XXXII, 568.
89 S.P. 91/92, fo. 149: Gunning to Suffolk, 12/23 March 1773.
90 Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 238, 239. 246; cf. ibid. 338, 347, 393.
91 Corr. of George III, II, 428-9.
92 Fraguier, p. 615.
93 Ibid. p. 619.
94 A.E. C.P. Angleterre 500, fos. 249-51: Bourdieu to d/Aiguillon, ao November 1772.
95 Ibid. 500, fos. 258-61: Bourdieu to d/Aiguillon, 24 November 1772.
96 A.E. C.P. Angleterre 500/240-51, 501, fos. 5-6: Bourdieu to d/Aiguillon, 20 November 1772, 5 January 1773.
97 Ibid. 500, fo. 276: d/Aiguillon to the Abbé de Terray, 30 November 1772.
98 Fraguier, pp. 616, 619-20.
99 A.E. C.P. Angleterre 501, fo. 121: Bourdieu to d/Aiguillon, 2 March 1773.
101 A.E. C.P. Angleterre 501, fos. 112-14: Guines to d/Aiguillon, no. 120, 26 February 1773.
103 Principal Secretary to the French Embassy, chargt d/affaires during Guinea's absence on holiday.
104 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fos. 167-70: Gamier to d/Aiguillon, 9 October 1772; fo. 194: d/Aiguillon to Gamier, 18 October 1772.
105 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 12 October 1772.
106 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Gustavus III, 23 October 1772; Hjelt, p. 63. He told Mussin-Pushkin that ‘sa Cour ferait tres-bien de ne pas penser a former aucune tentative contre la Suéde, parcequ/elle trouveroit surement la France sur son chemin et que l/Angleterre ne s/en meleroit pas attendu qu/ere ne vouloit point entrer en guerre’: cf. A.E. C.P. Suède 262, fos. 272, 276; Add. MS. 35502, fos. 18-19; Add. MS. 24158, fo. 182.
107 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fos. 199-203, 208-11, 214-20: Garnier to d/Aiguillon, 23 and 30 October 1772. The idea of a non-aggression pact was Gartner's own, approved by d/Aiguillon: ibid. 500, fos. 150-1, 177: cf. R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 23 October 1772, and d/Aiguillon's account to Creutz: Tegnér, E., Bidrag till kännedomen om Sveriges yttre politik närmast efter statskoälfningen 1772 (Valda skrifter, V) (Stockholm, 1906), 119 n. IGoogle Scholar.
108 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Gustavus III, 6 November 1772.
109 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fos. 208-11; Gamier to d/Aiguillon, 23 October 1772.
110 For his denials, see, e.g. S.P. 78/283, fos. 269, 301, 312.
111 For the ‘promise’ see Goebel, op. cit. 360-3; but see too the judicious discussion in Nieto, M.H., La Ctuttion de lot Mahrinat (Madrid, 1947), 227-30, 264, 269Google Scholar; Nieto doubts whether anything Rochford said could be considered binding.
112 See, e.g., S.P. 78/287, fos. 46-48: Rochford to St Paul, 12 February 1773.
113 S.P. 95/123, fos. 33-4: Goodncke to Suffolk. 29 January 1973.
114 R.A. Anglic*: Nolcken to Gustavua III, 16 March 1773, 6 November 1772.
115 S.P. 95/123, fos. 39-41: Suffolk to Goodncke, 26 February 1773.
116 S.P. 91/90, fos. 145-6: Cathcart to Suffolk, 12/23 January 1772; 91/92. fo. 71: Gunning to Suffolk, 16 January 1773.
117 S.P. 91/92. foa. 119-21: Suffolk to Gunning, 26 March 1773.
118 Correspondance secrète de Broglie avec Lotus XV, II, 396 n. 2. For d/Aiguillon's optimism about England, see A.E. C.P. Suède, 262, fos. 147, 153, 229, 362. D/Aiguillon told Creutz (the Swedish ambassador in Paris) about his offers to England: Hjelt, PP. 154-5.
