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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), which came into being during Hitler's Blitzkrieg against Yugoslavia in April 1941, was nominally included in the Italian sphere of influence in the Balkans. It soon turned into an uneasy condominium, however, between its formal Italian mentors and the Germans. Italian influence was largely symbolic, while German officers, experts of all profiles, businessmen and officials were prominent in Zagreb from the outset. Mussolini was deeply mistrustful of German intentions, and suspected that Germany sought a leading role in Croatia in spite of Hitler's assurances to the contrary. Nevertheless, the Italians could not devise a strategy to bring their nominal Croatian protégés to heel.
While there is no evidence of a German ‘grand design’ to undermine Italy's aspìrations in the Balkans, it is certain that the Germans never intended to give up their leading role in the economic sphere. By early 1942 they secured control over all key natural resources of the NDH and most of its industrial capacity, often acting behind their Italian partners' backs in pursuit of their objectives.
Also in 1942 the Wehrmacht made a strong bid to bring Croatian armed forces under its command and control. While this caused some intra-German disputes, and was resisted by the foreign ministry, it proved ultimately successful due to the rise of insurgency which threatened strategic interests of the Axis. Again, Italian claims to precedence were disregarded.
The most serious dispute between Italy and Germany in the NDH concerned large joint antiinsurgency operations in the first half of 1943, and the Italians' refusal to give up their links with the Četniks. The breakdown of Italo-German military co-operation in the NDH reflected a deeper malaise of the intra-Axis relationship. It was founded upon different assumptions and objectives, but such differences remained unstated. The rivalry between Germany and Italy in Croatia vividly reflected this deeper schism between the ultimate objectives of Mussolini and his brutal Teutonic friend.
1 See Broszat, Martin, ‘Soziale Motivation und Fuehrerbindung’, in Viertejahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, IV (10 1970), 392–409Google Scholar.
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3 One such ‘sane’ view was advocated in ‘Vorschläge für eine neue deutsche Kapitalpolitik’, Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag (Berlin, 1940)Google Scholar.
4 Fertilio, Luka, ‘Poslanici NDH u Trećem Reichu’, in Hrvatska revija, XXV, 1 (03 1975), 50Google Scholar.
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6 The Goebbels diaries, 1942–43 (Garden City, NY, 1948), p. 357Google Scholar (entry for 8 May 1943).
7 Hitler, Adolf, Secret conversations, 1941–1944 (New York, 1953)Google Scholar, entries for: 13 Oct. 1941; 26 Feb. 1942; 13 May 1942; 29 June 1942.
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10 Orlow (1968), p. 101.
11 Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–45 (ADAP), D, XII, no. 526, p. 831. Confidential Croatian–German Economic Protocol, Zagreb, 16 May 1941.
12 For a statement of Italian economic ambitions see: National Archives, Washington, D.C.: Microfilm T-120, cont. 1095, frames 450134–137, 148–9, 155–6. A memorandum by the Italian Minister for Trade and Foreign Exchange Regulations, Ricardi, : ‘Der wirtschaftliche Wiederaufbau Europas’, 10 1940Google Scholar.
13 Hrvatski narod (‘Croatian People’, a daily newspaper, semi-official organ of the Pavelić regime), Zagreb, 17 and 24 June 1941.
14 For the proceedings see: Vrančić, Vjekoslav, Branili smo državu. Barcelona-Munich: Knjižnica Hrvatske Revije, 1985, II, 145–9Google Scholar.
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16 ADAP, E, 2, pp. 300–2. Kasche to the Foreign Ministry, 1 May 1942.
17 T-120, roll 208, No. 1894. Troll-Obergfell to the Foreign Ministry, 25 July 1942.
18 Krizman, Bogdan, Ustaše i Treči Reich (Zagreb, 1983), p. 357Google Scholar.
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20 Troll-Obergfell conveyed this to Berlin in another telegram later that day after talking to Lorković: T-120, roll 208, No. 1902 of 25 July 1942.
21 T-120, roll 208, No. 1948. Kasche to the Foreign Ministry, 31 July 1942.
22 T-120, roll 208, No. 2089. Kasche to the Foreign Ministry, 12 Aug. 1942.
23 T-501, roll 264. Glaise to Löhr, 11 Sept. 1942.
24 For a detailed account of the whole episode see: Odić, Slavko, Neostvareni planovi (Zagreb, 1961), pp. 245fGoogle Scholar; also Krizman (1983), pp. 375–88.
25 T-120, roll 1141, No. 2485/42. Helm to Himmler, Sarajevo 21 Sept. 1942.
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28 KAW (Kriegsarchiv Wien – Vienna War Archives), B/521, Nr. 1484. Löhr's personal letter to Diakow, no date.