119 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 113-14, 202: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 18 February, 21 March 1773. When Bougainville, deprived for the moment of royal support for another voyage of exploration, and finding himself unemployed, suggested to de Boynes (the Minister of Marine) that he might be temporarily commissioned to a frigate and sent on a cruise to the Baltic so that French officers could be trained in the navigation of those waters, d/Aiguillon replied that at present it was ‘nullement convenable’ to send any French warship to the Baltic (A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 155-6: d/Aiguillon to de Boynes, 7 March 1773).
120 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 262, fos. 344-9: Creutz to Gustavus III (copy), 13 December 1772; 263, fos. 170 ff.: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 15 March 1773. In return for French subsidies, Sweden engaged to have an army of 47,000 men, and 21 ships of war, in readiness by i January 1776.
121 A.E. C.P. Angleterre 501, fo. 219: Guinea to d/Aiguillon, 23 March 1773.
122 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 35-41, 103, 179-80: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 16 January, 15 February, 15 March 1773; Ibid.263, fos. 113-14, 202:d/Aiguullon to Veirgennes, 18 February, 21 March 1773; Véou, P., ‘Un chapitre inedit des Mémoires de Barthélémy: La Révolution suèdoise de 1772’, Revue des Etudes Historiques, CIV (1937)Google Scholar.
123 He also tried to deter the British Government from sending a fleet to the Baltic by. spreading rumours of concentrations of troops on the Hanover border: Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 313 (to Prince Henry, 23 February 1773); cf. Add. MS. 35505, fo. 136: Harris to Keith, 6 April 1773. The rumours caused Suffolk some concern: A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 501, fo. 276: Guinea to d/Aiguillon, no. 123, 2 April 1773. Suffolk, like Frederick, realized that Sweden's weakness would for some time to come make her innocuous as an enemy and a liability as an ally: D.R. A. Dept. f.u.A. England II: Diede to Schack-Rathlou, 26 March 1773. Osterman seems in the end to have realized it too (Bull, op. cit. p. 99).
124 A.E. C.P. 501, fo. 227: Guines to d/Aiguillon, no. 122, 23 March 1773.
125 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Gustavus III, 16 March 1773: ‘dess [sc. the British government's] bearbetande därwid wore nu mere af hel annan beskaffenhet än tillförene.’
126 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 31, 230-a, 238-40: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 16 January, 29 March, 5 April 1773; Add. MS. 35370, fo. 112: Sir J. Yorke to Hardwicke, 6 April 1773.
127 Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 30: Gunning to Goodricke, 25 January/5 February 1773.
128 See, e.g., A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 9, 35-41, 122, 176.
129 A.E. C.P. Suéde 263, few. 3-4, 16-17, 49, 61-2, 158-60: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 3, 14, 20, 24 January, 18 February, 7 March, 21 March 1773.
130 Correspondance secrète de Broglie avec Louis XV, II, 387. For Broglie's very pertinent criticisms of d/Aiguillon's policy in the northern crisis, see Stiegung, H., Louis XV:s hemliga diplomats och Sverige, pp. 281–8Google Scholar; and Petersson, Bengt, ‘Louis XV:s hemliga diplomati-nägra reflexioner’, Scandia, XXVIII (1962), 407–12Google Scholar.
131 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fo. 108: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 21 March 1773.
132 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 161-6: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon, 9 March 1773; cf. Barthé'lémy's account in Vé'ou, op. cit. 423; Hjelt, p. 176. Already in February Gustavus had told Goodricke that ‘the Ballance of Europe was in the hands of the King of Great Britain’: S.P. 95/123, fos. 49-50: Goodricke to Suffolk, 19 February 1773.
133 R.A. Kabinettet för utrikes brevväxlingen: U. Scheffer to Nolcken, 26 March 1773; A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fo. 185: Gustavus III to Louis XV, 17 March 1773: printed but misdated in Manderström, L., op. cit. 63Google Scholar.
134 S.P. 78/287, fo. 56: St Paul to Rochford, 17 February 1773.
135 Compare Mercy's comment (to Maria Theresa, 17 February 1773): ‘La France,… par des désordres aussi inouïs qu/inexcusables, s/est réduite pour le moment dans l/estat d/anéantissement où elle se trouve, n/ayant ni la volonté ni le pouvoir d/offrir à son allié des secours, des moyens pour barrer les vues ambitieuses des deux puissances formidable’ ( d/Arneth, A. and Geffroy, A., Marie Antoinette. Corretpondance secrète entre Marie-Thérète et le Cte de Merey-Argenteau (Paris, 1875), I, 420–1)Google Scholar.
136 The marginal minute on Martange's report of 29 March reads: ‘conversation avec M’ Rochford relativem au projet d/Alliance avec l/Ang (A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 501, fo. 241: Martange to d/Aiguillon, 29 March 1773)
137 Corretpondance secrète du Comte de Broglit avec Lauis XV, edd. Ozanam, D. and Antoine, M. (Paris, 1956–1961), 11, 386 n. 3Google Scholar; Correspondance inédite du Généal-Major de Martange (Paris, 1898), 508 ffGoogle Scholar
138 Corretpondtmce…de Broglie avec Louis XV, II, 384-5 n. 2.
139 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 501, foe. 320-1: d/Aiguillon to Guinea, no. 66, la April 1773; ibid. foe. 338-9: same to same, no. 67, 19 April 1773.
140 S.P. 78/287, fos. 166-7: Stonnont to Rochford, 4 April 1773; A.E. C.P. Suéde 263, foa. 216-27; Hjelt, pp. 184-90.
141 When de Broglie protested that a Toulon fleet would be useless to Sweden, Louis XV noted at the foot of his letter: ‘Dans la Baltique, si nous y paroissions, l/Angleterre y paraïtroit aussytost. Dans la Méditerranée, cela n/est pas si sûr mais pouroit être. Dans quelques jours nous en serons éclaircis’ (Corr. de Broglie avec Louis XV, 11, 386). Cf. the comment of Bonneville de Marsangy: ‘Une démonstration maritime, en faveur de la Suéde, ayant pour théatre la Méditerranée, devait paraître à tous…une conception aussi platonique qu/illusoire’ ( Marsangy, L. Bonneville de, Le Camie de Vergennes. Son ambassade en Suède (Paris, 1898), 377)Google Scholar.
142 A.E. C.P. Angletene, 501, fo. 309: Guinea to d/Aiguillon, no. 124, 9 April 1773.
143 S.P. 78/287, fos. 140-61: Stormont to Rochford, 31 March 1773.
144 S.P. 78/287, fos. 166-9: Stormont to Rochford, 4 April 1773.
145 Correspondence…de Martange, 508-16; Corr. of George III, II, 467-8.
146 As appears from ibid. 11, 476.
147 Corr. de Martange, 525: italics mine.
148 Ibid. 535-7. Rochford gave Martange a version of Stormont's despatch of 31 March heavily coloured to demonstrate that Stormont, like himself, was the friend of France. He told him, for example, that Stormont had argued strongly that it was unjust and unwise of England to prevent France from sending aid to Sweden; and added, ‘Imaginez-vous…qu/il a été jusqu'à mettre dans sa dépêche que la Grande Bretagne alloit se rendre la fable de l/Europe en armant en faveur de la Russie.’ This was quite untrue. All that Stormont had said was mat if we were going to be driven to fight on the same aide as Russia, we had better make sure of an alliance on decent terms beforehand.
149 Corr. de Martange, 506-7.
150 Ibid. 527-8.
151 Corr. of George III, II, 476: King to North, 25 April 1773.
152 A.E. C.P. Suéde 262, fo. 362 for d/Aiguillon's despatch; A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fo. 305: Guines to d/Aiguillon, II December 1772.