29 T-501, roll 264. Glaise to Löhr, 11 Sept. 1942.
30 T-120, roll 208, No. 2623. Kasche to the Foreign Ministry, 19 Sept. 1942.
31 See: Kazimirović, Vasa, NDH u svetlu nemačkih dokumenata i dnemika Gleza fon Horstenau 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Nova knjiga – Narodna knjiga), p. 237Google Scholar.
32 T-501, roll 264, Glaise's note of 22 Sept. 1942. All see Krizman (1983), p. 403.
33 BA MAF (Federal Archives, Military Archives, Freiburg), RH 31/III/11. Foertsch to Glaise, 25 Aug. 1942.
34 ADAP, E, III, pp. 530–8. Schmidt's minutes of the conversation Hitler-Pavelić, 23 Sept. 1942.
35 T-120, roll 208, No. 2753. Kasche to Ribbentrop, 28 Sept. 1942.
36 ADAP, E, 4, pp. 1–8. Memorandum for the Führer, signed by Kasche, Glaise and Löhr, Zagreb, 1 Oct. 1942.
37 T-50I, roll 265, The Reich Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Ministry of the Independent State of Croatia, 12 Nov. 1942. On this note also see Krizman (1983), pp. 428–9.
38 ADAP, E, IV, 98. Minutes of Goering's talks in Rome, 23 Oct. 1942.
39 For the minutes (in Serbo-Croatian translation), see Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd: Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, XII/2, 840–5Google Scholar.
40 ADAP, E, 5, pp. 116–17. A note by the Trade Department of the Foreign Ministry for Ribbentrop on talks with Kosak, 18 Jan. 1943. For reaction in Zagreb see: T-77, roll 895. Glaise to the OKW, 24 Jan. 1943.
41 ADAP, E, 5, pp. 171–2. Kasche to the Foreign Ministry, 3 Feb. 1943. Kazimirović (1988) has the date of the meeting wrong: ‘3 Feb.’ was when Kasche sent his report; the meeting had taken place a day earlier.
42 Krizman (1983), pp. 491f.
43 VII-Zbornik, XII/2, pp. 961–5. Hitler's Instruction No. 47 of 28 Dec. 1942.
44 T-120, roll 212, no number. OKW to Ritter, 3 Jan. 1943.
45 ADAP, E, 5, pp. 19–20. Ritter to Kasche, 4 Jan. 1943.
48 T-120, roll 212, No. 98. Kasche to the Foreign Ministry, 7 Jan. 1943.
47 ADAP, E, 5, pp. 114–15. Kasche to Ribbentrop, 17 Jan. 1943.
48 The minutes of all four rounds of talks are in ADAP, E, 4, pp. 538–55, 562–4 and 582–5.
49 Kazimirović (1988), p. 153.
50 T-821, roll 21, frame 975. Comando Supremo, Argomenti militari speciali trattati nei colloqui presso il Quartiere Generale germanico nei giorni 18, 19 dicembre 1942. 19 Dec. 1942.
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53 VII-Zbornik, IV/9, No. 211. Roatta to V Corps Commander, 11 Jan. 1943.
54 BA MAF RH 31/III, 12. Löhr's handwritten letter to Glaise, 11 Jan. 1943.
55 Vll-Zbornik, IV/9, No. 218. Comando Supremo to Comando 2. Armata, 15 Jan. 1943.
56 Vll-Zbomik, IV/9, No. 217. Supersloda Operazioni to Comando Supremo, 12 Jan. 1943.
57 T-821, roll 298, frames 114–16. VI Army Corps to Division ‘Murge’, 22 Jan. 1943.
58 Das Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (KTB/OK W – War Diary, German High Command), III/5, entries for 25, 29 and 30 01 1943Google Scholar.
59 T-501, roll 264, frame 899. Glaise to Löhr, 28 Jan. 1943. Also: VII-Zbornik, IV/9, No. 235. Chief of German Liaison Staff to the Second Army Command, 27 Jan. 1943.
60 KTB/OKW, Vol. 3, 31 Jan. 1943.
61 Ibid. 7 Feb. 1943.
62 VII-Zbornik, IV/10, No. 197. Robotti's notes on the Belgrade meeting, 8 Feb. 1943.
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69 P.R.O., F.O. 371, R 8802/3700/22, minute from Eden to Churchill, 2 Dec. 1942.
70 ADAP, E, 5, pp. 314–21. Minutes of German-Italian talks in Rome.
71 For a record of Ribbentrop's conversation with Alfieri see ADAP, E, 5, pp. 321–3.
72 KTB/III, pp. 172–3.
73 ADAP, E, 5, No. 192. Mussolini's letter to Hitler, 9 Mar. 1943.
74 KTB/III, p. 255.