153 Though Guinea believed himself to hsve received a hint nearly to the same effect from Mansfield: A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fo. 339: Guines to d/Aiguillon, no. 114 (bis), 27 December 1772.
154 Corr. de Martange, 530-4. Dumouriez in his Mémoires has a story to the effect that since the device of delaying British mobilization was found on examination to be impracticable, Rochford and Martange agreed that French troops in French transports should be convoyed by a British naval escort, and Martange was to report this verbally in Paris. D/Aiguillon is said to have hesitated; meanwhile the plan leaked out and came to Dumouriez's knowledge; and Dumouriez, who had a grudge against d/Aiguillon, revealed it to Monteynard, who was properly indignant: the scheme thereupon dropped: Mémoires du Général Dumouriex (Paris, 1848), I, 154–5Google Scholar. The story was accepted by de Broglie, though he admitted there was no documentary evidence for it other than Dumouriez, and though he himself remarked that Dumouriez ‘ne paraît avoir eu ni une mémoire ndeleniun vif scrupule dela vérite’: Broglie, de, Le Secret du Roi (Paris, 1878), II, 417 ff. and 422 n. I. It cannot, however, be true; for it would have required the consent of tile whole Cabinet, and would have disastrously compromised the ministry in the eyes of the public. But it may well be that d/Aiguillon played with the notion on his own account: in his interview with Stormont on 31 March he threw out the suggestion, as if in jest, but dropped it at once when it met with no response: S.P. 78/287, fo. 155: Stormont to Rochford, 31 March 1773Google Scholar.
155 S.P. 78/287, fo. 137: Rochford to Stormont, a April 1773. It is true that both Rochford and the king professed themselves sceptical of this, but on Rochford at least the story seems to have made some impression (Ibid. loc. cit.); Corr, de Martange, 521.
156 S.P. 91/86, fo. 44: Cathcart to Rochford, 19 October 1770: cf. ibid. 85, fos. 59-73; Rochford to Cathcart, as August 1770.
157 Corr. de Martange, 537.
158 S.P. 78/287, fos. 170-6: Rochford to Stormont, 7 April 1773.
159 Add. MS. 9242. fo. 154.
160 Corr. de Martange, 528.
161 Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 434: it is possible, however, that the reference to ‘un homme de confiance du due d/Aiguillon’ applied not to Martange, but to Gamier or Bourdieu: the letter is dated 30 March, which would imply very prompt intelligence if Martange was intended.
162 Tegnér, V, 175, 176 n. I.
163 Add. MS. 33258 fo. 433: lacunae supplied from A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fos. 305 ff.: Guinea to d/Aiguillon, II December 1772.
165 S.P. 78/287, fo. 189: Stonnont to Rochford. 7 April 1773.
166 S.P. 78/287, fos. 203-15: Stonnont to Rochford, 10 April 1773.
167 Correspondence de Broglie avec Louis XV, II, 384-5 n. 2.
168 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 501, fo. 338: d/Aiguillon to Guines, no. 67, 19 April 1773; S.P. 78/288, fos. 59-60: Guines to Rochford, 26 April 1773; Correspondance de Broglie avec Louis XV II, 396 n. 3; Fraguier, p. 622. As early as II April, Stornmont received the impression that d/Aiguillon was ‘looking for a proper way of getting off’: S.P. 78/387, fos. a 16-19: Stonnont to Rochford, II April 1773.
169 S.P. 78/287, fos. 201, 216-19; 288, fos. 21-5: Stormont to Rochford, 7, II, 14 April; 287, fos. 228-30: Suffolk to Stormont, 16 April 1773; Corr. of George III, II, 472-3; Suffolk to King, 14 April 1773.
170 Corr. of George III, II, 474; S.P. 78/288, fos. 26-7: the Toulon fleet was of twelve ships of die line and six frigates.
171 S.P. 91/92, fo. 156: Suffolk to Gunning, Circular, 23 April 1773. Guinea thought die delay of two days in the announcement indicated that the British Government was deliberately dragging its feet (A.E. C.P. Angletêrre, 501, fos. 362-4: Guines to d/Aiguillon, no. 128, 23 April 1773).
172 Corr. of George III, II, 476.
173 S.P. 78/288, fos. 59-60: Guines to Rochford, 26 April 1773.
174 S.P. 78/288, fo. 65: Rochford to Stormont, 27 April 1773; Corr. of George III, II, 478-9.
175 Add. MS. 36800, fo. 3: Rochford to Cooke, 27 April 1773; S.P. 78/288, fos. 104-5: Guinea to Rochford, 5 May 1773; ibid. fos. 130-43: Rochford to Stormont, 12 May 1773; ibid. fos. 165-8: Stormont to Rochford, 18 May 1773; ibid. few. 160-70: Rochford to Stormont, 21 May 1773; Corr. of George III, II, 488. It is interesting to note that d/Aiguillon/a despatch to Guinea announcing the suspension of the armament stated that d/Aiguillon had told Stormont that he had taken thia decision in order to contribute to the establishment of good relations between the two countries, and to’ prevenir tout ce qui pourroit…occasionner des mouvemens en Angleterre embarrassants pour son Ministere'. D/Aiguillon gave Stormont a copy of this despatch on 30 April, and Stormont in a note of i May explicitly denied that d/Aiguillon had ever adduced this last motive to him. It seems likely, then, that d/Aiguillon got the idea from Martangc, and was now confusing his public with his secret negotiations: see S.P. 78/288, fos. 86-95 = Stormont to Rochford, 30 April/I May 1773.
176 Guinea himself had wondered too: A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 501, fo. 340: Guinea to d/Aiguillon, no. 126, 19 April 1773. For the alarm about Spain see Add. MS. 24159. fo. 39: Suffolk to Grantham, 12 April 1773; S.P. 78/288, fos. 120-35: Stormont to Rochford, 5 May I773i enclosing copy of Grantham to Stormont, 27 April; Add. MS. 0242, fo. 196: Rochford to Grantham, 28 May 1773; S.P. 78/288, fos. 206-9: Stormont to Rochford, 2 June 1773.
177 ‘Well imagined and fortunately executed’, was Conway's verdict: Add. MS. 35505, fo. 336.
178 Corr. of George III, II,494, 508-9; S.P. 78/289, fo. 20: Rochford to Stormont, 18 June 1773. Stormont/a sceptical reply, 23 June, ibid. fo. 38.
179 S.P. 78/289, fo. 45: Rochford to Grantham and St Paul, a6 July 1773.
180 Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 48: Suffolk to Gunning, n June 1773 (referring to an earlier viut which the two secretaries had made to the fleet before its disarmament).
181 Cf. Favier's view, in his Conjectures raisonnées: Boutaric, I, 481; II, 33, 32.
182 He was the brother of the Gustaf Adam von Nolcken who wat minister in London.
183 R.A. Muscovitica. Baron F. von Nolckens Depescher. Nolcken to K.P., 15/26 March 1773
184 R.A. Muscovitica, Ribbing to K.P., 28 March/8 April 1773.
185 Gustavus must have interpreted Nolcken's despatches a good deal more optimistically than a dispassionate reading of them would seem to warrant: RA. Muscovitica, Nolcken to K.P., 8/19, 15/26, 19/30 March 1773. The initial step towards a dttentt probably came from Vergennes, who on 18 March pressed Scheffer to give a formal déteti to rumours that France was urging Sweden to attack: R.A. Scheffenka Ssrulingen. Skrivelser till Ulrik Scheffer: Vergennes to Scheffer, 18 March 1773.
186 S.P. 91/93. fos. 10-12: Gunning to Suffolk, 10 April 1773; cf. S.P. 95/123, fos. 111-13: Goodricke to Suffolk, 27 April 1773.
187 S.P. 78/287, fos. 203-15: Stormont to Rochford, 10 April 1773.
188 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 262, fos. 283-5.
189 Add. MS. 35505, fo. 303: Suffolk to Keith, n June 1773: ‘The Court of France continues perfectly quiet, and is satisfied with die Russian declaration; on which the French Minister plumes himself highly; having, in defiance of stubborn facts and inconsistent dates, placed it to the account of the Toulon preparations’: Fraguier, p. 626; Mareangy, Bonneville de, Le Comte de Vergennes, 381Google Scholar; Bourgeois, E., Manuel historique de politique étrangère (Paris, 1928), I, 443Google Scholar; G. Zeller, Histoire da Relations internationales, III. Let tempt modernet, II, 303.
190 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fo. 299: Gustavus III to Creutz (copy), 14 May 1773. The Danish ministers, with equal tact, attributed the preservation of the peace to the British armament (Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 118: Woodford to Gunning, 9 May 1773). They may even have believed it, for A. P. Bemstorff conveyed congratulations in cypher, as well as en clair (D.R.A. Ges.-Arkiver, England I: Bemrtorff to Diede, 8 May 1773).
191 Wolfgang Michael was too charitable when he wrote ‘In London hatte dieses Mai die Entscheidung Über Krieg und Frieden Europas gelegen, durch die feste Haltung des britischen Kabinetts war der Friede erhalten worden’ ( Michael, W., Englands Stellung xur ersten Teilung Polens (Hamburg, 1890), 77)Google Scholar.
192 S.P. 91/93, fos. 10-12: Gunning to Suffolk, 10 April 1773; RJV. Muscovitica, Ribbing to K.P., 8/19 March, 13/24 March 1773.
193 Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 161, 461, 500; cf. Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 62: Sir J. Yorke to Gunning, 15 March 1773; S.P. 78/286, fo. 152: St Paul to Rochford, 4 November 1772.
194 See the account in Horn, D. B., British Public Opinion and the First Partition of Poland (Edinburgh, 1945). 20-3, 47–64Google Scholar; and cf. The Letters of Horace Walpole, VIII, 258 (to W. Mason, 27 March 1773).
195 Correspondence secrète de Broglie avec Louis XV, II, 396; and cf. Favier's remarks in Boutaric, 11, 177 and n. 3.
196 Egerton MS. 2702, fo. 54: Suffolk to Gunning, Private, 9 March 1773.
197 S.P. 78/288, fo. 159: Birkbeck to Rochford, 3 May 1773.
198 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to Gustavus III, 16, 23, 27 April 1773. Suffolk, too, took care to instruct Gunning to profess ignorance of the orders given to the fleet, and of its destination: S.P. 91/92, fos. 158-9: Suffolk to Gunning, Confidential, 23 April 1773. Guinea (C.P. Angleterre, 501, fo. 385, 29 April 1773) confirms Rochford's story. But Rochford also successfully persuaded Diede (after the crisis was over) that the rumours to this effect had never had any foundation: D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A. England II: Diede to Schack-Rathlou, 7 May 1773.
199 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 5 and 9 March 1773; A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fos. 279-82: Vergennes to d/Aiguillon. Draft. Private. 24 April 1773.
200 A.E. C.P. Suéde, 263, fo. 296: d/Aiguillon to Vergennes, 13 May 1773.
201 Pol. Corr. XXXIII, 551: to Goltz, 24 May 1773: ‘…je ne vous dissimulerai point que j/ai tout lieu d'être surpris de la fermeté du Lord Stormont…. Je le connais de longue main, et jamaia je lui en aurais suppose une austi forte doae pour parier avec autant de hauteur et, en même temps, de dignité a un ministère étranger.’
202 Correspondance secrète de Broglie avec Louit XV, II, 395, 404; Boutaric, i, 448; II, 177: Broglie, , Le Secret du Roi, II, 438Google Scholar: Guibert to Dumouriez, [May] 1773: ‘J/ai vu maintenant lea troia grandea puiaaancea qui balancent lea destinees de l/Europe. Nous, nous sommea morta. Mande-moi si le nom français eat une parure là où tu es; je n/ai pas encore trouvé à m/en vanter depuis que je voyage.’ Cf. Mercy-Kaunits Corr. II, 419, and Saint-Priest, Comte de, Mémoiret (Paris, 1929), I, 144–5Google Scholar.
203 Corr. of George III, II, 470; R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 4 May 1773.
204 S.P. 78/288, fos. lai-a; Sandwich Papers, I, 35; Add. MS. 35505. fo. 187: R. Bradahaw to Keith, 23 April 1773; ibid. fo. 239: W. Eden to Keith, 7 May 1773; Corretpondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (1839), IV, 261 n. I: Mrs Alexander Hood to Lady Chatham, 25 April: ‘Upon its being said, that our equipment would be only a fleet of observation, Sir Charles said, “If I sail, it will be a war.”’
205 Add. MS. 35505, fos. 205-6: Stormont to Keith. 24 April 1773; Add. MS. 35370, fos. 46-7: Sir ]. Yorke to Hardwicke, 28 August 1772.
206 Thus de Visme wrote to Gunning, 5 January 1772: ‘I cannot but consider it as a great misfortune for a publick minister, that we have no particular connection or alliance with any one Power in Europe except Russia, so that we cannot concert measures with any other minister, and compare intelligence, and discuss the news and business of the day so as to receive mutual helps and lights from each other’ (Egerton MS. 2701, fo. 7).
207 Add. MS. 35370, fo. 86: to Hardwicke, 12 January 1773.
208 Ibid. fo. 105: to Hardwicke, 9 March 1773.
209 R.A. Anglica, Nolcken to K.P. Apostille, 19 June 1772.
210 Sandwich Papers, I, 29: Sandwich to Rochford, 15 November 1772; cf. a similar sentiment in The Annual Register, 1772, p. 3.
211 D.R.A. Dept. f.u.A., England II: Diede to Osten, 15 September 1772; cf. same to same, 19 January 1773.
212 S.P. 91/88, fo. 109:Cathcart to Suffolk. Most Secret. 20/31 August 1771. Among other home truths, he wrote ‘…that the fearing a War with France prevented her [England] holding at Paris a language which, without a War would have prevented the loss of Corsica;- and that the same policy, and a desire of having friends everywhere, and enemies nowhere, occasioned England to hold a middle conduct, in many other instances, expensive and disadvantageous for herself, ineffective for her friends and the common cause, and highly convenient for her enemies’. And The Annual Register for 1771 admitted (p. 12) that ‘Our unhappy intestine divisions, which had gradually spread into almost every part of the British Empire, had so filled the hands, and engaged the thoughts of government, that little attention either had, or could for some time past have been given to our foreign interests.’
213 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 5 March 1773. This long despatch contains an exceptionally shrewd analysis of British policy.
214 Add. MS. 35505, fo. 239: W. Eden to Keith, 7 May 1773.
215 Annual Register, 1771, p. 6.
216 Compare George Ill's comment on Dunkirk: ‘You may think me prolix, but it is from not desiring that the heat of a Boy may throw me so much off my guard as to draw this country into another addition of 50 millions to the National Debt; we must get the Colonies into order before we engage with our Neighbours’: Corr. of George III, II, 372: to North, I August 1772. And perhaps there was something to be said for the view of Sabathier de Cabres, who considered that ‘Le plus grand bien en Politique, c/est d'étre cms moins que nous sommes; de faire couver pour ainsi dire sous la cendre un pouvoir réel qui ne sort que pour s'affermir et qui étonne en enlevant subitement par son éclat et par ses actes lea moyens de lui mettre un frein’ ( Cabres, Sabathier de, Catherine II, sa Com et la Rustic (Berlin, 1862), 09)Google Scholar.
217 On 30 July 1733, Horatio Walpole had written to Baron Gedda: ‘Si nous marquons du diplaiair de voir l/Europe en danger d/une guerre générale, à l/occasion d/une dispute qui intéresse si peu l'équilibre de cette partie du monde, et de l/empressement à maintenir la paix et à prévenir une rupture, il [Chavigny] va aussitôt représenter à ceux qui le veulent bien écouter lea bonnes intentions du Roy et de ses ministres comme l/effet de leur faiblesse et de leur timidité, ae trouvant dans l/incapacite de remplir leurs engagemens; d/ou il infere qu/il n/y a rien a craindre de l/Angleterre ni de la Hollande dans I/abaissement où elles sont présentement’ (quoted in Plumb, J. H., Sir Robert Walpole, II, 286–7)Google Scholar.
218 S.P. 91/93, fos. 102-6, 191: Gunning to Suffolk, 4 June, 3 August 1773, for Gunning's remarkable conversations with Catherine. Suffolk replied: ‘I will frankly own to you, that I feel so much indignation at the style the Court of Petersburg has behaved in, towards this country, that I am exceedingly less concerned for the Impediments that obstruct the Alliance, than I once thought I should ever have been A subsidy to Denmark can never make the foundation of a treaty with Russia. A guaranty of the usurpations in Poland can never compose a part of it. Nor will His Majesty, contrary to established usage, admit the Turkish clause’ (Ibid. fo. 195: Suffolk to Gunning, 27 August 1773).
219 The partition, wrote The Annual Register for 1772 (p. 2), ‘is to be considered as the first very great breach in the modern political system of Europe’.
220 A.E. C.P. Angleterre, 500, fo. 141: Gamier to d/Aiguillon, no. too, 25 September 1772.
221 Ibid. fo. 340: Guinea to d/Aiguillon, no. 114 (bit), 27 December 1772.
222 Henry, Prince, for instance, ‘saw the confusion in Europe as a chance for Prussia to profit-perhaps even to divide up the Germanics between Austria and Prussia’ (Kaplan, Herbert H., The First Partition of Poland (New York, 1962), 131)Google Scholar.
223 As Ribbing, for instance, repeatedly advised his government: see, for example, his remarkably forceful statement in R.A. Musoovitica: Ribbing to K.P., 21 December/1 January 1772/3, Apostille.
224 R.A. Anglica: Nolcken to K.P., 4 May 1773. Compare Burke/a view: The Corret-pondenee of Edmund Burke (Cambridge, 1960), II, 429Google Scholar.
225 Chatham Papers, IV, 298-9: Chatham to Shelburne, 20 October 1773.
226 See in particular hit private letter to Stormont of 12 May 1773: Add. MS. 9242, fo. 174.
227 Rain, Pierre, La diplomatie française d/Henri IV a Vergennes (1945), 252–3Google Scholar.
228 Ibid. p. 323.
229 See Vergennet/a memoir of 8 December 1774, quoted in Salomon, R., La Politique Orientale de Vergennes (1935), 30–1Google Scholar.
230 Rain, p. 286.
231 R.A. Anglica. Svenska beskickningar till Nolckcn. Upplösta chifferbrev (vol. 438): Baric to Nolcken, 6 November 1772.
232 R.A. Kabinenet för utrikes brevväxlingen. Gustavus III to Nolcken, autog. draft, 14 May 1773.
233 Anderson, M. S., ‘The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-4’, The Slavonic and East European Review, XXXVII (1958–1959)Google Scholar; Salomon, pp. 355 ff.
234 On this episode see, most recently, Carlason, Signe, Sverige och Storbritannien, 1787-90 (Lund, 1944)Google Scholar.
235 Konetzke, R., Die Politik des Grafen Aranda (Berlin, 1939), 39Google Scholar.
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